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施罗德 · 2026/08/07

SARIF 评论:7月

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SARIF 评论:7月

海湾地区紧张局势再度升级,使通胀与增长呈相反方向变动,令各央行面临艰难权衡。短期债券估值颇具吸引力,但能源价格上涨仍是关键风险。

市场回顾

霍尔木兹海峡:再度关闭,油价反弹

七月份的主导主题是能源市场地缘政治风险的重新抬头。美国与伊朗于18六月签署的谅解备忘录被证明是短暂的,停火协议于13七月破裂,伊朗重新对商业航运实施限制。到七月底,霍尔木兹海峡事实上仍然关闭,布伦特原油已反弹至每桶$100美元。与快速解决相比,长期僵局现在看起来更有可能,这使得油价居高不下,并对前端收益率构成持续压力。

上涨的石油和天然气价格正将通胀和增长拉向相反的方向。它们通过能源、汽油和交通成本推高整体通胀,但同时也像对家庭和企业征税一样,削弱实际收入、利润率和需求。这使央行面临艰难选择:收紧政策并冒着加剧增长冲击的风险,或者暂停并冒着整体通胀传导至工资和服务价格的风险。在澳大利亚、英国和欧洲,经济增长本已疲软,市场可能已定价了过多的收紧。美国更具韧性,受到家庭支出和与人工智能相关的资本支出的支撑,但也无法免受进一步石油冲击的影响。

关键风险在于,在第一次霍尔木兹海峡关闭期间控制能源价格的缓冲措施现已基本耗尽。OECD商业库存已大幅下降,美国战略石油储备接近数十年低点,而此前国际能源署协调的释放行动留下的再次释放空间有限。成品油市场也紧张,美国中间馏分油库存低于季节性平均水平,炼油利润率处于创纪录高位。中国的库存缓冲也在关闭期间因进口大幅下降而被消耗。如果海峡持续关闭,OECD库存下降、战略石油储备受限以及中国缓冲减少,共同构成油价上行的显著风险。

澳大利亚:表面之下的疲软

澳大利亚储备银行(RBA)在六月将现金利率维持在4.35%,指出此前的收紧尚未完全传导至经济。在六月季度CPI数据发布前,市场定价年底前现金利率接近4.60%,意味着还有一次加息。然而,截尾均值通胀低于预期,为0.8%,这给了RBA在八月会议上等待的空间。目前市场定价进一步收紧的概率低于50%。我们的观点是,除非海湾冲突进一步升级,否则RBA在2026,年内已完成加息。

增长在表面数字之下正在恶化。第1季度GDP环比仅增长0.3%,并受到数据中心和人工智能基础设施投资的提振。排除这一狭窄、进口密集的资本支出类别,动力看起来更弱,因为住宅建设下降且消费者情绪疲软。劳动力数据也显示出闲置产能:失业率高于RBA的预测,而就业不足和劳动力利用不足率有所上升。这降低了工资加速增长的风险,并削弱了RBA进一步收紧的理由。

欧洲:在经济放缓中收紧

欧洲央行(ECB)在六月将利率上调25 basis points至2.25%,并在七月维持不变,现在关注点在九月。市场定价年底前还会进一步收紧50 basis points,但我们认为这在增长疲软且第二轮通胀效应证据有限的情况下过于激进。

增长明显放缓。5月欧元区综合PMI降至48.5,为30个月低点,而服务业PMI降至47.7。这一点很重要,因为任何第二轮通胀效应可能首先出现在服务业定价和工资结算中。然而,服务业活动、新订单和预期都在走弱。

工资也在继续降温。劳动力成本指标显示压力正在缓解,而非重演2022至2023的工资-价格螺旋,同时核心通胀仍接近2.3%。欧洲央行以通胀为重点的使命意味着官员们将保持警惕,9月加息仍有可能,但迄今为止,几乎没有证据表明能源冲击已蔓延至更广泛的价格制定行为。

在英国,市场预计英国央行今年年底前至少加息两次。近期通胀低于英国央行预测,核心通胀同比为2.6%,而工资增长和职位空缺正在放缓。由于政策已经具有限制性,经济增长疲弱且价格压力受控,除非海湾局势进一步升级,否则英国央行可能能够在2026,期间维持利率不变。因此,英国前端估值看起来相对具有吸引力。

美国:空谈无益——债市心知肚明

7月联邦公开市场委员会(FOMC)会议对我们上月提出的观点进行了早期检验。6月,我们认为沃什的鹰派首秀更多是建立信誉,而非美联储反应函数的明确指引:“空谈无益,美联储是否会真正兑现鹰派言论尚待观察。”7月并未证伪这一点。美联储将利率维持在3.50%–3.75%,而三位成员持异议,主张立即加息25bp个基点。沃什再次未提供前瞻指引,并表示他“欢迎”长期美债收益率走高,这加剧了关于其言论有多少会转化为行动的不确定性。

市场对此不以为意。股市最初上涨,随后回落,而收益率曲线急剧陡化。30年期国债收益率上升12 basis points个基点至5.21%,为2007,以来最高水平;同时2年期收益率下降4 basis points个基点至4.24%。这种熊市陡化表明,投资者对近期加息并不那么担忧,而更担心美联储可能行动过慢,难以遏制通胀。

通胀数据更令人鼓舞。FOMC会议次日公布的6月核心PCE环比仅上升0.1%,同比放缓至3.3%,而整体PCE下降,因为6月霍尔木兹海峡短暂停火降低了能源价格,这印证了早些时候公布的6月CPI和PPI数据。美联储是否提前看到了通胀数据?此外,达拉斯联储截尾均值PCE在12个月基础上为2.2%,服务业通胀同比为2.3%。这是沃什此前提及的替代通胀指标。剔除能源冲击后,美国通胀正更接近美联储目标,但核心PCE仍远高于目标,为3.3%,对美联储构成持续行动压力。

截至月底,美国前端利率定价9月加息一次,12月再加息一次的概率为50%。这与上个月的观察“市场已按字面意思理解他的言论并大幅重新定价”保持一致,但我们仍然认为,美联储的实际行动比言论所暗示的不确定性更大。美联储比欧洲更有灵活性来忽略能源驱动的高企整体通胀,如果7月和8月的通胀读数证实最近的进展,美联储可能会在等待沃什的工作组报告的同时,避免在2026收紧政策。然而,关键在于这取决于油价保持在每桶$100以下。

投资组合变动

尽管欧洲和英国的估值具有吸引力,但多重交叉因素使得直接进行长久期操作变得困难,尤其是在这些地区。主要风险是如果霍尔木兹海峡基本保持关闭,油价可能大幅上涨。前端收益率与油价密切相关,特别是在欧洲,由于对天然气价格的敏感性和欧洲央行以通胀为重点的使命。在美国,美联储的反应函数不确定,但除能源外的通胀正在改善。在澳大利亚,增长疲弱,近期的CPI数据表明澳洲联储可以等待,尽管目前可用的风险溢价有限。

我们将久期维持在1至2年的适度水平,重点关注估值最具吸引力的前端市场。大约一半的敞口在澳大利亚,我们对其增长前景疲软和澳洲联储按兵不动的信心更强。我们还在欧洲和英国持有较小的短期头寸,这些地方的估值最具吸引力,并在美国持有利率曲线陡峭化头寸和三年期TIPS(实际利率敞口),作为对油价大幅上涨的对冲。鉴于波动性加大,我们正根据估值变化更积极地调整敞口。

信用:降低敞口以减少相关风险

在信用方面,我们在利差风险看起来不对称的地方减少了敞口。我们将新兴市场债务敞口从6%降至2.5%,以减少对油价敏感的相关风险,关闭了接近今年最紧水平的5% AUD CDX出售保护头寸,并削减了美国混合证券的小额头寸。我们还将澳元次级银行敞口从10%增加到15%(取代了已出售的澳元信用保护)。由于赎回日期在三年以内,利差高于澳洲联储现金利率125bp个基点,这些澳大利亚银行证券为低利差久期风险提供了非常有吸引力的补偿,前提是按预期在三年内被赎回。

外币:维持较高水平的外汇风险

我们维持了7%的澳元空头头寸,主要是兑美元,作为对霍尔木兹海峡局势进一步升级的对冲。在地缘政治冲击中,美元应受益于避险需求,而澳元作为高贝塔、对中国敏感的货币则容易受到冲击。该头寸还有助于在油价上涨、通胀预期重新定价和利差扩大时,抵消信用和前端久期的潜在损失。我们将其视为非对称的宏观对冲,而非方向性货币头寸。

总之,七月的变动反映了我们观点更具选择性的表达,即市场对收紧的定价相对于潜在增长和通胀趋势而言过高,尤其是在美国以外。我们维持适度的前端久期,在风险回报恶化时削减信用敞口,并保留对油价再次冲击的对冲。

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完整英文原文

The re-escalation in the Gulf has pushed inflation and growth in opposite directions, leaving central banks with a difficult trade-off. Front-end bond valuations look appealing, but higher energy prices remain the key risk.

Market Review

The Strait of Hormuz: Re-Closed and Oil Rebounds

July’s dominant theme was renewed geopolitical risk in energy markets. The US–Iran memorandum of understanding signed on 18 June proved short-lived, with the ceasefire breaking down on 13 July and Iran reimposing restrictions on commercial shipping. By late July, the Strait of Hormuz remained effectively closed and Brent crude had rebounded to $100 per barrel. A prolonged stalemate now looks more likely than a quick resolution, keeping oil prices elevated and maintaining pressure on front-end yields.

Higher oil and gas prices are pulling inflation and growth in opposite directions. They lift headline inflation through energy, petrol and transport costs, but also act as a tax on households and businesses, weakening real incomes, margins and demand. This leaves central banks with a difficult choice: tighten and risk amplifying the growth shock, or pause and risk headline inflation feeding into wages and services prices. In Australia, the UK and Europe, where growth was already softening, markets may have priced too much tightening. The US is more resilient, supported by household spending and AI-related capex, but it is not immune to a further oil shock.

The key risk is that the buffers that contained energy prices during the first Hormuz closure are now largely spent. OECD commercial inventories have fallen sharply, the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve is near multi-decade lows, and earlier IEA-coordinated releases leave limited scope for a repeat. Product markets are also tight, with US middle-distillate stocks below seasonal averages and refining margins at record highs. China’s inventory buffer has also been drawn down after imports fell sharply during the closure. If the Strait remains closed, depleted OECD stocks, a constrained SPR and a reduced Chinese buffer create meaningful upside risk to oil prices.

Australia: Softening Underneath the Surface

The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) held the cash rate at 4.35% in June, noting that earlier tightening has yet to fully flow through the economy. Before the June quarter CPI, markets priced the cash rate near 4.60% by year-end, implying one further hike. However, trimmed mean inflation came in below expectations at 0.8%, giving the RBA room to wait at its August meeting. Further tightening is now priced at less than a 50% probability. Our view is that the RBA is done for 2026, unless the Gulf conflict escalates further.

Growth is deteriorating beneath the headline numbers. Q1 GDP rose just 0.3% quarter-on-quarter and was flattered by data centre and AI infrastructure investment. Excluding this narrow, import-intensive capex category, momentum looks weaker against falling residential construction and soft consumer sentiment. Labour data also point to spare capacity: unemployment is above the RBA’s forecast, while underemployment and underutilisation have risen. This reduces the risk of renewed wage acceleration and weakens the case for additional RBA tightening.

Europe: Tightening Into a Slowing Economy

The European Central Bank (ECB) raised rates by 25 basis points to 2.25% in June and held in July, with attention now on September. Markets are pricing a further 50 basis points of tightening before year-end, but we view this as too aggressive given weaker growth and limited evidence of second-round inflation effects.

Growth is clearly slowing. The Euro area composite PMI fell to 48.5 in May, a 30-month low, while services dropped to 47.7. This matters because any second-round inflation effects would likely appear first in services pricing and wage settlements. Instead, services activity, new orders and expectations are all weakening.

Wages also continue to cool. Labour-cost indicators point to easing pressure rather than a repeat of the 2022–2023 wage-price spiral, while core inflation remains close to 2.3%. The ECB’s inflation-focused mandate means officials will remain vigilant, and a September hike remains possible, but there is little evidence so far that the energy shock has spread into broader price-setting behaviour.

In the UK, markets price at least two Bank of England hikes by year-end. Recent inflation has been below BOE forecasts, core inflation is 2.6% year-on-year, and wage growth and vacancies are easing. With policy already restrictive, growth weak and price pressures contained, the BOE may be able to keep rates on hold for 2026, absent further Gulf escalation. UK front-end valuations therefore look relatively attractive.

United States: Talk Is Cheap - and the Bond Market Knows It

The July Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting provided an early test of the view we set out last month. In June, we argued that Warsh’s hawkish debut looked more like credibility-building than a firm guide to the US Federal Reserve’s (Fed) reaction function: “talk is cheap, and it remains to be seen whether the Fed actually delivers on the hawkish messaging.” July did little to disprove that. The Fed held rates at 3.50%–3.75%, while three members dissented in favour of an immediate 25bp hike. Warsh again offered no forward guidance and said he “welcomes” higher long-term Treasury yields, reinforcing uncertainty over how much of the rhetoric will translate into action.

Markets were unimpressed. Equities initially rallied, then reversed, while the curve steepened sharply. The 30-year Treasury yield rose 12 basis points to 5.21%, its highest level since 2007, while the 2-year yield fell 4 basis points to 4.24%. This bear steepener suggests investors are less worried about near-term hikes and more concerned that the Fed may be too slow to contain inflation.

The inflation data were more encouraging. June core PCE, released the day after the FOMC meeting, rose just 0.1% month-on-month and eased to 3.3% year-on-year, while headline PCE fell as the brief June Hormuz ceasefire reduced energy prices, confirming earlier June CPI and PPI releases. Did the Fed see the inflation data early? In addition, the Dallas Fed Trimmed Mean PCE was 2.2% on a 12-month basis and services inflation was 2.3% year-on-year. This is an alternative inflation measure that Warsh has referenced previously. Excluding the energy shock, US inflation is moving closer to the Fed’s target, but core PCE remains well above at 3.3%, maintaining pressure on the Fed to act.

By month-end, US front-end rates priced one September hike and a 50% chance of another in December. That remains consistent with last month’s observation that “markets have taken his comments at face value and repriced sharply”, but we continue to think actual Fed delivery is less certain than the rhetoric implies. The Fed has more flexibility than Europe to look through energy-driven headline inflation, and if the July and August inflation readings confirm recent progress, it may avoid tightening in 2026 while waiting for Warsh’s taskforces to report back. However, critically this depends on oil remaining below $100 a barrel.

Portfolio Changes

Several crosscurrents are making outright long-duration calls difficult, despite appealing valuations in Europe and the UK, in particular. The main risk is a materially higher oil price if the Strait of Hormuz remains largely closed. Front-end yields have been closely tied to oil, particularly in Europe given gas-price sensitivity and the ECB’s inflation-focused mandate. In the US, the Fed’s reaction function is uncertain, but inflation excluding energy is improving. In Australia, growth is weak and recent CPI data suggest the RBA can wait, although the risk premium now available is limited.

We are maintaining modest duration of 1 to 2 years, focused on front-end markets where valuations are most compelling. Around half of the exposure is in Australia, where we have greater confidence in the weakening growth outlook and an RBA on hold. We also hold smaller short-end positions in Europe and the UK which have the most attractive valuations, and in the US we hold a yield curve steepening position and three-year TIPS (real rate exposure) as a hedge against a much higher oil price. Given higher volatility, we are adjusting exposures more actively as valuations change.

Credit: Reducing exposure to reduce correlated risks

In credit, we reduced exposure where spread risk looks asymmetric. We cut emerging market debt exposure from 6% to 2.5% to reduce exposure to oil-sensitive correlated risks, closed the 5% AUD CDX sold protection position near this year’s tightest levels and cut the small position in US hybrids. We also increased the AUD subordinated bank exposure from 10% to 15% (replacing the sold AUD credit protection). With call dates under three years and spreads above 125bps over the RBA cash rate, these Australian bank securities offer very attractive compensation for low spread-duration risk, provided they are called within three years as expected.

Foreign Currency: Maintaining higher levels of FX risk

We maintained a 7% short AUD position, mainly against the US dollar, as a hedge against further escalation in the Strait of Hormuz. The USD should benefit from safe-haven demand in a geopolitical shock, while the AUD is vulnerable as a high-beta, China-sensitive currency. The position also helps offset potential losses in credit and front-end duration if oil rises, inflation expectations reprice and spreads widen. We view it as an asymmetric macro hedge rather than a directional currency position.

In summary, July’s changes reflect a more selective expression of our view that markets have priced too much tightening relative to underlying growth and inflation trends, particularly outside the US. We are maintaining modest front-end duration, trimming credit where risk-reward has deteriorated, and retaining hedges against a renewed oil shock.

Learn more about investing in Schroder Absolute Return Income fund or the Schroder Absolute Return Income Active ETF (TMX: PAYS).

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关键论点
  • 海湾地区地缘政治风险再度升级,将通胀和增长推向相反方向,使各国央行面临艰难权衡。
  • 前端债券估值具有吸引力,但能源价格上涨仍是关键风险。
  • 由于截尾均值通胀低于预期,澳洲联储可能在2026年不再加息。
  • 欧洲央行可能定价了过多的紧缩,经济增长正在放缓。
  • 如果油价保持在每桶100美元以下,且不包括能源的通胀改善,美联储可能在2026年避免加息。
  • 由于利差风险不对称,削减了信用敞口,包括新兴市场债务和澳元CDX。
  • 维持澳元空头头寸,作为对局势进一步升级和油价冲击的对冲。
风险
  • 如果霍尔木兹海峡持续关闭,油价可能会大幅上涨。
  • OECD库存减少、SPR受限以及中国缓冲减弱,油价存在上行风险。
  • 如果油价超过每桶100美元,各国央行可能被迫比预期更紧缩。
  • 地缘政治升级可能导致避险资金流入和利差扩大。