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The world needs Chinese electrical equipment makers to power AI data centers

中文标题

全球需要中国电气设备制造商为AI数据中心供电

Multiple economies
Citable research brief

Core conclusion · Tlines extraction

Natixis argues that surging AI data center electricity demand, set to more than double globally from 415 TWh in 2024 to 945 TWh by 2030, will strain US, European and Japanese power infrastructure, where data centers could absorb 48%, 28% and 66% of incremental supply respectively. This opens a major opportunity for Chinese power equipment makers, whose share of global exports rose from 22% in 2017 to 33% in 2025, lifting overseas revenue, margins and capex.

Institution
Natixis
Published
10/12/2026
Research topic
Inflation · Semiconductors
Time horizon
2030 · 2024

Key arguments

  • Global AI data center electricity demand is projected to more than double from 415 TWh in 2024 to 945 TWh by 2030, with the US adding 240 TWh and China 175 TWh, together over 80% of the global increase.
  • New data centers could absorb 48% of US incremental power supply by 2030, 28% in Europe and 66% in Japan, crowding out other sectors and pushing up energy prices.
  • Chinese power equipment makers' global export share rose from 22% in 2017 to 33% in 2025, accelerating since 2021, boosting overseas revenue and profitability.
  • Renewed capex and improving ROIC suggest part of China's electrical equipment sector is already benefiting from the global AI power investment cycle.

Key numbers

Global data center power demand, 2024
415 TWh
Global data center power demand, 2030
945 TWh
US incremental data center power demand, 2024-2030
240 TWh
China incremental data center power demand, 2024-2030
175 TWh
China share of global power equipment exports, 2025
33% (up from 22% in 2017)

Main risks

  • If power generation construction does not accelerate, data centers could crowd out other sectors' energy needs, raising energy prices and feeding inflation.
  • Europe's lower 28% incremental supply absorption partly reflects moderate expected growth in compute capacity, which may not materialize.
  • Chinese manufacturers face potential export restrictions or geopolitical barriers in key end markets, and domestic disinflation continues to weigh on profitability.

Corresponding source evidence

  1. Assuming no acceleration in the construction of power generation, new data centers may absorb 48% of US ’s incremental power supply between now and 2030. · 2030
  2. Europe looks better, with 28% of the incremental power supply but this is explained by the very moderate increase in compute capacity, which is expected; Japan’s power constraint is relatively bigger with projected data centers eating up 66% of the expected additional power to be installed.
  3. The strong export performance is clearly shown in the increasing relevance of overseas revenue since 2024, which is likely to edge higher on the surging exports and underwhelming domestic demand. · 2024

Context: the conclusion is Tlines' automated extraction, not the institution's wording. Quoted evidence is publisher wording. Scope and date must travel with the conclusion.

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AI analysis

AI-generated from the report above · not a translation and not the institution's wording · verify against the official source

Cross-institution comparison · CPI

How this page was produced

Tlines extracted the conclusion, arguments, numbers and risks above from the report published by Natixis on 10/12/2026, then structured them for comparison. The publisher's own wording is reachable through the source link on this page and is displayed in full above. Last updated 10/17/2026. Methodology · Source policy · AI usage · Request a correction