由于未能在最后一刻达成协议以避免新的第 338 条关税，新关税现已正式生效，适用于从加拿大进口至美国的另一部分商品。
正如我们之前所指出的，这些措施对约占加拿大对美出口 5% 的美国进口商品征收 50% 的关税税率——这是在钢铝、木材和机动车辆等产品已有关税基础上的额外加征。
正如一个月前关税首次宣布时我们所论证的，关税规模可能不足以令加拿大的经济增长前景脱轨。新征税的美国进口商品中加拿大附加值部分合计约占加拿大GDP和就业的 0.4%。超过 80% 的出口在CUSMA豁免下仍可免关税。
尽管如此，这些措施标志着美国关税威胁/措施的再次加剧，且特别针对加拿大。在此，我们概述了关于新措施我们已知和未知的信息，以及未来几天需要解答的关键问题。
对于特定目标行业，影响将十分显著
这些关税与此前的措施不同，至少在纸面上，美国进口商相对于加拿大出口商而言，转向替代市场的难度要显著更低。
根据我们此前的统计，在 2025 年，美国针对的进口产品中，约 3.7% 来自加拿大，而这些产品在加拿大出口中，美国占比达 81%。
塑料制品、电机设备、家具和木制品行业是受新措施影响最大的行业——从区域来看，这意味着经济影响将更集中在魁北克省、不列颠哥伦比亚省和安大略省。
由于关税税率如此之高且仅适用于加拿大，从加拿大购买这些产品将因成本过高而不可行。
从机制上看，加拿大的平均有效关税税率将从约 3% 上升至约 6%——不再是美国主要贸易伙伴中最低的，但仍低于美国对全球所有国家进口商品的平均关税税率（接近 7%）。实际上，观测到的关税税率不会增加那么多，因为许多高关税产品将直接不再交易。但关税上升带来的经济成本是实实在在的。
美国政府此前征收的关税在最初实施措施后的数周内已被修改或取消。
这包括在2025年3月短暂对加拿大进口商品征收全面关税，之后几天内实施CUSMA豁免，该豁免自此保护了加拿大大部分出口商品免受关税影响。
此外，从美国对全球贸易伙伴征收的全面关税（即当前取代IEEPA关税的第301条关税制度，而IEEPA关税在2月被美国最高法院裁定无效，并暂时被第122条措施取代）中豁免的商品清单已扩大，覆盖了美国进口商品的一半以上。
但据报道，美加双方已切断谈判，使得结束当前额外关税的路径高度不确定。
截至撰写本文时，加拿大尚未宣布对新的美国关税的具体回应，但已表示计划采取报复措施。
一般而言，报复措施通常会增加国内（加拿大）进口的成本，而不是损害外国出口商。
但在这种情况下，一个细微差别是，加拿大实际上是美国新第338条关税清单上产品的净进口国——加拿大在2025年从美国进口了约$23亿美元的目标产品，而出口约为$20亿美元。
从理论上讲，这意味着将这类特定产品的进口转向原本运往美国的加拿大卖家，从机械上可能完全弥补失去的美国出口。
现实情况并非如此简单——供应链高度一体化，因此边境两侧都有出口商/进口商将因新关税而面临成本大幅增加。
但与迄今为止实施的其他一些行业特定关税相比，这些措施下，贸易流向更有可能在北美内部重新调整，以避免关税成本增加。
商业信心/投资会受到影响吗？
大多数（超过80%）加拿大对美出口在新关税下仍将免税——但美国行政当局关税政策的不可预测性意味着企业无法预测哪个行业可能成为下一个目标。而这种不可预测性对所有受贸易影响的行业的商业信心都构成压力，而不仅仅是那些直接受到关税影响的行业。
尽管如此，经过一年半的关税威胁，企业已显示出适应不确定性的迹象，截至2026，商业信心和投资指标有所回升。
我们预计这些新关税对宏观经济的整体影响不足以推动加拿大央行认真考虑转向降息。
关税对经济增长的阻力仍相对集中在少数受影响严重的行业，财政（政府税收和支出）政策仍比央行全面调整利率更适合提供有针对性的救济——而且有报道称，在最新一轮关税实施后，将有财政支持措施跟进。
尽管如此，贸易不确定性加剧以及近期潜在（不包括能源产品）通胀趋势的回落，也增加了加拿大央行今年不会加息的可能性。
这对更广泛的CUSMA谈判意味着什么？
第338条关税措施的出台进一步侵蚀了受CUSMA保护的加拿大出口份额，但根据现行规则，超过80%的加拿大出口仍应继续免税跨境。
CUSMA本身十年内不会到期，协议要求在到期前进行谈判以尝试续签。但额外关税的威胁仍将存在。
尽管如此，更广泛的CUSMA豁免在多种形式的美国更广泛关税政策下得以维持，包括当前的第301条全球关税措施。随着豁免第301条关税的更广泛产品清单扩大至覆盖美国大部分进口，美国全球平均关税税率呈下降而非上升趋势。
尽管美国贸易政策的未来充满不确定性，但我们继续认为，加拿大与美国之间的跨境贸易对双方均有益，这支持了CUSMA下大部分贸易应保持免税的观点。
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With no last-minute deal to avoid new section 338 tariffs, new tariffs have now officially taken effect on another subset of U.S. imports from Canada.
As we noted previously, the measures apply a 50% tariff rate on U.S. imports accounting for about 5% of Canadian exports to the United States – adding to existing tariffs on products like steel and aluminum, lumber, and motor vehicles.
As we argued a month ago when the tariffs were initially announced, the size of the tariffs is likely not large enough to derail Canada’s economic growth backdrop. The Canadian value added content of newly tariffed U.S. imports adds up to ~0.4% of Canadian GDP and jobs. More than 80% of exports would remain duty free under CUSMA exemptions.
Still, the measures mark a re-intensification of U.S. tariff threats/measures, and concentrated specifically on Canada. Here we outline what we know, and what we don’t know, about new measures and key questions that will need to be answered in the days ahead.
For specific sectors targeted, the impact will be significant
These tariffs are different than previous measures in that, at least on paper, it appears that U.S. importers would have a significantly easier time than Canadian exporters diversifying to alternative markets.
By our earlier count, about 3.7% of total U.S. imports of products targeted come from Canada in 2025 while the U.S. accounted for 81% of Canadian exports of those products.
Plastic products, electrical machinery, furniture and wood product sectors are among the most significantly impacted by the new measures – and regionally that means a higher concentration of economic impact in Quebec, BC, and Ontario.
Because the tariff rate is so high and applies only to Canada, purchases of these products from Canada would be prohibitively expensive.
Canada’s average effective tariff rate mechanically would rise to around 6% from around 3%—no longer the lowest among major U.S. trade partners, but still below the average U.S. tariff rate on imports from all countries (close to 7%). In practice, the observed tariff rate will not increase that much, because many of these highly tariffed products will simply not be traded. But the economic cost of the increase is real nonetheless.
Prior tariffs imposed by the U.S. administration have been modified or dropped in the weeks following the initial imposition of measures.
That includes briefly imposed blanket tariffs on imports from Canada imposed in March 2025 before the CUSMA exemption that has since protected the bulk of Canadian exports from tariffs was imposed days later.
And an exemption list from broader U.S. tariffs imposed on all trade partners (the current section 301 tariff regime that replaced the section 122 measures that temporarily replaced the IEEPA tariffs struck down by the U.S. supreme court in February) has grown to cover more than half U.S. imports.
But the U.S. and Canadian sides have reportedly cut off negotiations, leaving the path to end the current additional tariffs highly uncertain.
At time of writing Canada has not yet announced a specific response to the new U.S. tariffs but has signaled plans to impose retaliatory measures.
In general, retaliatory measures typically add costs to domestic (Canadian) imports rather than hurting foreign country exporters.
But a nuance in this case is that Canada is actually a net importer of products on the new section 338 tariff list from the United States – Canada imported about $23 billion USD of the products targeted from the U.S. in 2025 compared to about $20 billion USD of exports.
On paper, that means that redirecting imports of these specific products to instead purchase from Canadian sellers that otherwise would have been shipping to the United States mechanically could actually fully replace lost U.S. exports.
The reality is that would not be so simple – supply chains are heavily integrated so there are exporters/importers on both sides of the border that will see a significant increase in costs as a result of new tariffs.
But there is likely more potential for trade flows to reorient within North America to avoid increased tariff costs with these measures than some of the other sector specific tariffs imposed to-date.
Will business sentiment/investment falter?
Most (more than 80%) of Canadian exports to the U.S. would remain tariff free under new tariffs – but the unpredictability of U.S. administration tariff policy means it is not possible for businesses to predict which sectors might be next. And that unpredictability is a weight on business confidence across all trade exposed industries, not just those directly targeted with tariffs.
Still, businesses have been showing signs of adapting to living under uncertainty after a year and a half of tariff threats with measures of business confidence and investment perking up to-date in 2026.
We do not expect the broader macroeconomic impact of these new tariffs to be enough to push the Bank of Canada to seriously consider pivoting to interest rate cuts.
Tariff economic growth headwinds are still relatively narrowly based in a smaller number of highly impacted industries and fiscal (government tax and spending) policy is still better suited to provide targeted relief than blanket changes in interest rates from the central bank – and there are reports that fiscal supports will follow the imposition of this latest tariff round.
Still, the intensification of trade uncertainty and recent moderation in underlying (excluding energy products) inflation trends also has increased the likelihood that the BoC will not hike interest rates this year.
What does it mean for broader CUSMA negotiations?
The section 338 tariff measures imposed further erode the share of Canadian exports protected by CUSMA, but more than 80% of Canadian exports should continue to cross the border duty free under current rules.
CUSMA itself does not expire for a decade, and the agreement requires negotiations in the mean-time to try and extend the deal before then. But the threat of additional tariffs will remain.
Still, the broader CUSMA exemption has held through multiple forms of broader U.S. tariff policies, including the current section 301 global tariff measures. U.S. average tariff rates globally have been drifting lower rather than higher with the list of broader products exempt from those section 301 tariffs rising to cover the bulk of overall U.S. imports.
While the future of U.S. trade policy is highly uncertain, we continue to argue that trade across the Canada and U.S. border is mutually beneficial, and that argues for the bulk of trade to remain tariff free under CUSMA.
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