The emerging stress in Asia was initially treated as a regional and containable problem. The US economy was enjoying a 'Goldilocks' period with a rare combination of low unemployment, contained inflation and improving productivity. That crisis did not reach Wall Street until late October, when the Dow plunged 7.18% and circuit breakers halted trading for the first time.
The S&P 500 still ended 1997 up 31%, but the initial disruption triggered a wider global systematic shock which endured throughout 1998.[1]
The 2013 environment makes a similar point from a different angle. Everyone knew the Federal Reserve’s money printer would eventually be switched off, yet markets climbed anyway. The central bank had spent years buying bonds, to hold borrowing costs down and nudge investors out of safe assets and into risky ones. Growth was weak and spending cuts were about to bite, meaning when the reckoning arrived in May, no one should have really been surprised.
So, how useful is that history lesson for today? Our current stance leans toward cautious pessimism rather than bearishness. None of the obvious candidates, whether the trillions going into artificial intelligence, the war in Iran or the state of US public finances, looks likely on its own to trigger an imminent break.
A fiscally constrained US government, a Fed we believe is on the verge of raising rates, and valuations still priced for a fairly benign outcome all combine to leave the market with very little margin for error. These factors are intertwined and generally reinforce each other, suggesting it would not take much of a shock to expose the underlying fragility.
It might offer some comfort that the model cites August 2011, when the US lost its triple-A credit rating and the Eurozone debt crisis threatened the single currency bloc, as the least similar period to our current environment.