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加拿大央行发出鹰派警告

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加拿大央行发出鹰派警告

政策利率维持在 2.25% 不变,符合普遍预期

10月会议是“现场”会议。市场目前定价加息75–100bp个基点

整体基调逐步转鹰……

……加拿大央行删除了政策利率“适当”的表述……

……并警告通胀上行风险有所增加……

……但同时淡化了关税影响,称行为已适应

10月更新的通胀预测被指出将指导政策决定

在加拿大央行最新沟通之后,10月会议是“现场”会议,并关注加息风险。这些沟通强化了我们对至少从Q4开始至2027年初加息75bp个基点的预测信心。

市场对沟通(此处、此处和此处)作出反应,推动两年期加拿大国债收益率上升8bp个基点,表现落后于包括美国在内的其他市场。加元兑美元升值超过半美分。

10月会议现在定价加息10bp个基点,而市场预期为25bp个基点。12月会议定价加息22bp个基点,市场预期为25bp个基点。市场目前定价到明年夏天累计加息75–100bp个基点。

我们将拭目以待,但提醒一下,丰业银行经济部是唯一自去年11月2025预测以来一直预测年底前收紧的机构,且远远领先于市场。

图表1–3显示了沟通前后的盘中市场走势。

有时沉默足以说明问题,而这次的沉默对市场来说并不令人安心。尽管加拿大央行将隔夜利率维持在2.25%不变(符合普遍预期),但删除了“当前政策利率仍然适当”的表述。这一省略与下一点结合,意义重大。

他们还明确警告“通胀上行风险已经增加”,在声明中以及麦克勒姆行长的开场白中均有体现。

整体基调在通胀上行风险与经济复苏不确定性之间有所权衡,正如声明最后一段所述,但新闻发布会对这一权衡中加拿大央行政策行动方向的任何疑虑一扫而空。声明和发布会明确表示,2%的通胀目标神圣不可侵犯,通胀过高(已明确指出),上行风险增加,这将作为未来政策调整的“灯塔”。

此外,我们可以原谅声明中其他一些牵强的说法,比如经济和通胀表现符合他们的预期。不,并非如此。Q2GDP增长3.3%,超过了加拿大央行2.8%的预测,Q1被上修0.4个百分点,净超出预期近一个百分点。通胀同样如此,实际为3%(同比),而加拿大央行预测Q3为2.7%。方向一致,但这些是明显超出加拿大央行预期的,可能在一定程度上使他们感到不安。毕竟,今天的沟通与之前相比完全转变了叙事。

麦克莱姆警告称,由于中东冲突持续的时间越长,油价上涨传导至其他价格的风险就越大,通胀风险已转向上行。图表 4 显示了当前WTI期货曲线指向冲突迄今的高点。他本应更广泛地谈论大宗商品价格压力,因为不仅仅是石油和天然气。他还表示,冲突持续的时间越长,炼油厂利润率面临的上行压力就越久,这确实正在发生(图表 5)。这就更让人好奇,为什么加拿大刚刚延长了燃油消费税暂停措施,而炼油厂在紧张的市场中拥挤在该领域。

行长麦克莱姆不断强调,企业已经适应了关税和不确定性,他预计这种情况将持续下去。事实上,虽然他负责任地指出了不确定性,但我认为他特意淡化了不确定性在未来决策中的指导作用,同时强调了关税的成本影响。

麦克莱姆非常关注10月份的下一轮预测,并暗示决策将由这些预测指引:

“我们将在下次会议上发布新的预测。我们的利率决定将受到通胀前景的指引。这将成为我们下次决策的核心。”

在我看来,你不能先发出警告,然后发布新的预测,却在关键时刻无所作为。从现在到10月28日之间,还有更多信息需要消化,例如通胀、就业和GDP数据,以及能源市场贸易发展,但加拿大央行显然已经打开了一扇足够大的门,以便在一切配合的情况下,最早在下次会议上收紧政策。目前这还不明确,但相对于12月,10月的风险回报应该吸引更多关注。

在新闻发布会上被问及连续多次加息的风险时,麦克莱姆不仅没有回避,反而给出了肯定的回答。

所有这些都表明加拿大央行叙事发生了彻底转变。所发生的情况体现在国内数据的上行、能源和其他大宗商品价格持续走高,以及对额外财政政策行动的未明示假设。

请参见随附的声明对比,该对比跟随新闻发布会记录之后。我们将很快发布新的预测。

以下是对新闻发布会问答环节的完整记录尝试。任何错误或遗漏都应归咎于我打字跟不上。

问1:您是否更担心通胀而不是贸易冲突对经济增长的任何拖累?

A1。我们同时强调了这两类风险。我们对这两类风险都感到担忧。势头令人鼓舞。但经济仍存在闲置。美国新的贸易行动带来不确定性。通胀率为3%,仍然过高,且高度集中在汽油和能源领域。剔除汽油后的CPI为2.2%。但中东冲突仍在持续。冲突持续越久,能源价格上涨蔓延至其他价格、导致通胀更为普遍的风险就越大。风险正在变化,我们准备好在必要时调整货币政策。未来指导我们决策的最重要因素,将是我们对通胀的预测及其相关风险,其中包括经济闲置、油价上涨,以及这些因素可能产生的溢出效应。我们将在下次会议上更新预测。这将真正指导我们的决策。我们的指引灯塔是2%的通胀目标。我们对此坚定不移。

Q2。反制关税将于9月8日生效。您如何看待?

A2。这将增加成本。这些成本可能传导至消费者价格。反制关税主要针对中间产品。其中不多会直接影响CPI。这意味着影响不那么直接,传导需要更长时间。我们将不断完善评估。目前我们的评估是,报复性关税的通胀影响是温和的。更大的问题在于中东局势。

Q3。您此前曾表示,如果美国实施进一步限制,可能需要进一步降息。如果贸易紧张局势持续或加剧,您认为近期是否会出现这种情况?

A3。当美国最初加征关税时,我们确实降了息,并维持低利率以支持经济。关税对经济增长构成压力。我们看到经济在第二季度出现反弹。企业告诉我们,它们正在适应关税并调整供应链。这从数据中可以看到。出口和投资上升,招聘力度加大。如今美国贸易谈判破裂带来了新的挑战,使这种反弹更加不确定。但正如我强调的,我们必须关注通胀。中东冲突是关键,冲突持续越久,通胀风险就越大。

Q4。您如何看待贸易紧张局势对加拿大经济的影响,是否会回到去年的下行风险情形?

A4。我们是在加拿大经济基础更为稳固的情况下应对这一问题的。企业已经适应,正在继续前进并寻找做生意的方法。这些关税虽然非常严苛,但适用于相对狭窄的范围。受影响的企业将受到严重冲击。你会看到对经济增长的一些影响,尤其是在第4季度。但总体而言,这些关税影响了我们对美国出口的约5%(编者注:占总出口比例更低),我们预计不会产生重大影响。局势可能升级,也可能出现其他结果。加拿大和美国曾接近达成协议。加拿大实施反制关税是为了让关税得以撤销。我们必须评估这些关税对复苏可持续性的影响。

Q5。风险平衡是否得以维持?

答:5。我已经回答了那个问题,以便可持续发展目标(SDG)能够回答。现在罗杰斯发言:增长风险主要来自贸易紧张局势,通胀风险主要来自中东。两者都非常动态,且存在关于这些风险如何传导至经济和通胀的不确定性。我们的职责是维护价格稳定,这正是我们将要关注的焦点。

问:6。最近的债券抛售是否表明风险重新定价健康?还是其中暗藏风险?美国国债的行动是否恰当?

答:6。从根本上说,我们看到全球主权债务水平高企,发行量上升,但这并非唯一因素。AI基础设施的建设正在推动企业债券发行量走高。中东局势已恶化。央行和市场对通胀更加担忧。所有这些因素正在同时发挥作用。加拿大的收益率曲线因多种原因低于美国。我们看到全球债券收益率对加拿大产生了一些溢出效应。也许更严重的问题在于金融稳定方面。[编辑附注:转给罗杰斯再次回答]。罗杰斯:我们曾谈到的脆弱性出现在杠杆头寸迅速逆转,并溢出至回购市场乃至核心市场时。我们现在尚未看到这种情况发生。我们看到的是风险重估。

问:7。您能否阐述由于关税,增长路径已降低了多少?这些新关税是否存在更高的传染风险?

答:7。我们看到增长在2季度出现反弹。这证明企业和工人正在调整。如果我们能神奇地取消关税,就能回到更高的增长路径。这不在我们的控制范围内。我们能够控制的是在加拿大进行的投资和结构性改革。我们需要多元化出口、提高生产率、整合国内市场。货币政策无法实现这些目标。这不在我们的控制范围内。我们必须将潜在增长视为既定路径,但该路径越高,经济在不积累通胀的情况下增长的空间就越大。

问:8。为什么删除了关于政策利率适宜的说法?

答:8。自我们的七月会议以来,数据与我们的预测大体一致。预测所面临的风险正在转变。通胀的上行风险已经增加。经济复苏的持久性更加不确定。我们将在下次会议上公布新的预测。我们的利率决定将以通胀前景为指导。这将在我们的下一次决策中被置于核心位置。

问:9。是否需要连续加息?

答:9。存在多种情景和一系列可能的结果。最好的结果是中东局势得到解决且关税被取消。但这不是唯一的结果,两者都可能变得更加复杂。当然,如果我们认为通胀将保持在过高水平,那么我们将提高利率,并准备进行多次加息,但这并非唯一结果。我们的目标是将通胀恢复到2%。

问:10。为什么市场定价三次加息?您将多大程度将市场行情纳入未来决策?

答:10。[罗杰斯回答]。市场正在定价多种因素。我们会考虑这些因素。我们讨论市场状况。它们都会纳入我们的利率决策。

问:11。借贷成本已经上升,似乎正在产生一定程度的紧缩效果。这如何影响您在未来几个月的政策决策?

答11。麦克勒姆。我想我已经回答了那个问题。我们会考虑金融状况。如果较高的利率反映了对货币政策的预期,如果那是我们的想法,那么我们准备这样做。如果货币政策没有做到所需的程度,市场就会重新定价。市场理解我们的反应函数,并且油价越高持续越久,通胀的上行风险就越大,这会引起市场关注,但这并不意味着我们不需要采取行动。

问12。您如何看待关税的长期影响,以及即使加拿大和美国之间的关系恢复正常,美国对自己造成的伤害?

答12。这届美国政府喜欢保护主义。如果理性占上风,我们可以回到更好的状态。政府应该做对其公民有利的事情。如果能回到过去的状态会很好,但我不认为我们可以指望这一点。当然,我们在过去一年看到的是,企业已经从震惊和愤怒,到否认,再到适应和继续前进,这就是我们所看到的。你看到加拿大经济和企业正在适应。加拿大经济正在应对并正在做出反应。是的,这新一轮关税是一个挫折,但我毫不怀疑加拿大企业将适应并找到新的经营方式。

本报告由丰业银行经济学部编制,作为丰业银行客户的资源。本文所载的意见、估计和预测截至本报告日期均为我们自己的观点,如有变更,恕不另行通知。本文所载的信息和意见是从据信可靠的来源汇编或获得的,但对其准确性或完整性不作任何明示或暗示的陈述或保证。丰业银行及其任何高级职员、董事、合伙人、员工或关联公司对因使用本报告或其内容而产生的任何直接或间接损失不承担任何责任。

完整英文原文

The policy rate was unchanged at 2.25% as universally expected

October is a ‘live’ meeting. Markets now pricing 75–100bps of hikes

The overall tone was incrementally hawkish…

...as the BoC removed reference to the policy rate being “appropriate”…

...and warned that upside risks to inflation have increased…

...while nevertheless downplaying tariffs as behaviour has adapted

Fresh inflation forecasts in October were noted as guiding the policy decision

October’s Bank of Canada meeting is ‘live’ and on watch for hike risk in the wake of updated communications from the Bank of Canada. The communications reinforce conviction in our forecast for at least 75bps of rate hikes starting in Q4 into early 2027.

Markets responded to the communications (here, here and here) by pushing the two-year GoC yield higher by 8bps, thereby underperforming other markets including the US. The Canadian dollar appreciated by over half a penny to the USD.

The October meeting is now priced at 10bps of a 25bps hike. December is pricing 22bps of a 25bps hike. Markets are now pricing between 75–100bps of tightening by next summer.

We’ll see what happens, but as a reminder, Scotiabank Economics is the only shop that has been forecasting tightening by year-end right back to our November 2025 forecast and way ahead of markets.

Charts 1–3 show intraday market moves around the communications.

Sometimes it’s the silence that says enough and this silence wasn’t of the comfortable sort to markets. While the Bank of Canada left its overnight rate unchanged at 2.25% as universally expected, it struck out reference to how “the current policy rate remains appropriate.” That omission speaks volumes when combined with the next point.

They also explicitly warned that “upside risks to inflation have increased” in statement codified fashion and in Governor Macklem’s opening remarks.

The broad tone somewhat traded off upside risks to inflation alongside more uncertainty over the economic rebound as noted in the concluding paragraph to the statement, but the press conference swept away any doubt over which way the BoC’s policy actions would lean in terms of that mixture. The statement and presser made clear that their 2% inflation goal is sacrosanct, that inflation is too high as explicitly noted, and that upside risks have increased and that this will be the BoC’s “beacon” for future policy adjustments.

We can otherwise forgive some other stretched truths in the statement, like how the economy and inflation have performed in line with their expectations. No they haven’t. Q2 GDP growth of 3.3% surpassed the BoC’s 2.8% projection and Q1 was revised up by 0.4 ppts for a net beat to their expectations of nearly a percentage point. Ditto for inflation at 3% y/y whereas the BoC had forecast 2.7% for Q3. They were in line with the direction but these are meaningful overshoots of the BoC’s expectations and probably played a role in spooking them somewhat. After all, today was a total narrative shift by the BoC compared to previously.

Macklem warned that inflation risk had pivoted higher because the longer the conflict in the Middle East persists, the greater the pass through risk of higher oil into other prices. Chart 4 shows the current WTI futures curve toward the high points of the conflict to date. He should have spoken more broadly about commodity price pressures since it’s not just about oil and gas. He also said that the longer the conflict goes on, the longer the upward pressure upon refiners’ margins which is definitely happening (chart 5). That makes it all the more curious why Canada just extended the fuel excise tax suspension given that refiners crowded in the space in a tight market.

Governor Macklem constantly emphasized that businesses have adjusted to tariffs and uncertainty and that he expects this to continue to be the case. In fact, while he responsibly flagged uncertainty, I thought he went out of his way to downplay the role this would play in guiding future decisions while playing up the cost implications of tariffs.

Macklem put a lot of attention on the next forecast round in October and intimated that the decision will be guided by those forecasts:

“We will have a new forecast at our next meeting. Our interest rate decisions will be guided by the outlook for inflation. That will be front and center in our next decision.”

In my opinion, you don’t warn, then issue fresh forecasts, only to whiff in the moment. There is a lot more information to digest between now and October 28th, such as data on inflation and jobs and GDP, plus energy market and trade developments, but the BoC very clearly cracked open the door by enough to increase flexibility to tighten as soon as the next meeting if everything cooperates. That’s not clear as yet, but the relative risk-reward on October versus December pricing should be attracting more attention toward October.

When asked during the press conference about the risk of multiple back-to-back rate increases, Macklem not only did not bat it away, he responded in the affirmative.

All of which is a total narrative shift by the BoC. What happened is captured by domestic data upsides, higher energy and other commodity prices for longer, and unspoken assumptions about additional fiscal policy actions.

Please see the attached statement comparison that follows the press conference transcript. We will soon be issuing fresh forecasts.

The following is an attempt at providing a full transcript of the Q&A part of the press conference. Any errors or omissions are to be blamed on my typing abilities in keeping up.

Q1. Are you more concerned with inflation than any drag on growth from the trade conflict?

A1. We highlighted both risks. We're concerned about both risks. Momentum is encouraging. There is still slack. New American trade actions create uncertainty. Inflation is 3% which remains too high. It is very concentrated in gasoline and energy. CPI ex-gasoline is 2.2%. But the conflict in the Middle East is going on. The longer it goes on, the greater is the risk that higher energy prices start to spill into other prices and you get more generalized inflation. The risks are shifting and we are prepared to adjust monetary policy as needed. The most important thing that is going to guide our decision going forward is our inflation forecast and the risks around that. It includes slack, higher oil prices, the potential for that to spill over. We'll be updating that forecast at our next meeting. That will really guide our decisions. Our beacon is our 2% inflation target. We are committed to it.

Q2. Counter tariffs go into effect on Sept 8th. How do you judge this?

A2. They will add costs. Those costs could feed through to consumer prices. The counter-tariffs are mostly on intermediate inputs. Not many of them will directly impact CPI. That means the effect is less direct and it takes more time to pass through. We will be refining our estimates. Our assessment at this point is that the inflationary impact of the retaliatory tariffs is modest. The bigger issue is what's going on in the Middle East.

Q3. You previously said further rate cuts may be needed if the US imposes further restrictions. Do you see that happening in the near future if trade tensions drag on or intensify?

A3. When the US first imposed tariffs we did cut and held it low to support the economy. The tariffs have weight on growth. We saw the economy rebound in the second quarter. Businesses are telling us they are adapting to tariffs and shifting their supply chains. You can see that in the data. Exports and investment have come up, hiring has been stronger. There is a new challenge with the breakdown in trade discussions with the US. That makes that rebound more uncertain. But, as I stressed, we have to keep our eye on inflation. The conflict in the Middle East is key and the longer it goes on the greater the risk to inflation.

Q4. How are you thinking about how trade tensions play out for the Canadian economy and would they go back to last year's scenarios in terms of downside risks?

A4. We're coming into this with the Canadian economy on a better footing. Businesses have adapted. They're getting on and finding ways to do business. These tariffs are very steep but they are applied to a relatively narrow base. The businesses they hit will get hit hard. You will see some impact on growth particularly in Q4. But overall they hit about 5% of our exports to the US (ed. even less total) and we don't expect them to be a big effect. There could be escalation. There could be other outcomes. Canada and the US were close to a deal. Canada is applying counter tariffs in order to get tariffs rolled back. We'll have to assess their impact on the sustainability of this recovery.

Q5. Has the balance of risks been maintained?

A5. I've answered that question so the SDG can answer. Rogers speaking now: risks to growth primarily through trade tensions, risks to inflation that come primarily out of the Middle East. They're both pretty dynamic and there is uncertainty about how these risks transmit through the economy and inflation. Our mandate is to preserve price stability and that's what we are going to be focused upon.

Q6. Does the recent bond rout indicate a healthy repricing of risks? Or are there risks embedded within it? And are US Treasury actions appropriate?

A6. Underneath it all we have high levels of sovereign debt globally with rising issuance but it's not the only factor. The build out of AI infrastructure is driving corporate bond issuance higher. The situation in the Middle East has become worse. Central banks and markets are more concerned about inflation. All these things are working simultaneously. Canada's curve is below the US for many reasons. We are seeing some spillover of global bond yields into Canada. Perhaps the more serious issues are around financial stability. [ed. passed to Rogers again.]. Rogers: the vulnerability we have spoken about comes when leveraged positions get reversed quickly and spill over from repo markets into core markets. We don't see that happening now. We see a repricing of risk.

Q7. Can you outline how much lower the growth path has been because of tariffs? Is there not higher risk of contagion with these new tariffs?

A7. We've seen growth rebound in Q2. That is evidence that businesses and workers are adjusting. If we could magically roll back tariffs we could get back to a higher growth path. That's not in our control. What is in our control are the investments and structural reforms we do in Canada. We need to diversify our exports, improve productivity, integrate our domestic markets. Monetary policy can't do that. It's not in our control. We have to take that path for potential growth as given but the higher that path is the more the economy can growth without building inflation.

Q8. Why did you drop reference to the policy rate being appropriate?

A8. Since our July meeting, the data has been broadly in line with our forecast. The risks around the forecasts are shifting. The upside risks to inflation have increased. The durability of the rebound is more uncertain. We will have a new forecast at our next meeting. Our interest rate decisions will be guided by the outlook for inflation. That will be front and center in our next decision.

Q9. Could consecutive rate increases be required?

A9. There are a number of scenarios and range of possible outcomes. The best outcome would be resolution in the Middle East and tariffs get rolled back. That's not the only outcome, both could become more complicated. Certainly if we felt that inflation was going to remain too high then we would raise interest rates and would be prepared to do multiple increases but that's not the only outcome. Our objective is to get inflation back to 2%.

Q10. Why are markets pricing three hikes and how much will you factor markets into future decisions?

A10. [Rogers answering]. Markets are pricing in a number of things. We take these factors into account. We talk about market conditions. They all feed into our rate decision.

Q11. Borrowing costs have increased which seem to be doing some tightening. How does this all affect your policy decisions in coming months?

A11. Macklem. I think I have answered that question. We will take into account financial conditions. To the extent that higher interest rates reflect expectations about monetary policy, if that's what we think, then we're prepared to do that. If monetary policy doesn't do what is needed then markets will reprice. The fact that markets understand our reaction function and that the upside risks to inflation increase the higher oil prices are for longer then it gets attention in markets but doesn't mean we don't need to do something.

Q12. How are you thinking about the long-term effects of tariffs and what the US is doing to itself even if things go back to normal between Canada and the US?

A12. This US administration likes protectionism. If rationality prevails then we can get back to a better place. Governments should do what's good for their citizens. It would be nice if we could go back to where we were but I don't think we can count on that. Certainly what we've seen over the past year is that businesses have gone from shock and anger to denial to adapting and moving on and that's what we're seeing. You are seeing the Canadian economy and businesses adapting. The Canadian economy is coping and it is responding. Yes this new round of tariffs are a setback but I have no doubt Canadian businesses will adapt and find new ways of doing business.

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关键论点
  • 加拿大央行删除了政策利率仍然“适当”的表述,标志着立场转变。
  • 加拿大央行明确警告通胀上行风险增加。
  • 行长麦克勒姆表示10月份的预测将指导下一次决策。
  • 麦克勒姆承认可能连续加息。
  • 市场已定价至明年夏天加息75-100个基点。
  • 国内数据好于央行预测,第二季度GDP为3.3%,而预测为2.8%;通胀为3%,而预测为2.7%。
  • 能源价格和中东冲突被视为通胀的主要上行风险。
风险
  • 中东冲突持续,导致油价上涨和通胀扩散。
  • 与美国的贸易紧张升级,损害增长。
  • 通胀可能仍过高,迫使更快加息。
  • 市场重新定价可能导致金融不稳定。