我们预计欧洲央行将在下周加息 25bp。只要通胀仍主要由能源驱动，下周之后进一步加息意义不大，并可能损害欧元区经济。
下周欧洲央行会议的再次加息前景日益明朗。这不仅是因为一些欧洲央行成员已主张在7月会议上加息，还因为自那以来，欧元区经济对中东战争表现出了几乎出乎意料的韧性。这在一定程度上归因于运气好，以及亚洲竞争对手受霍尔木兹海峡关闭冲击更大，将订单拱手让给欧洲竞争对手，同时也得益于早已宣布的财政刺激措施。
与此同时，整体通胀继续攀升，并且看起来今年剩余时间将保持在同比 3% 以上，尽管核心通胀和服务业通胀等其他通胀指标目前并无令人担忧的理由。由于油价仍处高位，且新的天然气价格冲击风险增加，大多数欧洲央行政策制定者很难看不到再次加息的充分理由。
即使欧洲央行不喜欢这个术语，今年第二次加息也将属于“保险性加息”的范畴，或者更符合央行心意的说法是：通过加息来增强其公信力，并防范当前能源价格冲击可能产生的任何间接甚至第二轮效应。
新一轮员工预测不会带来重大变化，但应继续为加息支持者提供支撑。鉴于员工预测的截止日期通常在管理委员会会议前约两周，因此近期债券收益率飙升以及能源价格上涨再次不会体现在预测中。事实上，直到一周前，所谓的外部假设几乎与6月预测中的水平相当。
在此背景下，我们预计欧洲央行的增长和通胀预测将略有上调，主要得益于第一季度增长的统计上修和油价略高。基数和结转效应可能导致 2027 的增长和通胀预测略有上调。更笼统地说，关注欧洲央行是否会更新6月的备选情景将会很有意思。虽然在7月看来欧洲央行的“温和”情景几乎可能成为现实，但我们现在更接近“基准”和“不利”情景之间。
欧洲央行是否真的会在九月加息之后继续加息，则完全是另一回事。市场已开始消化今年年底前至少再次加息的可能性，而欧洲央行内部的意见似乎越发分歧。尽管今年欧洲央行的一篇博客文章支持了我们自己的观点，即当前的通胀浪潮主要由能源价格驱动，且在识别（并应对）通胀冲击时，驱动因素很重要，但伊莎贝尔·施纳贝尔和爱尔兰央行行长加布里埃尔·马赫卢夫的言论暗示了进一步加息的明确意愿。
然而，在（下周）再加息一次后，存款利率达到2.5%，仍将处于欧洲央行自身所称的中性区间内。进一步加息将意味着欧洲央行认为有必要采取限制性货币政策。但一个表现出韧性的经济与一个过热、需要限制性货币政策的经济之间存在巨大差异。我们仍然难以想象——在公共财政困境和债券收益率飙升的情况下——欧洲央行真的愿意火上浇油。或者换句话说，很难设想欧洲央行愿意冒着经济衰退的风险去应对教科书式的供给侧冲击。
下周欧洲央行会议及随后的新闻发布会的另一个议题将是近期债券收益率的飙升——以及与此相关的对欧洲（及其他地区）债务可持续性的担忧。乍一看，这次飙升实际上对欧洲央行来说正中下怀。债券市场正在替欧洲央行完成工作，即收紧金融条件。根据宏观模型，债券收益率上升50bp对通胀和GDP增长的影响略大于欧洲央行政策利率上升50bp。
因此，央行面临的主要挑战将是不要过度火上浇油。记住金融条件的不当收紧。事实上，只要通胀未受控制，对欧洲央行而言，最令人担忧的不是长期利率的绝对水平，而是欧元区各国之间的利差。一定程度的金融条件收紧可以减轻欧洲央行的负担；但过度收紧以及不均衡的收紧则会带来新的问题。
这就是为什么最终可能会出现这样的问题：欧洲央行是否愿意在“传导保护工具”的名义下重启资产购买。需要明确的是，这目前还不是一个需要讨论的问题。但如果债务可持续性担忧加剧（可能是在明年法国总统大选之前），市场或许会试探欧洲央行。我们以前就见过这种情况。在这种背景下，一个迄今为止主要局限于八卦媒体的讨论可能会变得更具政策相关性：克里斯蒂娜·拉加德提前卸任欧洲央行行长的可能性，以及谁将成为她的继任者。目前流传的一些可能候选人名单中，至少在过去，有些人并不是量化宽松的坚定支持者。
总而言之，我们预计欧洲央行下周将加息25bp。又一次保险性加息。或者对于那些不喜欢这个术语的人来说：一次鸽派加息。
We expect the ECB to hike interest rates by 25bp next week. As long as inflation remains mainly energy-driven, hiking rates further beyond next week would not make a lot of sense and could harm the eurozone economy
The stage looks increasingly set for another rate hike at next week's European Central Bank meeting. Not only because some ECB members already advocated for a rate hike at the July meeting, but also because, since then, the eurozone economy has shown an almost unexpected resilience to the war in the Middle East. This is partly due to good luck and to Asian competitors being hit harder by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and losing orders to European competitors, but also to long-announced fiscal stimulus.
At the same time, headline inflation has continued to edge higher and looks set to stay above 3% year-on-year for the remainder of the year, even if other inflation measures like core and services currently provide no reason to panic. With oil prices remaining elevated and the risk of a fresh gas price shock increasing, it will be hard for most ECB policymakers not to see a clear case for another rate hike.
Even if the ECB doesn’t like the term, the second rate hike this year would also fall into the category of ‘insurance rate hike’, or maybe more to the central bank's liking: a rate hike to strengthen its credibility and to preempt any possible indirect or even second-round effects from the current energy price shock.
The new round of staff projections will not bring any significant changes but should remain supportive for the rate hike proponents. Given that the cut-off date for the staff projections is normally some two weeks before the Governing Council meeting, the latest surge in bond yields as well as higher energy prices again will not have played a role in the forecasts. In fact, until a week ago, the so-called external assumptions were almost at similar levels as in the June forecasts.
Against this background, we expect the ECB’s growth and inflation forecasts to be revised upwards slightly, mainly due to earlier statistical upward revisions of first-quarter growth and slightly higher oil prices. Base and carry-over effects could lead to marginally higher growth and inflation forecasts for 2027. More generally speaking, it will be interesting to see whether the ECB will also present updates of the alternative scenarios from June. While in July it almost looked as if the ECB’s ‘milder’ scenario could materialise, we are now rather somewhere between the ‘base’ and ‘adverse’ scenario.
Whether the ECB will really go beyond a September rate hike is a completely different story. Markets have started to price in at least another hike before year-end, and views at the ECB seem to increasingly diverge. While an ECB blog article this year supported our own view that the current inflation wave is mainly driven by energy prices and that drivers matter when identifying (and reacting to) an inflation shock, comments by Isabel Schnabel and Irish central bank governor Gabriel Makhlouf hint at a clear willingness to hike further.
However, with one additional rate hike (next week), the deposit rate at 2.5% would still be within the range the ECB itself calls neutral. Going further would mean that the ECB sees restrictive monetary policy as necessary. But there is a big difference between an economy that has shown resilience and an overheating economy that needs restrictive monetary policy. We still find it hard to see – amid public finance woes and surging bond yields – that the ECB would really be willing to add more fuel to the fire. Or in other words, it's difficult to envisage the ECB being willing to risk a recession to tackle what is still a textbook supply-side shock.
Another topic for next week’s ECB meeting and the following press conference will be the latest surge in bond yields – and, related to this, concerns about debt sustainability in Europe (and elsewhere). At first glance, this surge is actually coming in handy for the ECB. Bond markets are doing the ECB’s job, i.e., tightening financing conditions. According to macro models, a 50bp increase in bond yields has a slightly larger impact on inflation and GDP growth than a 50bp increase in the ECB’s policy rate.
Consequently, the main challenge for the central bank will be not to add too much fuel to the fire. Remember the unwarranted tightening of financing conditions. In fact, as long as inflation is not under control, it is not so much the absolute level of long-term interest rates but rather the spread between eurozone countries that is of most concern for the ECB. Some tightening of financing conditions can ease the ECB’s job; too much tightening, and unequal tightening, would bring new problems.
This is why questions may eventually arise as to whether the ECB would be willing to restart asset purchases, now under the label of the Transmission Protection Instrument. Let’s be clear, this is not a debate for now. But if debt sustainability concerns grow, possibly ahead of next year's French presidential elections, markets might want to test the ECB. We have seen it before. In this context, a debate that has so far been confined largely to the yellow press might become more policy-relevant: the possibility of an early exit for Christine Lagarde as ECB president and the question of who would be her successor. Some of the names of possible candidates currently circulating have, at least in the past, not been strong supporters of quantitative easing.
All in all, we expect the ECB to hike interest rates by 25bp next week. Another insurance rate hike. Or for those who don’t like this term: a dovish rate hike.
正在载入文档……