II 全球机构情报

全球前瞻:马眼罩

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全球前瞻:马眼罩

本周初被迫进行的家庭娱乐活动将在接下来的几天迅速转入正题。美国将于周一和周二在北卡罗来纳州接待G20位央行行长和财政部长。如果这还算一个家庭,那么至少可以说是一个功能失调的家庭,他们将受到关于据称不公平的贸易政策、全球失衡以及世界其他地方对美国无辜政府所做的一切坏事的训诫。礼貌地点头,也许抽签决定谁去分散注意力,谁去拨快墙上的时钟。

然后我们开始正经事。三家央行将发表意见(加拿大央行、新西兰联储、马来西亚国家银行)。周五的非农就业数据已被主席沃什宣布为无关紧要,我将解释为什么在未能认识到通胀进展的情况下宣称就业市场一切顺利是一个错误。加拿大将在周五新数据公布时,检验其连续三次强劲就业增长以及G7中最快GDP增长的势头。全球宏观日历将聚焦于顶级发布,如欧元区通胀、中国PMI以及其他几项增长和通胀数据。

加拿大央行——不要对鸽派理由太过确定

加拿大央行将于周三发布最新决定和沟通。声明将于东部时间上午9:45发布,随后行长麦克勒姆在新闻发布会上发表书面开幕词,新闻发布会本身于东部时间上午10:30开始。加拿大央行在7月货币政策报告预测会议与10月28日的下一次会议之间处于空档期。由于与保安人员持续的劳资纠纷,将不会有媒体封锁和头条新闻的禁运发布,这可能意味着市场反应会有所延迟。就我个人而言,我认为这应该成为一种习惯,让市场人士正确地做这项工作。

没有人预计央行会在这次会议上调整其2¼%的政策利率。市场定价显示本次会议不会有任何变动,10月加息约三分之一25bp点,12月9日会议加息约三分之二。丰业银行经济部预计12月将加息一次,明年还会有两次加息。

7月份的声明可能面临全面重写,因为本次会议没有预测。关键可能是结论段落。他们会继续将政策利率描述为“合适”吗?可能暂时会。他们将重申不确定性很高。他们可能暂时应该保留关于继续评估并准备“在必要时”调整的句子。更鸽派的理由是贸易。更鹰派的理由也是贸易,但还有我将解释的其他问题。

经济增长比加拿大央行预期的要强劲。7月份货币政策报告预计Q2GDP增长为2.5%,但实际数据几乎高出整整一个百分点,且细节强劲(3.4%,此处回顾)。Q1被上调了四成至+0.3%。关键在于他们何时在10月更新预测,鉴于加拿大央行此前预计Q3增长仅为1.5%。Q2的上行惊喜是否会使他们下调Q3?还是他们会跟随动能迹象,至少维持这个数字或提高它?Q2GDP回顾解释说,鉴于强劲的就业和刺激措施的传导,以及库存对增长的波动性贡献可能出现急剧反弹,Q3有相当大的消费动能迹象。

我们的预测与年底或明年初传统产出缺口(衡量经济松弛的指标)收窄相符(图表1)。如果是这样,那么这一指标可能表明加拿大央行在政策调整的滞后效应下已经落后于通胀风险。尽管仍温和但正在反弹的潜在通胀趋势已重新设定了更高的起点,这可能仍值得宽松政策,但也许不应在中性利率的下限水平(图表2)。相对于我们已经纳入秋季联邦预算的财政政策,可能有更多的上行风险。

然而,房间里的大象是,与美国重新出现的贸易紧张局势可能如何影响前景。第一点是,经济比最悲观的经济学家和记者预期的要更具韧性,因此有理由不过度悲观。尽管关税只是情况的一部分,但出口量连续四个季度实现了稳健增长。此外,我们预测2027年GDP增长为2%,因为更多的财政政策支持与更高的商品价格持续时间相结合,抵消了关税和贸易政策的直接和间接影响。

加拿大的报复性关税可能在接下来的一年里给CPI通胀增加几个十分之一百分点。来自仅对C$28B加拿大出口征收的50%美国关税的需求侧通缩冲击可能不大。重点在于,贸易紧张局势对通胀的影响是双向的。

由于加拿大央行7月货币政策报告预测2027年底通胀为2%,2028为2.1%,更强的增长、可能更早的产出缺口收窄、即将到来的更多财政刺激、强于预期的贸易条件(图表3)以及报复性关税可能促使上调这一预测。如果美联储真的认真考虑可能恢复加息,那么鉴于当前政策利率利差处于数十年高位(图表4),加拿大央行可能会被拖向更高利率。

加拿大央行目前还不会感到任何迫切性这样做。他们有近整整两个月的时间来思考如何将预测的所有要素结合起来并呈现出来。从现在到那时可能发生很多事情。边境两边情绪都非常高涨;情绪会导致糟糕的预测。我仍然谨慎乐观地认为,有一条几乎完整协议的路径,而且美国政府在明年1月失去国会一院或两院之前同意该协议将更为明智。

事实上,听那些唱反调的人不断用没完没了的负面头条来贬低加拿大,已经让人相当厌倦。我甚至有些服务都读不下去了。他们今年早些时候抛出“衰退”这个词,并且看空至一季度,结果却目睹了强劲的数据,而后他们又无视这些数据,转而支持他们一直喋喋不休的那些下行风险。空头主导了媒体,而媒体本身更倾向于报道坏消息而非好消息。他们的报道中常常缺乏必要的平衡。

周五公布的非农就业数据并不会影响大局,因为沃什主席已经这么说了。也就是说,如果你接受他的逻辑的话。我对他的论点深表怀疑。首先,我会介绍预测数字及其依据,然后解释我为何怀疑。

预计八月非农就业仅增加30千人,而七月为减少-23千人。五月和六月的修正可能小于-103千人,因为七月的初步抽样率有所提高。失业率预计将小幅上升至4.2%。

这个预测综合了多种因素以及其他方法。

从自下而上的角度分解八月就业变化是另一种估算方法。由于建筑业的拉动,七月份商品部门的招聘异常强劲(+25千人),预计这一势头将大幅消退。服务业的招聘预计将从七月的几乎停滞中加速,但各分项表现参差不齐。政府部门预计再次下降,主要因为ESSER效应对地方政府的教育岗位产生影响。

其他劳动力市场指标普遍显示就业增长乏力。消费者信心中的“工作充足”指标在八月略有回升,但仍处于疫情以来的低位。职位发布变化不大。调查结果不一:标普PMI显示就业增长为去年初以来最快,但该调查混合了公司国内外业务,而目前没有ISM数据。

本周我们将从其他几项数据中进一步了解美国就业市场状况,但我预计它们不会大幅改变上述预测。周二将发布七月份JOLTS职位空缺。ADP私营部门就业人数在八月份可能约为45千人(周三)。市场将关注ISM制造业和服务业指数,以观察其就业分项是否像其他PMI那样有所改善。周四将公布八月份的Challenger裁员数据,预计会较低。Revelio的八月非农就业指标将在周四更新,但该指标跟踪效果不佳。每周初请失业金人数也在周四公布,但不在八月参考期内。NFIB小企业招聘计划要到下周才会发布,但七月份的计划有所上升。

为何沃什不应忽视劳动力市场

美联储主席沃什在杰克逊霍尔的讲话上周五令债券市场不安。他的部分使命可能是继续对收益率施压,因为10年期美国国债收益率在最近几周徘徊在4.6%至4.7%%区间。然而,他的部分信息是,他想要更多证据表明通胀压力正在消退,并认为劳动力市场没有问题。

我理解前者,因为我们只有几个月疲软的核心CPI和核心PCE数据。不过,他基本上放弃了之前提及的核心通胀的替代中心趋势衡量指标,例如修正平均PCE,该指标同比仍高达2.3%%。随着关税的加征和大宗商品价格在更长时间内保持高位,我对他关于通胀风险的警告比对另一部分职责的担忧更容易接受。

“在美联储双重使命的就业方面,我们国家表现良好。劳动力市场相当稳定。失业率保持在4.1%,以历史标准衡量仍然较低,并且几年没有太大变化。当劳动力供应增长缓慢时,月度就业增长自然偏低。”

他在失业率方面说得部分正确。问题在于如何看待这一点,以及他倾向于将就业疲软归因于劳动力供应不足。

失业率稳定是一回事,但就业增长和收入增长才是长期推动消费的因素。在特朗普政府的ICE突袭和更严格的移民政策之前,私人非农就业(不含医疗保健和教育,其中主要是医疗保健)就已经在减弱。家庭调查中的就业增长(失业率由此得出)也长期疲软。经通胀调整后的个人可支配收入增长已陷入停滞(图8)。

你应该为失业率感到高兴吗?还是在移民政策收紧的非常时期轻视它,而更担心疲软的就业和收入?到目前为止,美国消费者支出之所以保持坚挺,是因为美国人将储蓄占收入的比例比两年前减半至3%%。在持续的负面住房财富效应中。同时,名义工资增长继续下滑(图9),按PCE通胀率计算实际为负,这应该有助于缓解对第二轮价格压力的担忧。美国的消费动态并不十分有利,我认为这应该引起沃什主席的担忧。

最终,是什么导致了可用劳动力的疲软仍不确定。劳动力参与率正在急剧下降(图10),原因是年轻和年长工人退出劳动力市场(图11)。这必然都是因为ICE突袭和移民政策,还是工人找不到合适的机会而退出?我不理解沃什主席如此确信的基础。

如果是后者,那么沃什主席忽视这一点将是非常不明智的。他可能也不应该忽视图12所显示的情况。

加拿大将于周五与美国非农就业数据同时公布8月就业数据。这通常使得解读这些数据及其对加拿大利率和外汇的影响变得更加困难,尤其是当数据出现方向性冲突时。

预计新增就业岗位20万个,失业率小幅下降至6.3%。

季节性调整因子预计将处于高位,这与近因偏差一致,而近因偏差也使得调整因子在后疫情时代持续偏高(图13)。

8月通常是加拿大就业的季节性下滑月份,但也有一些例外(图14)。我保守估计未经季节性调整的月度变化为-50万。

图15展示了未经季节性调整的变化和季节性调整因子的不同情景,以及这些情景如何更有可能指向稳健的季节性调整后就业增长。

此外,动能因素也被考虑在内。劳动力调查采用面板轮换法进行就业抽样,即轮换出第一个月,并用最近一个月替换,以形成一个滚动六个月的住户目标群体。这可能导致招聘或裁员出现动能,因为基本上是在类似的群体中询问相似的个体。图16显示,当就业增长超过150万或前三个月的均值(本次为181万)时,下个月通常也会上升。

上个月的招聘构成没有明显的扭曲,因此预计不会对本月的预期产生干扰。

其他数据不太有帮助,但小企业招聘计划保持平衡,尽管它们报告了严重的工人短缺(图17)。

考虑到强劲的Q2GDP以及之前解释的进入Q3的持续动能迹象,经济动能也值得关注。特别值得注意的,是消费领域的活动指标仍然活跃。这在奥肯定律的意义上很重要,该定律假设GDP增长与就业增长之间存在相关性。

现在预期受美国新关税影响的行业出现疲软可能还为时过早。这些关税于7月宣布,但上周五才实施,因此不在劳动力调查的参考周内。此外,我们预计其对整体就业的影响有限。

对GDP跟踪同样关键的是,工作时间动能是否持续(图18)。这很重要,因为GDP等于工作时间乘以劳动生产率。

本周只有另外两家央行将公布政策决定。它们都在亚太地区,此前韩国央行和菲律宾央行上周已加息。其中一家预计加息,另一家则维持不变。

市场共识一致预期周三加息25bp个基点。市场几乎已完全定价加息。这将是继7月新西兰联储加息后的连续第二次加息。

前瞻指引表明,“可能有必要进一步减少货币刺激,以使通胀回到2%目标区间的中点。”

关键可能在于政策倾向,因为自7月以来能源和其他大宗商品价格再度抬头。在市场已超出此前利率路径的背景下,预计将发布新的明确远期利率路径(图19)。

市场共识几乎一致预期印尼央行周四维持隔夜利率在2.75%不变。唯一预期加息的一家可能面临众多反对因素。

其一,CPI通胀仍处于低位,为1.8%%同比,核心CPI也与该水平相当。这处于央行的舒适区间。如果有什么因素可能促使收紧政策,那么稳健的GDP增长(反弹至2.5%%季环比折年率,预期为2.4%%,前值为0%%)以及自7月9日会议以来油价再度上涨可能会促成。此外,对慷慨燃料补贴的财政代价日益增长的担忧也可能推波助澜。

下周的全球宏观日历将主要由8月通胀数据和更多经济体的Q2GDP更新构成,同时还有多项活动指标,将提供对行业和经济趋势的及时洞察。Jay和我共同负责以下内容。

加拿大方面,主要关注周三的加拿大央行沟通和周五的就业报告。其他数据包括周四的7月贸易数据(近期出口表现良好,图20)。周二和周四将发布PMI,周五发布Ivey PMI。在强劲的Q2GDP报告之后,周四的Q2生产率数据可能会反弹。

非农就业数据将主导美国日历,但也要关注其他一些不太引人注目的数据。周二和周四的ISM制造业和服务业指数将更新新订单、生产、招聘、库存和价格等软数据。建筑支出可能从上一个月的下降中回升(周二)。行业指引表明8月汽车销售可能持平(周二)。工厂订单预计将录得稳健增长,基于已知的耐用品订单大幅增长1.1%%,并将计入非耐用品(周三)。周四公布的7月贸易逆差预计将扩大至-$90亿美元,前值为$73亿。此外,还有美联储的褐皮书需要考虑。

德国(周一)和意大利(周二)将推动欧洲通胀数据于本周二发布,此前法国CPI读数较高,而西班牙通胀数据温和。市场预期整体通胀数据将偏高,受天然气价格升至年内最高水平的支撑,而环比核心CPI和服务业通胀数据可能成为重点关注对象。

随着8月全球能源价格再度走高,各央行将关注国内经济的最新通胀数据,尤其是秘鲁(周二)、韩国(周二)和土耳其(周四),这些国家的通胀仍高于目标。印尼(周二)和瑞士(周四)的通胀预计将保持可控。

印度,这个世界增长最快的经济体,将于周一公布其第2季度GDP数据。在去年下半年同比增长超过8%之后,第1-26季度增长放缓至7.8%,预计第2-26季度将进一步放缓至7.3%。油价上涨可能对工业活动造成压力,但国内消费和强劲的出口应继续支撑经济。

随后,周二将公布澳大利亚第2季度GDP和智利7月经济活动数据。预计澳大利亚经济增长将保持低迷,环比增长0.3%,劳动力市场的韧性支撑家庭支出,但住房市场状况疲软拖累整体活动。

中国还将公布两组PMI:官方PMI将在周末公布,而民间出口导向PMI将在本周前半段公布。两者在经历了上月大幅下滑后均预计反弹,尽管官方指标可能仍处于收缩区间,而民间指标保持在50上方。

最后,德国7月工厂订单报告将于周五公布,将提供制造业活动近期改善的最新情况,而韩国8月出口数据将于周一公布,将作为全球半导体需求持续性的重要观察指标。

本报告由Scotiabank Economics编制,作为Scotiabank客户资源。本文所含观点、估计和预测均为我们截至本文日期之观点,如有变更恕不另行通知。本文所载信息及观点来自据信可靠的来源,但未就其准确性或完整性作出任何明示或暗示的陈述或保证。Scotiabank及其任何高级职员、董事、合伙人、员工或关联公司对因使用本报告或其内容而产生的任何直接或间接损失不承担任何责任。

完整英文原文

Forced family fun at the start of the week will quickly get down to business over the ensuing days. The US hosts G20 central bankers and finance heads on Monday and Tuesday in North Carolina. If it’s still a family, then it’s a dysfunctional one to say the least that will be lectured on allegedly unfair trade policies, global imbalances, and all the bad things the rest of the world does to the innocent US administration. Politely nod and maybe draw straws to see who distracts and who turns forward the clock on the wall.

Then we get down to business. Three central banks will weigh in (BoC, RBNZ, Negara). Friday’s nonfarm payrolls have already been declared moot by Chair Warsh and I’ll explain why that’s a mistake to declare everything as just peachy in the job market while failing to recognize progress on inflation. Canada will test its streak of three strong employment gains in a row alongside the fastest GDP growth in the G7 when new figures arrive on Friday. The global macro calendar will focus upon top tier releases like Eurozone inflation, China’s PMIs and several other growth and inflation readings.

BANK OF CANADA—DON’T BE SO SURE ABOUT THE DOVISH CASE

The Bank of Canada delivers its latest decision and communications on Wednesday. The statement arrives at 9:45amET along with Governor Macklem’s written opening remarks to his press conference that itself begins at 10:30amET. The BoC is between MPR forecast meetings in July and the next one on October 28th. There will be no media lock-up and embargoed release of headlines given an ongoing labour dispute with security guards which could mean a somewhat delayed market reaction. Personally, I think that should be habit forming by letting the street do the work properly.

Nobody expects the central bank to adjust its 2¼% policy rate at this meeting. Markets are priced for nothing at this meeting, about one-third of a 25bps hike in October and about two-thirds of a hike at the December 9th meeting. Scotiabank Economics expects a hike in December and two more into next year.

The July statement is likely to face a total re-write since this meeting does not present forecasts. Key may be the concluding paragraph. Will they continue to describe the policy rate as “appropriate”? Probably, for now. They’ll repeat that uncertainty is high. They probably should leave the sentence about continuing to assess and being prepared to adjust “as needed” intact, for now. A case for more dovishness is trade. A case for more hawkishness is also trade but also other matters I’ll explain.

Growth has come on stronger than the BoC anticipated. The July MPR had 2.5% for Q2 GDP growth and was exceeded by almost a full percentage point alongside robust details (3.4%, recap here). Q1 was revised up four-tenths to +0.3%. Key will be when they refresh projections in October given that the BoC had anticipated just 1.5% growth in Q3. Will the upside surprise in Q2 motivate them to downgrade Q3? Or will they go with momentum signs and at least stand by that number if not raise it? The Q2 GDP recap explained that there are considerable signs of consumer momentum into Q3 given strong jobs and as stimulus works through and we may also see a sharp rebound in the oscillating inventory contribution to growth.

Our forecasts are compatible with closing the traditional output gap measure of slack in the economy by year-end or very early next year (chart 1). If so, then this measure may suggest the BoC is already behind inflation risk given lagging effects of policy adjustments. Still moderate but rebounding trends in underlying inflation have reset the starting point higher which may still merit accommodation but perhaps not at the lower bound of neutral (chart 2). There is probably more upside risk to what we have already incorporated on fiscal policy into a Fall federal budget.

Still, the elephant in the room is how renewed trade tensions with the US could impact the outlook. A first point is that the economy has been more resilient than the most negative economists and journalists have anticipated and so there is a case for not overdoing the doom. Export volumes have posted solid growth for four consecutive quarters despite tariffs that have only been one part of the picture. Further, we forecast 2% GDP growth in 2027 as more fiscal policy supports combine with higher for longer commodity prices as offsets to direct and indirect effects of tariffs and trade policy.

Canada’s retaliatory tariffs could add a handful of tenths of a percentage point to CPI inflation over the coming year. The demand-side disinflationary shock from 50% US tariffs on just C$28B of Canadian exports is likely to be modest. The point being that the impact of trade tensions on inflation cuts in both directions.

Since the BoC’s July MPR had projected inflation to end 2027 at 2% and 2028 at 2.1%, stronger growth, possibly earlier closure of the output gap, more fiscal stimulus forthcoming, a stronger than anticipated terms of trade (chart 3), and retaliatory tariffs may motivate raising this projection. If the Federal Reserve is truly serious about potentially renewing rate hikes, then the BoC could be dragged higher given a multi-decade high on the current policy rate spread (chart 4).

The BoC will not feel any great urgency to do so yet. They have almost two full months to gestate over how to mix all of the ingredients of a forecast together and present it. A lot could happen between now and then. Emotions are running very high on both sides of the border; emotions make for lousy forecasts. I’m still cautiously optimistic that there is a path to a deal that was almost complete and that it would be more sensible for the US administration to agree to it before they lose one or both chambers in Congress come January.

In fact, it’s getting pretty tiring to hear the naysayers constantly dump on Canada with endless negative headlines. I can’t even read some services any longer. They threw around the ‘r’ word earlier this year and were negative into Q2 only to witness strong numbers that they then dismiss in favour of those same downside risks they’ve been harping on about forever. The bears dominate the media which itself is motivated more by bad news than good news. Lacking in their coverage is too often the requisite amount of balance.

Nonfarm payrolls for the month of August won’t matter when the figures land on Friday. That’s because Chair Warsh said so. That is, if you accept his reasoning. I’m very sceptical toward his argument. First, I’ll cover the estimates and rationale and then secondly, I’ll explain my scepticism.

Payrolls are estimated to rise by just 30k after falling by -23k in July. Revisions may be smaller than the -103k over May and June because the initial sampling rate for payrolls improved in July. The unemployment rate is forecast to tick up to 4.2%.

There are several ingredients that go into this estimate along with other methods.

A bottom-up decomposition of the change in payrolls during August is another way of approaching the estimate. Goods sector hiring was unusually strong in July (+25k) due to the construction sector and this is expected to largely drop out. Services hiring is expected to accelerate from basically nothing in July but with very mixed components. Government is expected to be down again largely given the ESSER effect on education jobs at local governments.

Other labour market readings generally indicate tepid job growth. Consumer confidence jobs plentiful picked up a bit in August but remains toward the lows since the pandemic. Job postings have been little changed. Surveys are mixed as S&P PMIs recorded the fastest pace of job growth since the start of last year but mix domestic and foreign operations of companies but we don’t have ISM readings.

We will learn more about the state of the US job market in several other readings that are due out this week but I don’t expect them to materially swing the estimate. JOLTS job openings will be released for the month of July on Tuesday. ADP private payrolls will likely land around 45k during August (Wednesday). ISM-manufacturing and ISM-services will be watched to see if their employment subindices improves like other PMIs indicated. Challenger job cuts during August are due Thursday but are expected to be low. Revelio’s nonfarm payrolls indicator for August will be refreshed on Thursday but tracks poorly. Weekly claims also come out Thursday but are outside of the August reference period. NFIB small business hiring plans will not be released until the following week but plans were rising to July.

Why Warsh Shouldn’t Ignore the Labour Market

Federal Reserve Chair Warsh’s Jackson Hole speech spooked bond markets on Friday. Part of his mission may have been to keep up pressure on yields as the 10-year Treasury has stalled out in the 4.6–4.7% range over recent weeks. Part of his message, however, was that he wants much more evidence on disinflationary pressures and sees nothing wrong with the labour market.

I can understand the former given we only have a few months of soft core CPI and core PCE readings. Still, he has basically abandoned earlier references to alternative central tendency measures of underlying inflation like trimmed mean PCE that is still cruising at just 2.3% y/y. With tariffs being added and commodity prices higher for longer, however, I have less difficulty with his cautions on inflation risk than on the other half of his mandate.

“On the employment side of the Fed's dual mandate, our country is doing well. Labor markets are quite stable. The jobless rate, at 4.1 percent, remains low by historical standards and has not changed much for a couple of years. When labor supply is barely growing, monthly job gains are naturally going to run low.”

He’s partly right on the unemployment rate. The issue is what to make of that and his tendency to attribute soft jobs to soft labour supply.

A stable unemployment rate is one thing, but job growth and income growth are what drive consumption over time. Private nonfarm payrolls ex-health and education (mostly health) have been weakening long before ICE raids and tighter immigration policy under the Trump administration. The household survey’s job growth—from which the unemployment rate is derived—has also been weak for an extended period. Overall inflation-adjusted growth in personal disposable income has ground to a halt (chart 8).

Should you be enthused by the unemployment rate? Or downplay it in unusual times amid tightened immigration policy and more concerned about weak jobs and incomes? So far, US consumer spending has held up because Americans have cut the share of their incomes being saved in half to 3% compared to two years ago. Amid an ongoing negative housing wealth effect. While nominal wage growth continues to slide (chart 9) and is negative in real terms using the PCE inflation rate which should help to ease concerns about second-round price pressures. US consumer dynamics are not terribly favourable and I think that should concern Chair Warsh.

Ultimately it remains uncertain what is driving softness in the pool of available labour. The labour force participation rate is falling sharply (chart 10) due to exits by younger and older workers (chart 11). Is that necessarily all because of ICE raids and immigration policy, or are workers not finding suitable opportunities and dropping out? I don’t understand the foundations behind Warsh’s certainty.

If it’s the latter, then Chair Warsh would be very ill-advised to ignore it. He probably should not ignore what is shown in chart 12 either.

Canada refreshes jobs for the month of August on Friday at the same time as US payrolls. That often makes it difficult to disentangle the readings and their effects on Canadian rates and FX if there is any hint of competing directions.

A gain of 20k is expected with a downtick in the unemployment rate to 6.3%.

A high seasonal adjustment factor is expected in keeping with the recency bias to how they are calculated and that has driven them to be elevated in the post-pandemic era (chart 13).

August is normally a seasonal down month for employment in Canada with some exceptions (chart 14). I’ve conservatively gone with -50k m/m NSA.

Chart 15 shows scenarios around seasonally unadjusted changes and SA factors and how more often than not they would point to a solid seasonally adjusted gain in jobs.

What has also been considered is momentum. The Labour Force Survey uses a panel rotation approach to sampling jobs that rotates out the first month and replaces it with the latest month in a rolling six-month target population of households. This can lead to momentum in hirings or firings by basically asking similar groups of individuals across similar panels. Chart 16 shows that when job growth has exceeded 150k or the prior three months (181k this time), the next month is usually up again.

There were no notable distortions to the prior month’s composition of hiring that would be expected to distort expectations for this month.

Other readings are not terribly helpful but small business hiring plans are balanced while nevertheless reporting severe worker shortages (chart 17).

There is also a lot to be said for momentum in the economy given strong Q2 GDP and the signs of sustained momentum into Q3 that were explained here. Of particular note is that activity readings for the consumer sector remain buoyant. This matters in an Okun’s “law” sense that posits a correlation between GDP growth and employment growth.

It’s likely too soon to expect weakness in sectors newly affected by additional US tariffs that were announced in July but only implemented this past Friday and hence outside of the LFS reference week. Further, we expect a limited impact upon overall jobs.

Also key for GDP tracking will be whether momentum in hours worked is sustained (chart 18). This matters since GDP is hours worked times labour productivity.

Only two other central banks will weigh in with policy decisions this week. They are both in the Asia-Pacific region and follow hikes this past week by the Bank of Korea and the central bank of the Philippines. One is expected to hike while the other holds.

Consensus unanimously expects a 25bps rate hike on Wednesday. Markets are almost fully priced for a hike. This would be the second consecutive hike after the RBNZ hiked in July.

Advance guidance indicated that "some further reduction in monetary stimulus is likely to be required to return inflation to the 2 percent target midpoint."

Key may be the bias given a resurgence of energy and other commodity prices since July. A fresh explicit forward rate path is expected in the context of markets that have been overshooting the prior rate path (chart 19).

Consensus is almost unanimous in expecting Negara to hold its overnight rate at 2.75% on Thursday. The one holdout who expects a hike may have most things going against such expectations.

One is that CPI inflation remains low at 1.8% y/y with core CPI matching that rate. That’s within the central bank’s comfort zone. If anything motivates tightening, then decent GDP growth that rebounded to 2.5% q/q SAAR (2.4% consensus, 0% prior) and renewed increases in oil prices since the July 9th meeting might do it. So may a growing sense of the fiscal price being paid for generous fuel subsidies.

Next week’s global macro calendar will be shaped by August inflation data and Q2 GDP updates from more economies, alongside several activity indicators that will offer timely insights into sectoral and economic trends. Jay and I partner on the following.

Canada will mostly focus upon Wednesday’s BoC communications and Friday’s jobs report. Additional readings include trade figures for July (Thursday) with exports performing rather well of late (chart 20). PMIs are due out on Tuesday and Thursday plus the Ivey PMI on Friday. Q2 productivity figures (Thursday) will likely rebound in the wake of a strong Q2 GDP report.

Nonfarm payrolls will dominate the US calendar but watch for a few other lower profile readings. ISM-manufacturing (Tuesday) and ISM-services (Thursday) will refresh soft data on new orders, production, hiring, inventories and prices. Construction spending could pick up from the prior month’s dip (Tuesday). Industry guidance points to a flat month for vehicle sales during August (Tuesday). Factory orders are expected to post a solid gain based on the already known 1.1% rise in big-ticket durable goods orders and will add in nondurable goods (Wednesday). The trade deficit is expected to blow out toward -US$90B from $73B previously when July’s figures are released on Thursday. There is also the Fed’s Beige Book to consider.

Germany on Monday and Italy on Tuesday are set to drive the European inflation releases due this Tuesday, following France’s warm CPI reading and Spain’s tame inflation data last week. The market expects a warm headline print, supported by natural gas prices rising to their highest level of the year, with the month-over-month core CPI and services inflation figures likely to be the key focus.

With global energy prices elevated again in August, central banks will be focused on updated inflation readings in their domestic economies, especially in Peru (Tuesday), South Korea (Tuesday), and Turkey (Thursday), where inflation remains above target. Inflation in Indonesia (Tuesday) and Switzerland (Thursday) is expected to remain under control.

India, the world’s fastest-growing economy, is set to release its Q2 GDP figures on Monday. After expanding by more than 8% year over year in the second half of last year, growth slowed to 7.8% in Q1-26 and is projected to ease further to 7.3% in Q2-26. Higher oil prices are likely to weigh on industrial activity, although domestic consumption and stronger exports should continue to support the economy.

Attention will then turn to Australia’s Q2 GDP release and Chile’s July economic activity data on Tuesday. Australian growth is expected to remain subdued at 0.3% quarter over quarter, with labour market resilience supporting household spending but softer housing market conditions weighing on overall activity.

China will also release two sets of PMIs: the official state PMIs over the weekend and the private, export-oriented PMIs in the first half of the week. Both are expected to rebound after last month’s sharp decline, although the official measure is likely to remain in contraction territory while the private gauge stays above 50.

Finally, Germany’s July factory orders report on Friday will provide an update on the recent improvement in manufacturing activity, while South Korea’s August export data on Monday will be closely watched as a gauge of continued global semiconductor demand.

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关键论点
  • 加拿大央行预计维持2.25%不变,但市场定价10月加息概率约1/3,12月约2/3。
  • 丰业银行预计12月加息,明年再加两次,理由是增长强劲和通胀风险。
  • 美国8月非农就业预计增加3万,失业率升至4.2%。
  • 质疑美联储主席沃什对劳动力市场疲软的轻视;收入和就业增长正在走弱。
  • 加拿大8月就业预计增加2万,失业率降至6.3%。
  • 新西兰联储可能加息25个基点,为连续第二次加息。
  • 印尼央行预计维持2.75%不变。
  • 全球数据重点:欧元区通胀、中国PMI、印度Q2 GDP。
风险
  • 与美国贸易紧张局势可能影响加拿大央行前景,关税推升通胀并降低增长。
  • 如果美联储再次加息,加拿大央行可能因利差被迫跟进。
  • 美国消费者疲软源于实际收入下降,若劳动力市场恶化超预期可能加剧。
  • 情绪和政治因素可能破坏贸易协议,影响预测。