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品浩 · Tiffany Wilding, Graeme Westwood · 2026/08/19

宏观指标 | 反直觉的劳动力市场转变制约美国工资涨幅

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宏观指标 | 反直觉的劳动力市场转变制约美国工资涨幅

美国整体失业率已连续数月下降,但深入观察谁在离开劳动力队伍——以及谁没有进入或重返劳动力队伍——即可揭示为何平均工资停滞不前,以及为何劳动力市场并未构成通胀压力来源。

在上周的《宏观指标》中,我们讨论了美国劳动力市场中一些反直觉的趋势。自今年年初以来,失业率与就业人口比率同时下降——这种同步走势在历史上尚无先例(参见《宏观指标》,“随着年长劳动者退休,劳动力成本趋于缓解”)。

我们认为,这一趋势是劳动力市场中与人口结构、人工智能及移民政策相关的结构性变化相互碰撞的体现。其结果是,劳动力市场的紧张程度并不像整体失业率(据美国劳工统计局(BLS)数据,4.1%月份为2026,)所显示的那样高。失业率下降而报告工资通胀也在下降的事实印证了这一点:理论上,趋紧的劳动力市场应推高工资增长,而非使之放缓。

本周,我们将深入挖掘美国劳工统计局家庭调查数据,以更好地理解整体工资趋势温和化表面之下正在发生的情况。我们发现,在失业率下降的同时,就业人群构成的变化——谁在离开、谁未回归——正在拉低美国工资涨幅的衡量值。这一变化,加之劳动力退出率上升及找到工作的概率下降,描绘出一幅劳动力市场未产生持续通胀压力来源的图景。

鉴于劳动力成本占美国经济生产商品与服务投入成本的很大部分,当前处于高位的消费者物价通胀应随时间推移向劳动力成本趋势收敛。这些劳动力市场趋势也提示央行官员不应过度依赖失业率作为衡量美国劳动力市场状况的指标。

经济学家所称的图1中的“外部边际”是指就业人员构成变化的净效应——即进入与退出劳动力市场人员工资水平之间的差异。“内部边际”则是指仍就业人员平均工资的变化。如图所示,当经济向好时,更多人以较低工资进入就业,往往对平均工资产生下行压力。在经济衰退期间(如全球金融危机和新冠疫情期间),较大比例的低工资劳动者退出劳动力队伍,往往对工资产生逆周期的上行压力。

与此同时,从失业及劳动力市场外部找到工作的概率较低,意味着我们并未经历低于中位数的新进入者浪潮将工资水平分布推向低薪工作的情况,尽管我们看到的新进入者中,有较大比例低于平均及中位数工资水平。

换言之,情况很复杂——最终结果是,在劳动力供应下降的同时,衡量工资水平受到了构成上的拖累。图 3 显示,截至今年7月,从全职转向兼职的工人对平均工资的拖累最大——以前高于平均工资的工人正离开全职工作并转向兼职。然而,从就业转向失业的个人中,有越来越多的比例来自相对高薪的工作。

1 Mary C. Daly, Bart Hobijn, and Benjamin Pyle. “What’s Up with Wage Growth?” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter (March 2016) 返回内容

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完整英文原文

The headline U.S. unemployment rate has been falling for several months, but a closer look at who is leaving the workforce – and who isn’t entering or returning to it – reveals why average wages are stagnating, and why labor markets aren’t a source of inflationary pressure.

In last week’s edition of Macro Signposts, we discussed some counterintuitive trends in the U.S. labor market. Since the beginning of the year, we’ve seen tandem declines in both the unemployment rate and the employment-to-population ratio – a concurrence without historical precedent (see Macro Signposts, “As Older Workers Retire, Labor Costs Ease”).

We argued that this trend is symptomatic of structural changes in the labor market related to demographics, AI, and immigration policy that are all colliding. The result is a labor market that isn’t as tight as the headline unemployment rate alone (4.1% as of July 2026, according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)) would suggest. The fact that the unemployment rate is falling while reported wage inflation is also falling confirms this: A tighter labor market theoretically is supposed to firm wage growth, not soften it.

This week, we dig deeper into the BLS household survey data to better understand what is happening beneath the surface of those moderating headline wage trends. We find that a compositional shift in who is leaving employment – and who isn’t returning – is pulling measured U.S. wage growth lower even as the jobless rate declines. This shift, combined with rising labor force exits and a declining job-finding rate, paints a picture of a labor market that is not generating a sustained source of inflationary pressure.

Given that labor costs are a large portion of the input costs for the goods and services produced across the U.S. economy, consumer price inflation, which is now elevated, should converge to labor cost trends over time. These labor market trends also argue for central bankers not to be overly reliant on the unemployment rate as a measure of the state of the U.S. labor market.

What economists call the “external margin” in Figure 1 is the net effect of compositional shifts in the makeup of employed people – the difference in wage levels between those entering versus those exiting the labor market. The “internal margin” is the change in the average wage of people who were employed and remained employed. As the chart suggests, a higher rate of people entering employment at lower wages when the economy is doing well tends to put downward pressure on the average wage. During recessions (e.g., the global financial crisis and the COVID pandemic), a greater share of lower-wage workers leaving the workforce tends to put countercyclical upward pressure on wages.

At the same time, the lower job-finding rates from both unemployment and outside the labor market imply we’re not experiencing a wave of below-median entrants shifting the wage level distribution toward lower-paying jobs, although a greater portion of the entrants that we have seen are below the average and median wage levels.

In other words, it’s complicated – and the net result is a compositional drag on measured wages that is occurring alongside falling labor supply. Figure 3 shows that through July of this year, workers transitioning from full-time to part-time employment have been the greatest drag on average earnings – formerly above-average-wage workers are leaving full-time employment and transitioning to part-time. However, a rising share of individuals transitioning from employment to unemployment are people leaving what were relatively high-paying jobs.

1 Mary C. Daly, Bart Hobijn, and Benjamin Pyle. “What’s Up with Wage Growth?” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter (March 2016) Return to content

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AI 分析
由 AI 依据上文研报生成 · 非原文直译、非机构原话 · 重要判断请核对官网原文
关键论点
  • 劳动力市场的结构性变化(人口统计、人工智能、移民)导致劳动力市场并不像失业率所显示的那么紧张。
  • 就业人员构成的变化使得即使失业率下降,衡量到的工资增长也受到拖累。
  • 劳动力参与率下降和就业率下降表明劳动力市场没有产生持续的通胀压力。
  • 从全职转为兼职的转变是平均收入的最大拖累。
  • 消费者物价通胀应随时间向劳动力成本趋势收敛,这表明当前较高的通胀可能是暂时的。
  • 央行不应过度依赖失业率作为衡量劳动力市场紧张程度的指标。
风险
  • 消费者物价通胀目前偏高,如果其他因素占主导,可能不会向劳动力成本趋势收敛。
  • 如果进入和离开就业的工人构成发生变化,工资的构成性拖累可能会逆转。
  • 人工智能和移民政策导致的结构性变化不确定,可能以不同于预期的方向发展。
  • 失业率可能误导政策制定者,导致不适当的货币政策反应。