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品浩 · Tiffany Wilding · 2026/09/02

宏观路标 | 如果问题是通胀,为何工资不是?

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宏观路标 | 如果问题是通胀,为何工资不是?

凯文·沃什在杰克逊霍尔的演讲明显偏鹰派,且可以说是美联储正在积极考虑进一步收紧政策的最清晰信号。市场对此作出反应,将9月加息的可能性提高至约60%,并定价了截至明年年中累计约60 basis points的收紧幅度。

这次演讲同时做了三件事。

重新将2%个人消费支出(PCE)确立为实际通胀目标,并指出在一系列潜在通胀指标中,通胀运行在2%以上。

驳斥了两次较为温和的通胀数据代表有意义进展的观点。

明确表示,如果联邦公开市场委员会(FOMC)缺乏对通胀“清晰且以足够速度”向目标迈进的信心,则政策必须收紧。

根据美联储主席沃什的说法,问题不仅在于通胀是否在改善,还在于是否改善得足够快——这比FOMC其他官员公开评论设定的标准更高。尽管如此,沃什并未完全明确需要多大进展以及在多长时间内实现。自6月会议以来,多位FOMC成员已表示愿意等待更多数据再做进一步政策调整,特别是因为自6月以来收到的经济和通胀数据与通胀将放缓的预测一致。

许多人还指出,不应认为通胀预期已锚定是理所当然的,而长时间的高通胀(即使是由一系列供应冲击和价格水平调整引起)可能证明需要进一步收紧。

最终,委员会是否在9月加息(或不加)可能并非因为自6月以来增长和通胀前景发生重大变化。自6月以来,我们和共识预测对2027年底PCE通胀的预测均处于2.4%-2.5%区间——相比当前3.3%的增速有显著改善,但尚未完全回归目标。我们怀疑8月消费者物价指数报告——9月FOMC会议前发布的最后一项消费者通胀数据——不会实质性改变前景。

如果委员会加息,那是因为他们希望抑制通胀预期上行的风险,因为降低通胀的进展缓慢。

该风险依赖于一个特定机制:通胀预期推高劳动力成本,进而传导至价格。我们认为该风险相对较低。虽然对稀缺工人的高需求可能影响经济的某些小领域,但我们认为结构性因素正对工资构成下行压力(见宏观路标,“反直觉的劳动力市场变化制约美国工资增长衡量”)。尽管如此,政策决定将归结为集体判断。

目前,单位劳动力成本(ULC)增长与核心PCE之间的差距异常之大。ULC增长率约为每年1%%,几乎是疫情以来最慢的水平,而核心PCE约为3.3%%。这一差距在算术上由劳动份额的下降或资本所有者份额的上升(即劳动份额的倒数)来解释——实际上,劳动收入份额已降至自1947年以来该数据序列的最低点。其镜像反映在利润上:根据国民收入和产品账户,税后企业利润占国内总增加值的百分比处于80多年数据中的最高水平,而根据FactSet数据,标普500指数净利润率在第二季度创下历史新高(见图2)。简而言之,当前高于目标的通胀在算术上是一个利润份额的故事,而非劳动力成本的故事。

完整英文原文

Kevin Warsh's Jackson Hole speech struck a decidedly hawkish tone and was arguably the clearest signal yet that the Federal Reserve is actively considering additional tightening. Markets responded by raising the probability of a September hike to roughly 60% and pricing approximately 60 basis points of cumulative tightening through the middle of next year.

The speech did three things simultaneously.

Re-established 2% Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) as the operative inflation target and observed that across a range of underlying inflation measures, inflation is running above 2%.

Rejected the notion that two softer inflation prints represent meaningful progress.

Explicitly stated that policy must tighten if the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) lacks confidence that inflation is moving toward target "clearly and at sufficient speed."

According to Fed Chair Warsh the question is not only if inflation is improving, but if it's improving fast enough – a higher bar than what was set by public comments from other FOMC officials. Still, Warsh wasn’t completely clear on how much progress and over what time frame. Since the June meeting, various FOMC members have communicated a willingness to wait for more data before making further policy adjustments, especially since economic and inflation data received since June have been consistent with forecasts for inflation to moderate.

Many have also indicated that anchored inflation expectations shouldn't be taken for granted, and a prolonged period of elevated inflation (even if it were caused by a series of supply shocks and price level adjustments) may warrant additional tightening.

In the end, whether the committee ultimately hikes in September (or not) may not be due to substantial changes in the outlook for growth and inflation since June. Both our and consensus forecasts for PCE inflation for the end of 2027 have been in the range of 2.4%-2.5% since June – a substantial improvement from the current 3.3% pace but not a full return to target. We doubt the August Consumer Price Index print – the last consumer inflation data that will be released before the September FOMC meeting – will materially change the outlook.

If the committee hikes, it will be because they want to lean against the risk that inflation expectations will drift higher as progress on reducing inflation has been slow.

That risk hinges on a specific mechanism: Inflation expectations increase labor costs, which in turn feed through to prices. We think the risk is relatively low. While elevated demand for scarce workers may be impacting certain small segments of the economy, we think structural factors are putting downward pressure on wages (see Macro Signpost, “Counterintuitive Labor Market Shifts Constrain Measured U.S. Wage Gains”). Nevertheless, the policy decision will come down to a collective judgement call.

Right now, the gap between ULC growth and core PCE is unusually wide. ULC growth is running at roughly a 1% year-over-year pace, near the slowest pace since the pandemic, while core PCE is running at 3.3%. That gap is arithmetically explained by the decline in labor’s share or the rise in capital owners’ share, which is the inverse of labor’s share – and indeed, labor’s share of income has fallen to the lowest level in the series since 1947. The mirror image shows up in profits: After-tax corporate profit margins as a percentage of gross value added were at their highest level in over 80 years of data, according to the national income and product accounts, while S&P 500 Index net margins hit a record in the second quarter, according to FactSet data (see Figure 2). In short, today's above-target inflation is arithmetically a profit-share story, not a labor-cost story.

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关键论点
  • Warsh的讲话是美联储考虑进一步收紧的最明确信号,市场定价9月加息概率60%,至2027年年中累计收紧60个基点。
  • 美联储重申2%的PCE目标,并指出各项指标显示通胀高于2%;两次较低的通胀数据并不代表有意义的进展。
  • PIMCO认为薪资推动通胀的风险较低,因为单位劳动力成本增速仅约1%,而核心PCE为3.3%,表明当前是利润份额问题,而非劳动力成本问题。
  • 委员会可能加息以抵御通胀预期上行的风险,但近期数据与通胀温和的预测一致。
风险
  • 如果通胀进展缓慢,通胀预期可能上行,可能需要进一步收紧政策。
  • 如果劳动份额回升,单位劳动力成本与核心PCE之间的差距可能收窄,导致薪资推动的通胀。
  • 如果FOMC对通胀清晰且足够快速地向目标迈进缺乏信心,可能实施9月加息。
  • 8月CPI数据可能意外上行,改变政策前景。