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法国外贸银行 · Trinh NGUYEN · 2026/09/04

便宜还是刻意便宜?量化亚洲货币的深度错位

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便宜还是刻意便宜?量化亚洲货币的深度错位

营销通讯:本文件为营销展示。其编制未遵循旨在促进投资研究独立性的法律要求;亦不受制于任何禁止在投资研究传播前进行交易的禁令。研究 C1 - 公共 Natixis 4 九月 2026 亚洲宏观洞察 便宜还是刻意便宜?量化亚洲货币的深度错位 制造业繁荣和AI硬件需求提振了亚洲贸易和经常账户盈余(CAS)。这应会加强本币汇率,但东亚实际有效汇率(REER)自 40% 年以来按加权平均计算已下跌 2000。以中国为例:从 2010 年到 2025, 年,其人均GDP从 USD 4,630 升至 USD 13,866,,其净国际投资头寸(IIP)从 GDP 的 15.2%% 增至 20.1%%(超过 USD 4 万亿),然而人民币兑美元汇率至今仍持平于 6.72。相反,经常账户赤字(CAD)经济体如印尼、印度和菲律宾,其汇率随赤字恶化而变动。为评估这些错位,我们应用两个估值模型来量化亚洲外汇的公允价值。第一个是均值回归的购买力平价(PPP)模型,衡量实际有效汇率相对于其二十年平均水平的偏离。该模型显示,日元(JPY)是区域中低估最严重的货币,长期均值下方 26%。韩元(KRW)以低估 14% 位列第二,不过自 8 月以来兑美元升值 6.4%% 已收窄此差距。印尼盾(IDR)和印度卢比(INR)分别低估 12%% 和 9%%,而澳元(AUD)则高估 8%%。行为均衡汇率(BEER)模型通过将实际汇率与宏观经济基本面(人均GDP、净国外资产(NFA)和贸易条件(ToT))进行回归来细化这一分析。过去十年,新兴亚洲引领人均GDP增长,而新加坡、台湾、日本和韩国保持了相对于GDP最大的NFA规模。即使计入这些财富动态以及韩国因AI硬件出口改善的贸易条件,BEER模型仍确认韩元、印尼盾、印度卢比和日元深度低估,而澳元似乎严重高估。最终,国内政策往往使汇率与这些强劲基本面脱钩。日元的低估主要是日本央行刻意维持低利率政策的结果,并可能因加息、结构性套利交易平仓以及国内养老基金重新配置而面临修正。近期日本央行、韩国央行和美国财政部的干预表明,宏观经济失衡存在修正压力。韩元自 7 月以来兑美元快速升值 14.5%%,凸显了这些错位可能被迅速修正的程度。撰写人 Trinh NGUYEN 电话 +852 3900 8726 trinh.nguyen@natixis.com Dayeon HONG 电话 +852 3900 8540 dayeon.hong@natixis.com Haoxin MU 电话 +852 3900 8067 haoxin.mu@natixis.com 贡献:Jeremy JI jeremy.ji-ext@natixis.com 了解更多我们的研究… … 在 research.natixis.com

亚洲宏观洞察 2 亚洲经常账户盈余加速而汇率依然疲软。亚洲制造业出口正在推动全球出口,尤其是在人工智能资本开支持续飙升的时代,这加大了对亚洲硬件出口的需求。贸易顺差上升,推动经济增长、人均GDP和经常账户盈余(CAS)上升。这种储蓄积累本应意味着经常账户盈余经济体的货币更为强势。但除新加坡和马来西亚,以及程度较轻的泰国和台湾地区外,东亚经济体如中国、韩国和日本的货币依然疲软。当我们考虑实际有效汇率(REER)时尤为如此,实际有效汇率是在名义有效汇率基础上对各经济体相对全球的通胀差异进行调整后的指标(图表1和2)。以中国为例:人均GDP从2010年的4,630美元升至2025,年的13,866美元,但汇率如今仍大致维持在6.72兑1美元的水平,即使经过整整一年的升值。过去十年,其经常账户盈余只增不减,净国际投资头寸(IIP)从GDP的15.2%%升至20.1%%,即从2011年的1.5万亿美元升至4万亿美元。而中国并非唯一出现这种在经常账户头寸增强情况下货币相对疲软这一奇特现象的经济体。日本、韩国和台湾地区的实际有效汇率(REER)相对于其经常账户盈余和IIP头寸而言均偏弱(图表4)。图表1显示了这一奇特现象:亚洲经常账户盈余呈抛物线式上升,而加权平均REER却持续下降,与基本面脱节。与此同时,亚洲的经常账户赤字(CAD)经济体如印度尼西亚、印度和菲律宾,其汇率更多与CAD恶化幅度同步变动(图表5)。在本报告中,我们沿用Ca' Zorzi、Cap、Mijakovic和Rubaszek(2020)的方法,考察亚洲货币是否被高估或低估及其偏离基本面的程度,该方法采用了三种标准外汇公允价值模型:Trinh NGUYEN高级经济学家,新兴市场亚洲 trinh.nguyen@natixis.com Haoxin MU亚太区经济学家 haoxin.mu@natixis.com Jeremy JI初级经济学家 jeremy.ji-ext@natixis.com 60 80 100 120 140 160 60 80 100 120 140 160 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 图表 2 亚洲经常账户盈余国家的实际有效汇率(REER) CN SK TW MY SG TH JP 资料来源:法国外贸银行,CEIC 注:数据截至2026年7月 -200 0 200 400 600 800 1000 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 TW SG SK JP CN MY TH ID IN AU PH 图表 4 经常账户余额:占名义GDP百分比 平均 2006____-2010 2026 %变化(右轴) 资料来源:法国外贸银行,CEIC 注:数据截至2026年第四季度,四个季度移动平均 2026 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 图表 1 亚洲经常账户盈余国家的加权平均实际有效汇率(REER) 加权平均REER 经常账户占GDP百分比(右轴) 资料来源:法国外贸银行,CEIC 注:数据截至2026,年7月 经常账户盈余国家包括:韩国、台湾地区、日本、马来西亚、新加坡、泰国 -50 50 150 250 350 450 550 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 SG AU TW SK JP CN MY TH ID VN PH IN 千 图表 3 人均GDP(美元,千) 2006 2025 %变化(右轴) 资料来源:法国外贸银行,CEIC 注:数据截至2025, 越南数据从2019到2024, 印度尼西亚数据从2010

亚洲宏观洞察 3 已推出。我们将使用三个模型中的两个,因为第三个模型假设经常账户会对外汇做出调整,而这并不适用于亚洲经常账户盈余经济体,因为其外汇对不断增加的经常账户盈余反应迟钝,而这正是该模型的基础。量化均衡汇率模型 1:购买力平价模型——日元最有可能均值回归 在第一个模型中,我们使用购买力平价模型分析亚洲均衡汇率,这是最古老的汇率决定理论。其核心思想是汇率变动应抵消不同经济体价格指数变动带来的竞争力变化。换言之,实际有效汇率应均值回归。在此方法中,实际有效汇率是决定其均衡水平的唯一变量。什么是实际有效汇率?首先,它源自名义有效汇率,即一套加权外汇指数,权重基于贸易伙伴的相对重要性。实际有效汇率对相对价格水平进行调整。若一国的价格水平低于世界其他地区,其实际有效汇率将相对于名义有效汇率下降。中国的例子即是如此,中国的物价涨幅低于世界其他地区(图表 7 )。因此,中国的实际有效汇率远低于名义有效汇率。购买力平价模型表明,随着时间推移,人民币应调整至其均衡水平。那么如何计算?首先,由于这是一个均值回归模型,只需取某一国家在一段时间内的实际有效汇率平均值,然后比较该平均值与相对价值。我们使用从 2006 年8月至 2026 年7月的季度数据来确定各经济体的平均实际有效汇率,然后将该平均值与 2026 年7月的水平进行比较。通过以下公式,我们得到的结果如图表 8 所示。我们使用的实际有效汇率最新值为 2026 年7月。 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅 𝑖 𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅 𝑖𝑡 ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅ -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 80 85 90 95 100 105 110 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 图表 5 亚洲经常账户赤字国家的加权平均实际有效汇率 加权平均实际有效汇率 经常账户占GDP比重(右轴) 资料来源:法国外贸银行、CEIC 注:数据截至 2026, 年7月 经常账户赤字国家包括:澳大利亚、印度尼西亚、印度、菲律宾 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 图表 6 亚洲经常账户赤字国家的实际有效汇率 澳大利亚 印度尼西亚 印度 菲律宾 资料来源:法国外贸银行、CEIC 注:数据截至 2026 年7月 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 图表 7 中国有效汇率(2020=100) 实际 名义 资料来源:法国外贸银行、国际清算银行 注:数据截至 2026 年7月

亚洲宏观洞见 4 日元是迄今为止被低估程度最高的货币,较其长期均值低 26%。与此同时,韩元排名第二,低估幅度达 14%(见图表 8)。自7月以来,韩元兑美元升值了 6.4%,从而收窄了与均值的偏离。印尼盾和印度卢比也分别低于其20年均值 -12% 和 -9%,偏离幅度相当大。另一方面,澳元、新加坡元和林吉特的当前价值高于其长期均值,其中澳元高出 8%。尽管我们的模型显示澳元存在高估,但对进一步加息的预期在8月继续推动澳元升值。与此同时,新西兰元、菲律宾比索和人民币的汇率水平大致与其20年均值持平。模型 2:行为均衡汇率:韩元、印度卢比和印尼盾被低估 PPP模型的主要缺陷在于,实际有效汇率(REER)可能不具备均值回归特性,或者即便回归,过程也可能非常缓慢(如果确实会回归的话)。行为均衡汇率(BEER)模型通过考察基本面因素来对此进行修正。BEER模型使用的关键变量包括人均国内生产总值(GDP)、贸易条件(ToT)和净外国资产(NFA)。理论上,如果人均GDP上升,财富增加将提升对非贸易品的需求,并推高贸易品的价格,这反映为货币升值。如果NFA上升,那么利息收入将导致进口增加,从而使贸易收支恶化。最后,贸易条件的改善应带来财富增加和贸易收支改善,进而推高实际汇率。在实证中,我们将REER对这三个变量进行回归,以检验这些基本面因素是否对实际汇率具有解释力,公式如下:𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅 𝑖 𝐵𝐸𝐸𝑅 = 𝛼 𝑖 + 𝛽 𝑖 ∙ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐 𝑖 + 𝛾 𝑖 ∙ 𝑁𝐹𝐴 𝑖 + 𝜆 𝑖 ∙ 𝑇𝑜𝑇 𝑖 + 𝜖 𝑖 在讨论结果之前,我们先看一下人均GDP、NFA和贸易条件的演变。图表 9 显示了过去十年人均GDP的变化。收入增长最快的是亚洲新兴经济体,如中国、越南、印度、菲律宾、印尼和马来西亚。日本和澳大利亚的人均GDP增长最低,无论是名义值还是按购买力平价(PPP)调整后。与此同时,韩国和新加坡尽管收入水平较高,但人均GDP增长相对可观。 -26 -14 -12 -9 -5 -2 -1 0 1 5 7 8 -30 -20 -10 0 10 日元 韩元 印尼盾 印度卢比 人民币 新西兰元 新台币 菲律宾比索 泰铢 林吉特 新加坡元 澳元 图表 8 购买力平价(均值回归) 来源:法国外贸银行、彭博、CEIC、国际清算银行 注:数据截至7月,2026 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 新加坡 中国香港 澳大利亚 韩国 日本 马来西亚 中国 泰国 越南 印尼 菲律宾 印度 图表 9 人均GDP(千美元,购买力平价) 2006 2025 % 变化(右轴) 来源:法国外贸银行、CEIC 注:数据截至 2025

亚洲宏观洞察 5 就净外国资产(NFA)而言,新加坡占GDP比重最高,其次是台湾、日本和韩国。日本、韩国和中国相对于GDP的财富增长幅度最大(图表 10)。旅游收入恶化(图表 11)。过去十年,由于供给冲击,大宗商品价格上涨,因此,贸易条件对大多数进口国而言恶化,而对澳大利亚、马来西亚和印度尼西亚等出口国则有所改善。尽管如此,贸易条件近期对韩国等AI硬件出口国显著改善。使用这三个变量的BEER模型结果显示如下。考虑到较高的人均GDP、NFA和贸易条件,我们发现韩元、印尼盾、印度卢比和日元在实际有效汇率(REER)表现与宏观基本面之间存在最大差距。换言之,根据这三个解释变量,它们是最被低估的货币,因为其REER低于我们变量所预测的水平。相反,相对于人均GDP、NFA和贸易条件的长期表现,澳元是估值最高的货币。其他亚洲货币与基本面大致一致,差距不大。来源:Natixis,彭博,CEIC,国际清算银行 加权平均 购买力平价 4/9/2026 4/9/2026 2因素 3因素 日元 155.8 0.7% -23% -26% -30% -9% 韩元 1,356.6 6.4% -15% -14% -12% -20% 印尼盾 17,679 2.1% -11% -12% -11% -11% 印度卢比 94.49 1.0% -9% -9% -6% -11% 新台币 31.77 2.1% -3% -1% -2% -7% 人民币 6.72 0.6% -2% -5% -1% 3% 菲律宾比索 62.52 -2.2% -1% 0% -1% -3% 新西兰元 0.588 0.1% 0% -2% 1% 1% 泰铢 32.93 1.4% 0% 1% 0% -2% 马来西亚林吉特 4.04 1.0% 4% 5% 3% 2% 新加坡元 1.27 1.2% 6% 7% 6% 3% 澳元 0.720 2.6% 9% 8% 9% 13% 名义汇率 vs 美元 截至7月偏离公允价值 BEER 自7月以来兑美元变动 31 表 1. 结果摘要 货币 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 澳大利亚 MY ID SK PH CN SG TW IN KR JP HK TH 图表 11 贸易条件(2014=100) 2015 2026 % 变动(右轴)来源:Natixis,彭博 注:数据截至6月,2026 -210 -105 0 105 210 315 -150 -100 -50 0 50 100 150 200 250 SG TW JP SK CN TH MY IN PH ID AU 图表 10 净国际投资头寸 / GDP(%) 2015 2026 % 变动(右轴)来源:Natixis,CEIC 注:数据截至 2026 年第四季度 1, 滚动四季度 2026

鉴于日本和澳大利亚的人均GDP表现落后(作为已发达国家基数较高),而亚洲新兴市场在收入快速增长方面表现优异,我们还运行了仅包含净外国资产和贸易条件的另一个BEER模型。人均GDP和净外国资产都是财富效应的衡量指标,人均GDP更偏向新兴经济体,而净外国资产更偏向发达经济体,因为人均GDP较低的经济体的人均GDP增长更快。此外,对于某些经济体(如中国和澳大利亚),人均GDP和净外国资产之间存在协整问题。去掉人均GDP后,与购买力平价模型类似,日元和韩元最被低估,而澳元仍然最被高估,但程度较轻。双因素BEER模型与购买力平价模型相当接近。其他因素可能更好地解释这一现象,如利率差异、财政政策、短期资本流动和央行干预。但我们未将其纳入,因为它们会使结果变得嘈杂,而这三个变量在长期内最可靠,如欧洲央行论文所述。显然,对日本而言,日本央行极低的利率是其疲软的关键原因,这是一种蓄意政策,因此使外汇脱离基本面。宏观经济平衡法是另一种流行的方法,但其基本逻辑与前两种模型显著不同。宏观经济平衡法不是通过观察过去趋势来寻找实际汇率的潜在解释变量,而是要求求解方程组,以找到与内部和外部平衡(表现为稳定的经常账户)相一致的实际汇率水平。尽管其背后的经济解释颇具吸引力,但这种逻辑引发了关于全球经常账户失衡的长期争论,其核心是亚洲经济体持续的顺差与美国逆差之间的对比(图表14)。在过去三十年中,亚洲制造商保持了稳定的经常账户顺差,但其实际汇率按加权平均计算贬值了超过40%。因此,经常账户顺差对实际汇率的影响在亚洲似乎异常微弱,这削弱了宏观经济平衡法的可信度,因为关键假设几乎不成立。因此,我们坚持采用上述的购买力平价和BEER方法。-30 -12 -11 -6 -2 -1 -1 0 1 3 6 9 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 日元 韩元 印尼盾 印度卢比 新台币 菲律宾比索 人民币 泰铢 新西兰元 马来西亚林吉特 新加坡元 澳元 图表13 净外国资产 + 贸易条件 来源:Natixis、彭博、CEIC、国际清算银行 注:数据截至2026年7月 -20 -11 -11 -9 -7 -3 -2 1 2 3 3 13 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 韩元 印度卢比 印尼盾 日元 新台币 菲律宾比索 泰铢 新西兰元 马来西亚林吉特 新加坡元 人民币 澳元 图表12 人均GDP + 净外国资产 + 贸易条件 来源:Natixis、彭博、CEIC、国际清算银行 注:数据截至2026年7月 -2.0 -1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019 2022 图表14 经常账户余额(占世界GDP的百分比) 美国 中国 日本 台湾 新加坡 韩国 越南 马来西亚 泰国 来源:Natixis、联合国贸易和发展会议 注:数据截至2026年7月

亚洲宏观洞察 7 错位何时得以修正?或许某些货币会比预期更早面对修正。总而言之,CAS经济体汇率持续疲软,从根本上背离了传统经济学理论。尽管购买力平价(PPP)和均衡汇率(BEER)模型均确认,日元、韩元等该地区主要货币已被大幅低估,且这种背离主要是由刻意实施的利率政策、结构性资本流动以及主权干预所驱动,而非贸易动态所致。但变化正在酝酿。日本央行(BOJ)、韩国央行(BOK)及美国财政部的近期干预表明,宏观失衡(即利率水平偏低的环境)面临修正压力。韩元自7月以来兑美元快速升值14.5%,得益于连续50bp次加息至3%,这在一定程度上表明此类错位可以被修正。而在另一端,尽管加息预期升温推动澳元走高,但财富对房地产的依赖以及家庭部门仍较高的杠杆率,暗示再平衡势在必行,问题在于时机。-2.0 -1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 印尼 中国 马来西亚 印度 澳大利亚 美国 越南 韩国 中国台湾 新加坡 日本 泰国 菲律宾 图表 15 实际政策利率(8月-2026, %) 资料来源:法国外贸银行(Natixis)、彭博 注:数据截至8月2026, 实际政策利率 = 政策利率 - CPI。

亚洲宏观洞察 8 货币政策速度与外汇干预风险推动日元追赶 尽管估值模型凸显亚洲外汇长期结构性错位,近期催化剂很大程度上取决于货币政策速度及当局对货币疲软容忍度的转变。就日元而言,加速加息周期的前景和不断升级的干预风险仍是近期升值的主要驱动力。利率市场已消化日本央行进一步收紧政策,但偏鹰派委员中村贵宏近日评论称,为抑制通胀压力,可能考虑超大规模 50bp 加息或连续加息,这催化了本周日元大幅上涨。关键在于,尽管日本当局似乎未进行“汇率检查”或官方市场干预,但美元兑日元下行压力的猛烈程度表明,结构性套利交易和拥挤的空头头寸正在严重平仓。继7月底美日联合干预之后,日元作为融资货币的持久角色使投机市场面临风险。CFTC数据显示,尽管此前干预后投机性空头有所减少,但残余空头头寸依然存在(图表 16 )。这种挥之不去的积压使市场极易受到突然投降的影响,以及我们刚刚目睹的空头挤压——由日本央行偏鹰派言论驱动,投机者迅速止损并买回日元。日元看涨的另一推动因素是,有报道称政府养老金投资基金(GPIF)召开了一次非常规管理会议。这引发猜测,即GPIF可能提高国内资产配置目标,特别是自政府暗示可能性以来,长期日本国债收益率已大幅攀升(参见利率周报中《日元利率》章节:淡出地缘政治重新定价)。养老金资产结构性回流日本,可能为日元复苏注入巨大动能。韩元升值步伐或放缓 相反,尽管近期日元前景明确看涨,韩元(KRW)兑美元本季度迄今 14% 的升幅似乎过度。此次韩元突然上涨主要由三个临时因素驱动:围绕SK海力士ADR流动的投机性持仓、8月底公司临时纳税截止日期前出口商激进的美元抛售,以及资本外流大幅减少。7月KOSPI严重回调后,此前外国投资者的再平衡需求消退。因此,外国投资者仅小幅净卖出指数,其规模很容易被出口商的美元供应所掩盖。展望未来,这些支撑性顺风正在消退。8月纳税季已结束,SK海力士ADR相关流动似乎已被外汇稳定基金有效吸收,这意味着韩元升值步伐可能放缓。此外,在近期连续加息将基准利率推至 3% 后,韩国央行(BoK)预计将在下次会议上暂停加息。这一预期的政策暂停也可能限制韩元因收益率驱动的进一步上行空间,从而削弱与日本央行等机构的货币政策分化溢价——后者预计将加快自身加息步伐。Dayeon HONG 亚太策略师 dayeon.hong@natixis.com 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 -300 -200 -100 0 100 200 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 ' 000s 图表 16 日元期货持仓 CFTC日元净期货

es Positions, Non-Commercial USDJPY (Inverted, rhs) 来源:Natixis, Bloomberg

A SIA M ACRO I NSIGHTS 9 鹰派的澳洲联储立场将支撑近期澳元跑赢大盘 虽然估值模型显示澳元(AUD)目前被高估,但其相对于G10货币的强势可能会在近期持续。澳洲联储(RBA)仍是央行中对通胀上行风险最警惕的央行之一。继7月出人意料的高1%月率通胀数据(图表 17)之后,进一步加息的可能性明显上升。如果澳洲联储最早在9月会议上执行额外的加息,市场将可能对进一步收紧进行定价。澳洲联储行长保持着坚决强硬的立场,强调遏制通胀仍是央行的绝对优先事项,即使劳动力市场恶化或房价经历快速回调。因此,与日本央行类似,澳大利亚货币政策速度有继续加快的明显潜力,至少近期对澳元构成持续的升值压力。 -1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 1/25 4/25 7/25 10/25 1/26 4/26 7/26 %mom 图表 17 月度通胀:按类别贡献 食品 能源 住房 除食品外的商品 核心服务 运输 总体 来源:Natixis, RBA

A SIA M ACRO I NSIGHTS 10 CIB研究主管 亚太区首席经济学家 Jean-François Robin Alicia Garcia Herrero +33 1 58 55 13 09 +852 3900 8680 jean-francois.robin@natixis.com alicia.garciaherrero@natixis.com 新兴亚洲 大中华区 日本、太平洋地区 Trinh Nguyen Jianwei Xu Kohei Iwahara +852 3900 8726 +852 3900 8034 +813 4519 2144 trinh.nguyen@natixis.com jianwei.xu@natixis.com kohei.iwahara@natixis.com 亚太地区主题研究 Gary Ng Haoxin Mu Dayeon Hong +852 3915 1242 +852 3900 8067 +852 3900 8540 gary.ng@natixis.com haoxin.mu@natixis.com dayeon.hong@natixis.com Natixis CIB Research 亚太区策略师

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Marketing communication: This document is a marketing presentation. It has not been prepared in accordance with legal requirements designed to promote the independence of investment research; and it is not subject to any prohibition on dealing ahead of the dissemination of investment research. RESEARCH C1 - P ublic Natixis 4 September 2026 A SIA M ACRO I NSIGHTS Cheap or Expensive by Design? Quantifying the Deep Misalignment of Asian Currencies Booming manufacturing and AI hardware demand have boosted Asian trade and current account surpluses (CAS). This should strengthen local currencies, but East Asia real effective exchange rate (REER) has declined 40% since 2000 on a weighted average basis. Take the example of China: between 2010 and 2025, its GDP per capita rose from USD 4,630 to USD 13,866, and its net international investment position (IIP) grew from 15.2% to 20.1% of GDP (over USD 4 trillion), yet the renminbi has stayed flat at 6.72 versus the USD as of late. Conversely, current account deficit (CAD) economies such as Indonesia, India and the Philippines have seen their exchange rates move with deteriorating balances. To assess these misalignments, we apply two valuation models to quantify the fair value of Asian FX. The first is the mean-reverting Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) model, which measures the deviation of the REER relative to its two-decade average. It reveals that the Japanese yen (JPY) is the most undervalued regional currency at 26% below its long-term average. The Korean won (KRW) is second at 14% undervalued, though 6.4% since August appreciation against the USD has narrowed this gap. The Indonesian rupiah (IDR) and Indian rupee (INR) are undervalued by 12% and 9%, while the Australian dollar (AUD) is 8% overvalued. The Behavioral Equilibrium Exchange Rate (BEER) model refines this by regressing real exchange rates against macroeconomic fundamentals: GDP per capita, Net Foreign Assets (NFA), and Terms of Trade (ToT). Over the past decade, emerging Asia led GDP per capita growth, while Singapore, Taiwan, Japan and South Korea held the largest NFA size relative to GDP. Even after factoring in these wealth dynamics and South Korea's improved terms of trade from AI hardware exports, the BEER model confirms that the KRW, IDR, INR, and JPY remain deeply undervalued, while the AUD appears heavily overvalued. Ultimately, domestic policy often decouples exchange rates from these strong fundamentals . JPY’s undervaluation is primarily a consequence of the Bank of Japan's deliberate low-interest-rate policy, and ripe for correction on rate hikes, the unwinding of structural carry trades, and potential domestic pension fund reallocation. The recent interventions by the BOJ, BOK and US Treasury suggest that there is pressure for macroeconomic imbalances to be corrected. The rapid appreciation of the Korean won by 14.5% since July versus the USD point to the degree in which these misalignments can be rapidly corrected. WRITTEN BY Trinh NGUYEN Tel. +852 3900 8726 trinh.nguyen@natixis.com Dayeon HONG Tel. +852 3900 8540 dayeon.hong@natixis.com Haoxin MU Tel. +852 3900 8067 haoxin.mu@natixis.com With contribution from: Jeremy JI jeremy.ji-ext@natixis.com Discover more of our research… … on research.natixis.com

A SIA M ACRO I NSIGHTS 2 Asia Current Account Surplus Accelerates but FX Stays Weak Asian manufactured exports are powering world and even more so in the age of parabolically rising AI capex, which drives up demand for Asian hardware exports . Trade surpluses have risen, pushing upward growth, GDP per capita and the current account surplus (CAS). Such accumulation of savings would suggest a much stronger FX for CAS economies. But except for Singapore and Malaysia, and to a lesser extent Thailand and Taiwan, East Asian economies such as China, South Korea and Japan’s currencies have remained weak. This is especially so when we consider the real effective exchange rate (REER) where the nominal effective exchange rate is adjusted for relative inflation of those economies versus the world ( Chart 1 & 2 ). Take the example of China: GDP per capita rose from USD 4,630 to USD 13,866 between 2010 and 2025, but the exchange rate remains roughly the same level today at 6.72 versus the USD, even after a full year of appreciation. Its current account surpluses (CAS) have only risen in the past decade, with net international investment position (IIP) rising to 20.1% of GDP from 15.2% of GDP, or USD4trn from 1.5trn in 2011. And China isn’t alone in this curious phenomenon of having a relatively weak FX for a strengthening CAS position. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have a weak real effective exchange rate (REER) relative to their current account surplus and IIP positions ( Chart 4 ). Chart 1 shows this curious phenomenon where Asia CAS are rising parabolically while the weighted average REER continues to decline irrespective of fundamentals. Meanwhile, current account deficit (CAD) economies in Asia such as Indonesia, India, and the Philippines FX trade more in line with their deterioration of CAD ( Chart 5 ). In this note, we investigate whether Asian FX is over or undervalued and the degree in which they deviate from fundamentals following the methodology of Ca’ Zorzi, Cap, Mijakovic and Rubaszek (2020) , where three standard FX Fair Value models were Trinh NGUYEN Senior Economist, EM Asia trinh.nguyen@natixis.com Haoxin MU Economist, Asia Pacific haoxin.mu@natixis.com Jeremy JI Junior Economist jeremy.ji-ext@natixis.com 60 80 100 120 140 160 60 80 100 120 140 160 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 Chart 2 REER for current account surplus countries in Asia CN SK TW MY SG TH JP Source: Natixis, CEIC N.B. data as of July 2026 -200 0 200 400 600 800 1000 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 TW SG SK JP CN MY TH ID IN AU PH Chart 4 Current Account Balance: % of Nominal GDP Avg 2006-2010 2026 % change (rhs) Source: Natixis, CEIC N.B. data as of 2026 Q1, trailing four quarter for 2026 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 Chart 1 Weighted average REER for current account surplus countries in Asia Weighted average REER Current account % of GDP (rhs) Source: Natixis, CEIC N.B. Data is up to July 2026, Current account surplus countries include: South Korea, Taiwan (China), Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand -50 50 150 250 350 450 550 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 SG AU TW SK JP CN MY TH ID VN PH IN Thousands Chart 3 GDP per Capita (USD, thous) 2006 2025 % change (rhs) Source: Natixis, CEIC N.B. data as of 2025, Vietnam data from 2019 to 2024, Indonesia data from 2010

A SIA M ACRO I NSIGHTS 3 introduced. We will use two of the three models as the third assumes that the current account adjusts to FX, which does not apply to Asian CAS economies as the FX remains unresponsive to rising current account surpluses, which is the basis of the model. Quantifying Equilibrium Exchange Rate Model 1: Purchasing Power Parity Model – JPY is most primed for mean reversion In the first model, we analyzed Asian equilibrium exchange rate using the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) Model, which is the oldest theory of exchange rate determination. It is essentially boiling down to the idea that exchange rates should move to neutralize competitiveness changes by movements in price indexes across different economies. In other words, the REER should mean revert . In this approach, the REER is the only variable necessary to determine its equilibrium level. What’s a REER? First, it is derived from the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER), which is a weighted FX index and the weights are based on relative importance of trade partners. The REER adjusts the relative price levels. Should a country have a lower price level than the rest of the world, then the REER would decline relative to the NEER. An example of this is China where prices in China have risen by less than the rest of the world ( Chart 7 ). Thus, China’s REER is much lower than its NEER. The PPP Model suggests that over time, the renminbi should adjust to its equilibrium level. So how would we calculate that? First, as this is a mean reversion model, it is just a simple case of taking an average of the REER of a specific country over a period and then comparing the relative value of the average. We used quarterly data from August 2006 to July 2026 to determine the mean REER of each economy and then compare that average with July 2026 level. With the formula below, we got the results as shown in Chart 8 . The latest value of REER we use is for July 2026. 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅 𝑖 𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅 𝑖𝑡 ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅ -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 80 85 90 95 100 105 110 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 Chart 5 Weighted average REER for current account deficit countries in Asia Weighted average REER Current account % of GDP (rhs) Source: Natixis, CEIC N.B. Data is up to July 2026, Current account deficit countries include: Australia, Indonesia, India, Philippines 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 Chart 6 REER for current account deficit countries in Asia AU ID IN PH Source: Natixis, CEIC N.B. data as of July 2026 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 Chart 7 China Effective Exchange Rate (2020=100) Real Nominal Source: Natixis, BIS N.B. data as of July 2026

A SIA M ACRO I NSIGHTS 4 JPY is the most undervalued FX by a long shot 26% below its long-term average . Meanwhile, the Korean won ranks second at 14% (See Chart 8 ). Since July, KRW has appreciated by 6.4% versus USD, thus narrowing that deviation from mean. IDR and INR are also below their two-decade average by a sizeable -12% and -9%. On the other hand, the AUD, SGD, and MYR current values are above their long-term average, with AUD 8% higher. Despite our model suggesting an overvaluation of AUD, expectations of further rate hikes continued to push for AUD appreciation in August. Meanwhile, NZD, PHP and CNY are for the most part at par with their two-decade mean. Model 2: Behavioral Equilibrium Exchange Rate: KRW, INR and IDR undervalued The key setback of the PPP Model is of course that REER may not be mean-reverting or that it would revert in a very gradual way, if ever. The Behavioral Equilibrium Exchange Rate (BEER) model adjusts for this by looking at fundamentals. Key variables that BEER use are GDP per capita, terms of trade (ToT), and net foreign assets (NFA). The theory goes, should GDP per capita go up, greater wealth will raise the demand for non-tradable goods and push up the price of tradable goods as well, which is reflected as currency appreciation. Should NFA go up, then the income on interest would lead to a worsening of trade balance as imports rise. Finally, a better term of trade should lead to higher wealth and better trade balance, which should push up the real exchange rate. In practice, we regress REER on the three variables to see if these fundamentals have explanatory power for real exchange rate, which is expressed as the formula below. 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅 𝑖 𝐵𝐸𝐸𝑅 = 𝛼 𝑖 + 𝛽 𝑖 ∙ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐 𝑖 + 𝛾 𝑖 ∙ 𝑁𝐹𝐴 𝑖 + 𝜆 𝑖 ∙ 𝑇𝑜𝑇 𝑖 + 𝜖 𝑖 Before we discuss results, let’s look at the evolution of GDP per capita, NFA and ToT. Chart 9 shows GDP per capita change in the past decade. The fastest rising in income has been emerging Asian economies such as China, Vietnam, India, the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia. Japan and Australia have had the lowest growth of GDP per capita, whether nominally or purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted. Meanwhile, South Korea and Singapore have had relatively decent GDP per capita growth despite their higher income status. -26 -14 -12 -9 -5 -2 -1 0 1 5 7 8 -30 -20 -10 0 10 JPY KRW IDR INR CNY NZD TWD PHP THB MYR SGD AUD Chart 8 PPP (mean reversion) Source: Natixis, Bloomberg, CEIC, BIS N.B. data as of July, 2026 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 SG HK AU SK JP MY CN TH VN ID PH IN Chart 9 GDP per Capita (USDth, PPP) 2006 2025 % change (rhs) Source: Natixis, CEIC N.B. data as of 2025

A SIA M ACRO I NSIGHTS 5 For NFA, Singapore has the highest share of GDP, followed by Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea. Japan, South Korea, and China have had the biggest increase of wealth relative to GDP ( Chart 10 ). worsening tourism receipts ( Chart 11 ). In the past decade, commodity prices have risen, thanks to supply shocks, as such, terms of trade worsened for the most part for importers and improved for exporters such as Australia, Malaysia, and Indonesia. That said, terms of trade, recently improved significantly for AI hardware exporters such as South Korea. The BEER model using the three variables showed us the below results. Considering higher GDP per capita, NFA and ToT, we find that KRW, IDR, INR and JPY have the biggest gap between realized REER performance and macro fundamentals. In other words, they are the most undervalued according to these three explanatory variables as the REER is below what would be predicted by our variables. Inversely, AUD is the most overvalued relative to long-term performance of GDP per capita, NFA and ToT. Other Asian currencies are broadly in line with fundamentals with not too much gap. Source: Natixis, Bloomberg, CEIC, BIS Wgt. Avg. PPP 4/9/2026 4/9/2026 2-factor 3-factor JPY 155.8 0.7% -23% -26% -30% -9% KRW 1,356.6 6.4% -15% -14% -12% -20% IDR 17,679 2.1% -11% -12% -11% -11% INR 94.49 1.0% -9% -9% -6% -11% TWD 31.77 2.1% -3% -1% -2% -7% CNY 6.72 0.6% -2% -5% -1% 3% PHP 62.52 -2.2% -1% 0% -1% -3% NZD 0.588 0.1% 0% -2% 1% 1% THB 32.93 1.4% 0% 1% 0% -2% MYR 4.04 1.0% 4% 5% 3% 2% SGD 1.27 1.2% 6% 7% 6% 3% AUD 0.720 2.6% 9% 8% 9% 13% Nominal exchange rate vs USD Deviation from fair value as of July BEER Change vs USD since July 31 Table 1. Summary of Results Currencies -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 AU MY ID SK PH CN SG TW IN KR JP HK TH Chart 11 Terms of trade (2014=100) 2015 2026 % change (rhs) Source: Natixis, Bloomberg N.B. data as of June, 2026 -210 -105 0 105 210 315 -150 -100 -50 0 50 100 150 200 250 SG TW JP SK CN TH MY IN PH ID AU Chart 10 Net IIP / GDP (%) 2015 2026 % change (rhs) Source: Natixis, CEIC N.B. data as of 2026 Q1, trailing four quarter for 2026

A SIA M ACRO I NSIGHTS 6 Given Japan and Australia lagging performance in GDP per capita (high based as already developed) and emerging Asia outperformance in rapidly growing income, we also run another BEER with just NFA and ToT. Both GDP per capita and NFA are measures of wealth effects, with GDP per capita favoring more emerging economies and NFA favoring more developed economies as GDP per capita growth is more rapid for economies with lower GDP per capita. Moreover, there is an issue with cointegration with GDP per capita and NFA for some economies, such as China and Australia. Taking away GDP per capita, like the PPP model, JPY and KRW are most undervalued while AUD remains most overvalued but to a lesser extent. The two- factor BEER model and the PPP model mirror each other rather closely. Other factors may better explain this, such as interest rate differentials, fiscal policies, short-term capital flows and central bank interventions. But we did not include as they would make the results noisy and these three variables are most reliable long- term, like the ECB paper. Clearly, for Japan, the BOJ very low interest rate is the key reason for its weakness, which is a deliberate policy, and hence making FX divorced from fundamentals. Macroeconomic Balance (MB) is another popular approach, but it differs significantly from the first two models in terms of underlying logic. Instead of looking at past trends to find potential explanatory variables for real exchange rates, MB requires solving a system of equations to find the real exchange rate level that is compatible with internal and external balance, which substantiates as a stable current account. Despite the appealing economic interpretation behind, this rationale draws a long- standing debate about the global current account imbalance which centers at the consistent surplus of Asian economies versus US ’ deficit ( Chart 14 ). Over the past three decades, Asian manufacturers maintained a stable current account surplus, but their real exchange rate weakened by more than 40% on a weighted average basis. As such, the impact of current account surplus on real exchange rates seems exceptionally weak for Asia, which undermines the credibility of the MB approach since the key assumption hardly holds. Therefore, we stick to the PPP and BEER approaches as discussed above. -30 -12 -11 -6 -2 -1 -1 0 1 3 6 9 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 JPY KRW IDR INR TWD PHP CNY THB NZD MYR SGD AUD Chart 13 NFA + ToT Source: Natixis, Bloomberg, CEIC, BIS N.B. data as of July, 2026 -20 -11 -11 -9 -7 -3 -2 1 2 3 3 13 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 KRW INR IDR JPY TWD PHP THB NZD MYR SGD CNY AUD Chart 12 GDPpc + NFA + ToT Source: Natixis, Bloomberg, CEIC, BIS N.B. data as of July, 2026 -2.0 -1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019 2022 Chart 14 Current Account Balance (% of world GDP) US CN JP TW SK SG VN MY TH Source: Natixis, UNCTAD N.B. data as of July 2026

A SIA M ACRO I NSIGHTS 7 When will the misalignment be correct? Perhaps sooner than later for some In conclusion, the persistent weakness of CAS economies’ exchange rates represents a fundamental departure from traditional economic theory. While both the PPP and BEER models confirm that key regional currencies like the Japanese yen and South Korean won are heavily undervalued, and this disconnect is largely driven by deliberate interest rate policies, structural capital flows, and sovereign interventions rather than trade dynamics. But changes are afoot. The recent interventions by the BOJ, BOK and US Treasury suggest that there is pressure for macroeconomic imbalances to be corrected , namely the rather low-interest rate environment. The rapid appreciation of the Korean won by 14.5% since July versus the USD thanks to the back-to-back 50bps rate hike to 3% point to the degree in which these misalignments can be corrected. At the other end of the spectrum, while higher rate hike expectations are helping AUD higher, the dependency on real estate for wealth and the still high leverage in the household sector suggests that a rebalancing is on the cards, the question is when. -2.0 -1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 ID CN MY IN AU US VN SK TW SG JP TH PH Chart 15 Real Policy Rate (Aug-2026, %) Source: Natixis, Bloomberg N.B. Data as of Auguest 2026, Real Policy Rate = Policy Rate - CPI.

A SIA M ACRO I NSIGHTS 8 Monetary policy velocity and FX intervention risks driving JPY catch-up While valuations models highlight long-term structural misalignments across Asian FX, near-term catalysts hinge heavily on monetary policy velocity and shifting authorities ’ tolerance for currency weakness. For the Japanese yen, the prospects of an accelerated hiking cycle and escalating intervention risks remain the primary drivers of recent appreciation. Rates markets had already priced in further BoJ tightening but recent comments from hawkish board member Hajime Takata floating the possibility of outsized 50bp moves or back-to-back hikes to contain inflation pressures catalyzed a sharp yen rally this week. Crucially, while there does not seem to have been “ rate checks ” or official market intervention from Japanese authorities, the sheer pace of the downward pressure on USDJPY indicates a severe unwinding of structural carry trades and crowded short positions. Following the late July US-Japan joint interventions, the yen ’ s enduring role as a funding currency has left speculative markets exposed. CFTC data indicates that while speculative shorts were trimmed following previous interventions, residual short positioning remains ( Chart 16 ). This lingering overhang left the market highly vulnerable to sudden capitulation and short squeeze we just witnessed, driven by hawkish BoJ rhetoric to rapidly cut losses and buy back the yen. Adding to the bullish JPY narrative, reports suggest the Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF) had an irregular management meeting. This fuels speculation that the GPIF may increase its domestic asset allocation targets , particularly as long-end JGB yields have surged since the government suggested the possibility (see JPY Rates section from Rates Weekly: Fading the geopolitical repricing ). A structural shift of pension assets back to Japan could inject immense momentum into yen ’ s recovery . Pace of KRW appreciation set to moderate Conversely, while the near-term JPY outlook remains decidedly bullish, the recent 14% quarter-to-date appreciation of the Korean won (KRW) against USD appears overextended . This abrupt KRW rally was primarily driven by three transient factors: speculative positioning surrounding SK Hynix ADR flows, aggressive exporter USD selling ahead of end-of-August interim corporate tax deadlines, and a sharp reduction in capital outflows. Following the severe KOSPI correction in July, previous foreign investors rebalancing demands dissipated. Consequently, foreigners remained only small net sellers of the index amount easily overshadowed by exporter USD supply. Moving forward, these supportive tailwinds are fading. The August tax season has concluded, and SK Hynix ADR-related flows appear to have been effectively absorbed by the Foreign Exchange Stabilization Fund, meaning the pace of KRW appreciation is likely to slow. Furthermore, having recently delivered consecutive hikes to push the base rate to 3%, the Bank of Korea (BoK) is expected to pause at the next meeting. This anticipated policy pause could also serve as a cap for further yield-driven upside for the won, stripping away the monetary divergence premium for example versus BoJ which is expected to accelerate its own rate hikes. Dayeon HONG APAC Strategist dayeon.hong@natixis.com 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 -300 -200 -100 0 100 200 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 '000s Chart 16 Yen Futures Positioning CFTC JPY Net Futures Positions, Non-Commercial USDJPY (Inverted, rhs) Source: Natixis, Bloomberg

A SIA M ACRO I NSIGHTS 9 Hawkish RBA stance to anchor near-term AUD outperformance While valuation models indicate that the Australian dollar (AUD) is currently overvalued, its strength particularly against G10 peers is likely to persist in the near term. The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) remains one of the most vigilant central banks regarding upside inflation risks. Following July ’ s unexpectedly high 1% month- on-month inflation print ( Chart 17 ), the probability of further rate hikes tangibly increased. If the RBA executes and additional hike as early as the September meeting, markets will likely to price in further tightening. The RBA governor has maintained a resolutely firm stance, emphasizing that containing inflation remains the central bank ’ s absolute priority even if the labor market deteriorates or housing prices experience a rapid correction. Consequently, much like BoJ, there is distinct potential for Australian monetary policy velocity to accelerate, applying sustained appreciation pressure on the AUD , at least in the near term. -1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 1/25 4/25 7/25 10/25 1/26 4/26 7/26 %mom Chart 17 Monthly Inflation: Contribution by Category Food Energy Housing Goods ex food Core services Transport Headline Source: Natixis, RBA

A SIA M ACRO I NSIGHTS 10 Head of CIB Research Chief Economist, Asia Pacific Jean-François Robin Alicia Garcia Herrero +33 1 58 55 13 09 +852 3900 8680 jean-francois.robin@natixis.com alicia.garciaherrero@natixis.com Emerging Asia Greater China Japan, Pacific Trinh Nguyen Jianwei Xu Kohei Iwahara +852 3900 8726 +852 3900 8034 +813 4519 2144 trinh.nguyen@natixis.com jianwei.xu@natixis.com kohei.iwahara@natixis.com Asia Pacific, Thematic Research Gary Ng Haoxin Mu Dayeon Hong +852 3915 1242 +852 3900 8067 +852 3900 8540 gary.ng@natixis.com haoxin.mu@natixis.com dayeon.hong@natixis.com Natixis CIB Research Asia Pacific, Strategist

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I(WE), AUTHOR(S), WHO WROTE THIS REPORT HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THIS REPORT ACCURATELY REFLECT OUR(MY) PERSONAL VIEWS ABOUT THE SUBJECT COMPANY OR COMPANIES AND ITS OR THEIR SECURITIES, AND THAT NO PART OF OUR COMPENSATION WAS, IS OR WILL BE, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, RELATED TO THE SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS OR VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THIS REPORT. The personal views of authors may differ from one another. Natixis, its subsidiaries and affiliates may have issued or may issue reports that are inconsistent with, and/or reach different conclusions from, the information presented herein. In Hong Kong, this document is for distribution to professional investors only (as defined in the Securities and Futures Ordinance (Cap.571) of Hong Kong and any rules made under that Ordinance). Natixis Singapore branch is regulated by the Monetary Authority of Singapore. This document is intended solely for distribution to Institutional Investors, Accredited Investors and Expert Investors as defined in Section 4A of the Securities and Futures Act of Singapore. In Mainland China, Natixis Shanghai branch and Natixis Beijing branch are regulated in the PRC by China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, the People’s Bank of China, and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange for the engagement of banking business. This document is intended solely for distribution to Professional Investors who are authorized to engage in the purchase of Product of the type being offered or sold. PRC professional investors are responsible for obtaining all relevant approvals/licenses, verification and/or registrations themselves from relevant governmental authorities (including but not limited to China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, the People’s Bank of China, State Administration of Foreign Exchange and/or China Securities Regulatory Commission), and complying with all relevant PRC regulations, including, but not limited to, all relevant foreign exchange regulations and/or foreign investment regulations. In Taiwan, Natixis Taipei Branch is regulated by the Taiwan Financial Supervisory Commission. This document is intended solely for distribution to professional investors in Taiwan for reference only. In South Korea, this research material has been provided to you without charge for your convenience only. All information contained in this material is factual information and does not reflect any opinion or judgment by Natixis. The information contained in this research material should not be construed as offer, marketing, solicitation or investment advice with respect to any financial investment products mentioned in this material. In Australia, Natixis has a wholly owned subsidiary, Natixis Australia Pty Limited ("NAPL"). NAPL is registered with the Australian Securities & Investments Commission and holds an Australian Financial Services License (No. 317114) which enables NAPL to conduct its financial services business in Australia with "wholesale" clients. Details of the AFSL are available upon request. Natixis S.A. is not an Authorised Deposit-Taking Institution under the Australian Banking Act 1959, nor is it regulated by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority. Any references made to banking in the document refer to Natixis activities outside of Australia. Natixis is authorized by the ACPR and regulated by the Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA) for the conduct of its business in and from the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC). The document is being made available to the recipient with the understanding that it meets the DFSA definition of a Professional Client; the recipient is otherwise required to inform Natixis if this is not the case and return the document. The recipient also acknowledges and understands that neither the document nor its contents have been approved, licensed by or registered with any regulatory body or governmental agency in the GCC or Lebanon. In Oman, Natixis neither has a registered business presence nor a representative office in Oman and does not undertake banking business or provide financial services in Oman. Consequently, Natixis is not regulated by either the Central Bank of Oman or Oman ’s Capital Market Authority. This document has been prepared by Natixis. The information contained in this document is for discussion purposes only and neither constitutes an offer of securities in Oman as contemplated by the Commercial Companies Law of Oman (Royal Decree 4/74) or the Capital Market Law of Oman (Royal Decree 80/98), nor does it constitute an offer to sell, or the solicitation of any offer to buy non-Omani securities in Oman as contemplated by Article 139 of the Executive Regulations to the Capital Market Law (issued vide CMA Decision 1/2009). Natixis does not solicit business in Oman and the only circumstances in which Natixis sends information or material describing financial products or financial services to recipients in Oman, is where such information or material has been requested from Natixis and by receiving this document, the person or entity to whom it has been dispatched by Natixis understands, acknowledges and agrees that this document has not been approved by the CBO, the CMA or any other regulatory body or authority in Oman. Natixis does not market, offer, sell or distribute any financial or investment products or services in Oman and no subscription to any securities, products or financial services may or will be consummated within Oman. Nothing contained in this document is intended to constitute Omani investment, legal, tax, accounting or other professional advice. In Qatar, The information contained in this document has been compiled in good faith with all reasonable care and attention and, to the best of our knowledge and belief, is correct at the time of publication and does not omit any data available to us that is material to the correctness of such information. Any opinions expressed herein have been formed in good faith on the relevant facts available at the time of its formation.. Natixis Saudi Arabia Investment Company, licensed and regulated by the Capital Market Authority (Number: 19205-31), located in Alfaisaliah Tower, 16th Floor, King Fahad Road, Riyadh – KSA. Argentina: In accordance with laws and regulations in force, the representative office of a foreign financial institution not licensed to operate in Argentina is prohibited from receiving funds from the public for itself or for the foreign financial institution it represents. The unlicensed representative office is not authorized to perform foreign exchange transactions reserved to licensed entities pursuant to Law No. 18,924 on Brokerage Firms and Agencies. Any violation of the laws related to the unauthorized taking of funds shall be punishable consistent with Section 41 of Law 21,526 on Financial Institutions (Ley de Entidades Financieras), while violations of laws relating to foreign exchange transactions shall be punishable under the Criminal Exchange Regulations (Régimen Penal Cambiario) set forth in Law 19.359 (as amended and restated by Decree 480/1995). Colombia: By receiving this document you confirm that you have requested us to provide you this document and information on described in it. You also confirm that your interest in requesting such documents and information arose out of your own private interest and was not the result of any direct or indirect solicitation, promotion or offering of services or products by Natixis or by any of its representatives. Accordingly, the information contained in this document is not intended and should not be construed as constituting onshore promotion, marketing or solicitation of securities- market services or products. The distribution of the information contained in this document is restricted by law and persons who access it are required to comply with all such restrictions. The information is not intended to be published or made available to any person in any jurisdiction where doing so would contravene any applicable laws or regulations. By receiving this document, you confirm that you are aware of the laws in Colombia relating to the promotion and marketing of financial services products and you warrant and represent that you will not pass on or utilize the information contained in this document in a manner that could constitute a breach of such laws by Natixis, its affiliates or any other person. Any securities or products mentioned in this document have not been and will not be registered with the National Register of Securities ("Registro Nacional de Valores y Emisores") maintained by the Colombian Financial Superintendency ("Superintendencia Financiera de Colombia") and may not be publicly offered or sold in Colombia. This information does not constitute and should not be construed as an offer to enter into any agreement, or to purchase or subscribe any securities. The information is provided for information purposes only and does not constitute investment, legal, tax or other advice or any recommendation to buy, sell or otherwise transact in any of the funds or securities mentioned. Prospective investors should take appropriate professional advice before making any investment decision. Chile: This communication and any accompanying information (the "Materials") are intended solely for informational purposes and do not constitute (and should not be interpreted to constitute) the selling, or conducting of business with respect to such products or services in Chile (this "Jurisdiction"), or the conducting of any brokerage, banking or other similarly regulated activities in this Jurisdiction. Natixis ("Bank") is not registered (or intended to be registered) in this Jurisdiction. The Materials/information is/are private, confidential and are sent by the Bank only for the exclusive use of the addressee. The Materials must not be publicly distributed and any use of the Materials by anyone other than the addressee is not authorized. The addressee is required to comply with all applicable laws in this Jurisdiction, including, without limitation, tax laws and exchange control regulations, if any. Peru: The products/information mentioned here has/have not been registered under the Peruvian Securities Market Law (Supreme Decree N° 093-2002-EF) or before the Superintendencia del Mercado de Valores (SMV). There will be no public offering of the shares in Peru The SMV has not reviewed the information provided to the investor. This material is only for the exclusive use of Institutional investors in Peru and is not for public distribution." Panama: This document and its content are for information purposes and shall not be interpreted as banking or financial intermediation, business solicitation and/or public offering of any kind. Any and all services provided by Natixis are provided on a cross border basis outside of Panama. Natixis is not authorized by the Superintendence of Banks nor the Superintendence of the Securities Market to carry out any activities locally in Panama. Brazil: There are no products mentioned here which have been issued, placed, distributed or offered in the Brazilian market. Documents relating to these products, as well as information contained therein, may not be supplied to the public in Brazil nor be used in connection with any offer for subscription or sale of financial products or services to the public in Brazil. These products will not be offered in Brazil, except in circumstances which do not constitute any breach or noncompliance with the Brazilian applicable legislation. Mexico: “As per your request, this information is delivered to you, which strictly pertains to activities performed by Natixis, a Foreign Financial Entity in its country of origin, such institution is herein represented by its Representation Office in Mexico. This information is being delivered to you for information purposes only. Please note that the Representation Office in Mexico is prevented from negotiating, executing, or participating in (i) operations related to listed derivatives; and (ii) securing funds from the general public in Mexico.”
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AI 分析
由 AI 依据上文研报生成 · 非原文直译、非机构原话 · 重要判断请核对官网原文
关键论点
  • PPP模型显示日元低估26%,韩元14%,印尼盾12%,印度卢比9%相对长期均值。
  • BEER模型(人均GDP、净外国资产、贸易条件)确认韩元、印尼盾、卢比、日元低估;澳元高估。
  • 亚洲经常账户盈余货币因政策、结构性流动和干预而疲软,而非贸易。
  • 日元可能在日本央行加息、套利平仓和GPIF资产配置调整下升值。
  • 韩元升值可能因暂时性因素消退和韩国央行暂停而放缓。
  • 澳元短期内因澳洲联储鹰派立场维持强势。
  • 日本央行、韩国央行及美国财政部的干预表明纠正失衡压力。
风险
  • 政策不作为或推迟加息可能延长错位。
  • 当局外汇干预可能扭曲市场调整。
  • 全球风险情绪变化可能影响套利交易和资本流动。
  • 货币政策速度的意外变化可能改变预测。
  • 数据修订可能影响模型结果。