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荷兰国际集团智库 · James Smith · 2026/09/04

THINK Ahead:为什么凯文·沃什对通胀的看法是错误的

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THINK Ahead:为什么凯文·沃什对通胀的看法是错误的

美联储主席在杰克逊霍尔会议上明确表示,潜在通胀并未改善。但这并不是数据告诉我们的情况,詹姆斯·史密斯写道。加息可能即将到来,但理由远非令人信服。请阅读我们为您带来的未来一周指南。

为什么凯文·沃什对通胀的看法是错误的

现在对于凯文·沃什对美国通胀的看法,几乎不存在什么疑问。

他上周在杰克逊霍尔演讲中的每一个字都透露出偏鹰派的立场。核心信息是,他是一个注重大局的人。而他认为,通胀的大局根本没有任何好转。但事实真的是这样吗?

看看这张图,这是沃什演讲的核心内容:

超过50%的价格类别通胀率高于3%

这张图展示了美联储首选通胀指标——核心PCE物价指数中约200个类别通胀率的分布情况。其中超过一半的类别目前通胀率高于3%,四分之一类别的通胀率高于5%。

这听起来令人担忧。但我对此有些异议。

我最主要的不满在于,它刻意忽略了权重。医疗服务约占通胀篮子中的4%,却被当作与城际巴士同等重要,而城际巴士仅占约0.006%。很多问题取决于统计学家决定如何细分不同的定价类别。

此外,当你对其进行分解时,你会发现,在价格涨幅分布令人担忧的变化中,几乎全部来自商品价格。其中许多商品在整体篮子中的权重较小。更重要的是,这表明关税是导致沃什那份令人不安的图表的主要元凶。

关税在很大程度上解释了沃什令人不安的图表

但关税的影响正在迅速变化。此前最高法院裁定特朗普总统的紧急关税计划大部分无效,此后关税退款已超过美国财政部征收的关税收入。仅7月份,退款金额就约占美国总进口额的10%。

并非所有这些节省都会转嫁给消费者。但趋势是明确的。关税不太可能长期成为通胀压力的来源。沃什的图表应该会开始走低。

这些并不意味着通胀担忧可以完全忽视。服务业中通胀率高于3%的类别占比仍远高于疫情前的常态,而且进展甚微。

但这里也存在问题。衡量服务业通胀实际上相当困难——大约五分之一的服务业价格根本没有被衡量,而是通过“推算”得出的——统计学家必须找到代理指标。金融服务占了其中的大部分。

我提到这一点是因为有影响力的美联储理事克里斯托弗·沃勒本周表示,他完全忽略这些推算价格。它们并不能真实反映家庭面临的通胀率。剔除这些后,所谓的市场基础核心通胀目前比核心PCE整体数据3.3%低约0.3个百分点。仅7月份,月度价格涨幅中大约一半来自这些推算类别。这并非无关紧要。

截尾均值通胀看起来要好得多,好得多

那么,如果沃什衡量通胀的指标有缺陷,我们应该看什么呢?

一个选择是看“截尾均值”通胀。这一指标会剔除任何特定时期通胀率最高和最低的类别,从而削减我之前图表中展示的一些噪音。我们知道沃什本人最近对这一指标也有所青睐。

而且这很惊人。截尾均值通胀已降至2026,目前相当接近美联储2%的目标,这与大多数其他指标所显示的情况形成鲜明对比。同样,我怀疑这在一定程度上归因于关税。

现在,为了不再让您感到乏味,我要说明这一通胀指标也并非没有问题。因此,或许我们不应试图过于精明——而应直接关注总体指标所传达的信息。

在这方面,仍有乐观空间。核心PCE通胀的六个月年化率(能较好反映潜在趋势)在经历了今年夏天的两次较低读数后已开始回落。按三个月计算,消息甚至更好。如果你再看替代性的CPI通胀指标,情况就更好了。

通胀的潜在趋势正在改善

这正是沃勒本周提出的观点;他认为除非再次出现较高读数,否则他将投票支持本月“按兵不动”。

此外,今年早些时候六个月指标出现的一些回升可能只是源于季节性调整不当。

自2023,以来,核心PCE通胀在上半年的表现一直高于下半年,尤其在1月和2月。今年走势也大致相似——特别是在第一季度。

这本不应发生,但确实如此。而这预示着下半年通胀读数将较为温和,应会进一步拉低六个月均值。

核心PCE通胀上半年强于下半年

这里要传达的简单信息是,通胀背景并没有上周沃什所说的那么糟糕。而沃勒的观点感觉更符合最新数据。

这还没有论及我的同事詹姆斯·奈特利指出的其他一系列因素,这些因素令他对通胀相对乐观。想想租金增长的放缓。还有温和的薪资背景。

我们不要天真。沃什不太可能发表如此鹰派的言论却又不投票支持加息。现在这是我们目前的看法,除非数据出现真正疯狂的变化。今日强劲的就业数据表明这种情况不太可能发生。

但仅仅因为近期通胀数据就加息的理由远非明确。这与我上周对欧元区得出的结论相同。这也是为什么詹姆斯·奈特利认为美联储加息可能只会是一次性行动。

如果你仍意犹未尽,欢迎参加我们下周三的网络研讨会,我和詹姆斯·奈特利等人将讨论本月所有重要的央行会议。今天就报名吧!

发达市场展望

  • 9月联邦公开市场委员会会议的结果仍然悬而未决。在凯文·沃什在杰克逊霍尔研讨会上的演讲之后,鉴于评论的基调——在充分就业环境下聚焦通胀,且金融状况不被视为紧缩——我们改变了看法,认为加息的可能性大于不加息。鉴于美联储内部几乎没有人公开反对加息,且财政部长斯科特·贝森特甚至总统特朗普似乎都支持加息,我们将其定性为一种风险管理举措,类似于格林斯潘领导的美联储在30年前于1996年采取的行动。
  • 8月通胀数据(周五):对结果至关重要的是将于周五(11月11日)公布的8月通胀数据。鉴于能源成本的变化,整体通胀率将表现强劲。我们预计环比将上涨0.4%%,但核心通胀率应更为温和,环比上涨0.2%%。考虑到中东持续问题导致的能源价格进一步上涨,整体通胀数据走高,加上货运费用和机票价格可能进一步传导至核心通胀,我们预计这足以促使美联储采取预防性加息。
  • 欧洲央行利率决议(周四):下周欧洲央行会议再次加息的可能性越来越大。不仅因为一些欧洲央行成员已在7月会议上主张加息,还因为自那以来,欧元区经济对中东战争表现出了几乎出人意料的韧性。与此同时,整体通胀继续走高,并预计在今年剩余时间内同比保持在3%%以上,即使核心通胀和服务业通胀等其他通胀指标目前没有理由引发恐慌。欧洲央行是否会在9月加息之后继续加息,则是另一个问题。阅读我们的完整预览
完整英文原文

The Fed Chair made it clear at Jackson Hole that underlying inflation is not improving. But this is simply not what the data is telling us, writes James Smith. A rate hike may be coming, but the case is far from compelling. Read on for our guide to the week ahead

Why Kevin Warsh is wrong about inflation

There can now be little doubt about Kevin Warsh's views on US inflation.

Every syllable of his Jackson Hole speech last week was hawkish. The core message was that he’s a big-picture guy. And the big picture on inflation, he argued, simply isn’t getting any better. But is that really true?

Take this chart, the centrepiece of Warsh’s speech:

More than 50% of price categories have inflation rates above 3%

This shows the distribution of inflation rates across roughly 200 categories within the Fed's preferred inflation gauge, the core PCE deflator. More than half of those categories are currently experiencing inflation above 3%. A quarter are running above 5%.

That sounds alarming. Yet I have some problems with all of this.

My main bugbear is that it purposefully avoids weights. Doctors' services, which account for roughly 4% of the inflation basket, are treated with exactly the same importance as intercity buses, which account for around 0.006%. A lot simply depends on how granular the statisticians have decided to report different pricing categories.

What’s more, when you break it all down, you find that goods prices account for virtually all of the worrying shift in the distribution of price increases. Many of these goods have small weights in the overall basket. And more importantly, it suggests tariffs are the main culprit behind Warsh’s scary chart.

Tariffs explain a lot of Warsh's scary chart

But the impact of tariffs is changing rapidly. Following the Supreme Court's ruling against large parts of President Trump's emergency tariff programme earlier this year, tariff refunds now exceed tariff revenues collected by the US Treasury. In July alone, refunds amounted to roughly 10% of the value of total US imports.

Not all of these savings will be passed on to consumers. But the direction of travel is clear. Tariffs are unlikely to be a source of inflationary pressure for much longer. Warsh’s chart should start trending lower.

None of this means inflation concerns should be dismissed altogether. The share of service sector categories running above 3% inflation remains well above pre-pandemic norms and has shown remarkably little progress.

But here too, there are issues. It’s actually quite difficult to measure services inflation – and around a fifth of the services prices aren’t measured at all. They’re “imputed” – the statisticians have to find a proxy. Financial services account for most of this.

I bring this up because influential Fed Governor Chris Waller said this week that he ignores these imputed prices completely. They don’t tell us much about the true inflation rate facing households. Strip them out and so-called market-based core inflation currently runs roughly 0.3 percentage points below the headline core PCE figure of 3.3%. In July alone, roughly half of the month-on-month increase in prices was down to these imputed categories. That’s not exactly trivial.

Trimmed mean inflation looks much, much better

So if Warsh’s measure of inflation is flawed, what should we look at?

One option is to look at “trimmed mean” inflation. This strips out the categories with the highest and lowest inflation rates at any given time, cutting out some of the noise in the charts I shared earlier. We know Warsh himself has warmed to this indicator recently.

And it’s striking. Trimmed mean inflation has fallen in 2026 and now sits pretty close to the Fed’s 2% target, in sharp contrast to what most other measures are telling us. Again, I suspect some of this is down to tariffs.

Now without boring you even further into submission, this isn’t a problem-free measure of inflation either. So maybe we shouldn’t try to get too clever – and simply look at what the headline metrics are telling us.

Here, there is room for optimism. The six-month annualised rate of core PCE inflation, a decent sense of the underlying trend, has started to turn lower after two cooler prints this summer. On a three-month basis, the news is even better. And it's even better still if you look at the alternative CPI measure of inflation.

The underlying trend of inflation is improving

This was the point Waller made this week; he argued that barring another hot reading, he’d be voting for a ‘hold’ this month.

What’s more, some of the pick-up in that six-month metric earlier this year might simply be down to dodgy seasonal adjustment.

Ever since 2023, core PCE inflation has been higher in the first six months of the year than the second, and especially across January and February. This year has followed a broadly similar pattern – particularly in the first quarter.

This shouldn’t be happening, but it is. And it points to cooler inflation readings in the second half of the year which should drag down that six-month average even further.

Core PCE inflation has been stronger in the first half of the year than the second

The simple message here is that the inflation backdrop is not as bad as Warsh made out last week. And Waller’s view feels more in tune with the latest data.

This is without talking about the range of other factors my colleague, James Knightley, points to as reasons for relative optimism on inflation. Think about declining rental growth. And a muted wage backdrop.

Let us not be naïve. It is unlikely Warsh would come out with such a hawkish mantra and not vote to hike interest rates. That is now our view, unless something really crazy happens in the data. Today’s bumper payroll data suggests that’s unlikely.

But the case for raising rates simply because of recent inflation data is far from clear-cut. It’s the same conclusion I reached for the eurozone last week. And it’s why James Knightley thinks a Fed rate hike might end up as a one-and-done.

If you're still hungry for more, tune into our webinar next Wednesday where James Knightley and I, among others, will be talking about all the big central bank meetings this month. Sign up today!

THINK Ahead in developed markets

  • The outcome of the September FOMC meeting remains in the balance. In the wake of Kevin Warsh’s Jackson Hole Symposium address, we changed our view to a rate hike being more likely than not given the tone of comments – the focus on inflation in an environment of full employment and where financial conditions are not regarded as tight. With few on the Fed openly hostile to a hike and with Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and even President Trump seemingly on board, we characterised it as a risk management move, similar to that enacted by Alan Greenspan’s Fed 30 years ago in 1996.
  • Aug Inflation (Fri): Critical to the outcome will be the August inflation print, published on Friday 11 September. Headline inflation is going to be hot given the moves in energy costs. We look for a 0.4%MoM outcome, but the core measure should be a more modest 0.2%MoM. That elevated headline number, coupled with further rises in energy prices due to ongoing issues surrounding the Middle East, runs the risk of some further pass through into core inflation via freight charges and airline fares. We expect this to be enough to nudge the Fed into a precautionary hike.
  • ECB rate decision (Thu): The stage looks increasingly set for another rate hike at next week's European Central Bank meeting. Not only because some ECB members already advocated for a rate hike at the July meeting, but also because, since then, the eurozone economy has shown an almost unexpected resilience to the war in the Middle East. At the same time, headline inflation has continued to edge higher and looks set to stay above 3% year-on-year for the remainder of the year, even if other inflation measures like core and services currently provide no reason to panic. Whether the ECB will really go beyond a September rate hike is a completely different story. Read our full preview
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AI 分析
由 AI 依据上文研报生成 · 非原文直译、非机构原话 · 重要判断请核对官网原文
关键论点
  • 沃什的通胀图表具有误导性,因为它对所有类别一视同仁,未考虑其在篮子中的权重。
  • 商品价格(许多权重较小)几乎占了所有令人担忧的涨幅,表明关税是主要元凶。
  • 关税退税现已超过关税收入,表明关税不太可能长期推升通胀。
  • 市场基础核心通胀比标题核心PCE低约0.3个百分点,估算价格扭曲了数据。
  • 修剪均值通胀接近美联储2%的目标,与其他指标形成鲜明对比。
  • 夏季数据较冷后,六个月年化核心PCE已回落,季节性调整问题表明可能进一步下降。
  • 租金增长下降和工资温和为通胀乐观提供支持。
  • 尽管数据如此,由于沃什的鹰派言论和充分就业,加息可能性大,但可能是一次性的。
风险
  • 如果8月CPI数据火热,美联储可能加息不止一次。
  • 服务业通胀仍高于疫情前水平,可能具有粘性。
  • 中东冲突导致的能源价格冲击可能通过运费和机票价格传导至核心通胀。
  • 如果关税退税未完全传递给消费者,通胀下降可能更慢。
  • 季节性调整问题可能持续,掩盖潜在趋势。