Natixis · Bastien AILLET · 09/01/2026

Cancelling Public Debt : A well-intentioned mistake

Complete Research

Complete English original

Marketing communication: This document is a marketing presentation. It has not been prepared in accordance with legal requirements designed to promote the independence of investment research; and it is not subject to any prohibition on dealing ahead of the dissemination of investment research. 1 September 2026 EMEA M ACRO S NAPSHOT Cancelling Public Debt : A well- intentioned mistake During its summer school, the leaders of the far-left party, La France Insoumise led by Jean-Luc Mélenchon (LFI) raised the idea to cancel part of the French public debt held by the ECB/Eurosystem (especially that related to the pandemic). Then follows a verbal sparring between the President of the National Rally, Jordan Bardella and Matthieu Pigasse (a not yet official candidate (?) close to the leftist parties). While the former qualified this proposal as a “bad idea”, the latter mocked the former’s grasp of economics. In this report, we analyze these proposals, which may be seen as a well-intentioned mistake, as they are likely to generate more problems than benefits. We see several hurdles with the proposals made by LFI, which make them unrealistic and both institutionally and financially useless. First, without changes in the Treaty on the European Union, any form of public debt restructuring would be legally challenged by euro area partners. Second, in the absence of financial market reaction, the potential benefits look limited, as it will force the Bank of France to stop any profit redistribution to the French government. Third, in case of market reaction (which is highly probable), the likely increase of risk premium on French public bonds would imply an increase of costs rather than benefits. In sum, the current situation is preferable. In fact, French public bonds held by Bank of France generates profits that are distributed in turn to the French State. WRITTEN BY Alain DURRE, PhD Tel. +33 1 58 55 60 49 alain.durre@natixis.com Jean-François ROBIN Tel. +33 1 58 55 13 09 jean-francois.robin@natixis.com Bastien AILLET Tel. +33 1 58 55 39 36 bastien.aillet@natixis.com Discover more on our Website EMEA M ACRO S NAPSHOT 2 Think the unthinkable As we illustrated in previous reports 1 , the fiscal situation of France is critical for both public deficit and public debt. With a public deficit expected this year and next at above 5% of GDP, we forecast a continued increase of public debt to reach around 118% of GDP by 2028. Behind the expected mechanical increase of public debt stands the so-called “snowball effect” as current nominal GDP growth (2.0% in 2025) remains below the effective cost of funding (1.9%) of the French government. This fragile fiscal situation led some candidates for the presidential election (next 18 April-2 May) to consider the possibility to play with the French debt holdings by the Eurosystem (and the Bank of France in particular) to reduce the financial burden of the French state. Three proposals have recently emerged. The first two proposals are contained in the official programme for the presidential election of the far-left candidate, Jean-Luc Mélenchon (from La France Insoumise, LFI). The last proposal is the suggestion of a businessman close to the far-left party LFI. 2 ► Proposal 1: To demand that the European Union mandate the European Central Bank (ECB) to convert its holdings of sovereign debt into perpetual zero- coupon bonds 3 ► Proposal 2: To have the ECB bypass private banks to purchase public debt directly on financial markets, to bypass private banks, thereby removing government financing from the grip of financial markets. ► Proposal 3: A leftist banker, Matthieu Pigasse, close to the LFI party suggested to cancel simply the share of French public debt held by the ECB (and the Bank of France in particular). All proposals would be legally challenged The introduction of the euro was made possible after a compromise between two opposite visions. Originally, some countries led by Germany argued that adopting a stable single currency requires first a fiscal/political union that they saw neither desirable nor feasible. By contrast, other countries led by France argued that a stable single currency is possible without a political union under certain conditions. These countries saw deeper fiscal integration as both desirable and achievable. Hence, their enthusiasm for the single currency: it represented a ‘forcing mechanism’ to drive deeper economic and political integration beyond the economic and monetary union that would pave the way to a more federal Europe A compromise was thus reached through the adoption of several strong legal provisions in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), to 1 See e.g. Camatte, H. and Bartoletti, T. (2026), “France remains the Euro area's runner-up for public spending”, EMEA Macro Insights: August 28. 2 Some economists also close the LFI party also suggested to force the ECB to relaunch its QE programme, while forcing French banks to hold a minimum level of public bonds. Although beyond the scope of this report, the former suggestion would breach the central bank independence, while the latter appears difficult to envisage in the absence of state control on banks and/or regulatory enforcements. 3 See the official LFI programme for the presidential election https://melenchon2027.fr/programme2025/livre/chapitre6/s4/ . EMEA M ACRO S NAPSHOT 3 guarantee the stability of the single currency in the absence of a fiscal union . In particular: ► The establishment of the European Central Bank (ECB) pursuing a single monetary policy objective, namely price stability (Articles 127 and 282 of TFEU). ► The prohibition of monetary financing (Article 123 TFEU) to ensure monetary dominance and to preserve the integrity of central banks’ balance sheet. ► The prohibition of privileged access (Article 124 TFEU), which requires to treat similarly the private and the public sector in their relationships with the Eurosystem (i.e. ECB and National Central Banks). ► The independence of the central banks (Article 130 TFEU), which bans central banks and their decision-making bodies to seek or take instructions from Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, from any government of a Member State or from any other public body. 4 The proposals 1-3 above would breach the above-mentioned Treaty provisions as refinancing part or the entire public debt of states at an interest deviating from market conditions would constitute both monetary financing and privileged access while affecting the central bank independence. In the same vein, cancelling part of the French public debt held by the Eurosystem would thus breach these four Treaty provisions at least, since: (a) reducing public debt level of a country is similar as to finance directly the state ( just like financing the State at a rate that differs from market conditions) ; (b) this would also reduce the financial (and institutional, if following instructions of a government) independence of the central bank; (c) cancelling public and not private debt held by the Eurosystem would be against the privileged access prohibition; and (d) a sort of perpetual financing of public deficits would inevitably generate inflationary pressures (and would not comply with the objective of price stability). . As it is, all the proposals would be illegal given the current Treaty provisions and the ECB Statutes. Therefore, the only way to force the implementation of these proposals would be a change of the legal provisions in the Treaty, which appears neither desirable, not feasible (given the historical compromise between countries for the launch of the euro) and or trigger a political and likely financial clash. At the same time, there is no reason why the ECB could decide to act in favour of only one country like France and not for all euro area countries, which would substantially weaken the financial soundness of the Eurosystem, and thereby cancel the likelihood of such proposals. 4 This Treaty provision also stresses that the Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies and the governments of the Member States undertake to respect this principle and not to seek to influence the members of the decision-making bodies of the European Central Bank or of the national central banks in the performance of their tasks. EMEA M ACRO S NAPSHOT 4 Risk of introducing a ‘ fait du prince ’ premium Beyond the legal challenges, it remains that such a decision – through government pressures or by a deliberate decision by the ECB (not our base case as it is very unlikely) – would introduce an important moral hazard for the whole euro area system. In fact, questioning the reimbursement of public debt (partly or in totally) could be perceived by the market as an implicit threat of Frexit. We see four channels at least through which the cancellation of French public debt held by the Eurosystem could increase the risk premium on the marketable French public bonds, but not only. ► First, this would generate a huge uncertainty about the commitment of France to reimburse the remainder share of its public bonds in circulation. ► Second, the non-respect by France of key founding principles surrounding the euro area and its monetary policy could lead the market to question future participation of France to the euro (implying the resurgence of the (Frexit) redenomination risk). ► Third, the losses faced by the ECB through the balance sheet of Banque of France will de facto reduce the financial provisions and/or the central bank equity, which could weaken the euro exchange rate, thereby increasing the inflation premium. 5 ► Fourth, cancelling French debt held on central bank balance sheets would undermine market confidence in the stability of the entire euro area framework. With the credibility of fiscal rules already severely eroded, such a decision would challenge the very rationale behind the single currency. It would raise fears that European Central Bank (ECB) monetary policy could become subordinate to potential future fiscal profligacy. This would likely trigger a flight to quality, adversely affecting all euro-denominated financial assets and thereby increasing the inflation premium resulting from the depreciation of the euro . Recalling the euro area’s original sin – the initial deep-seated division between Europhiles and Eurosceptics – cancelling a portion of France’s sovereign debt would ignite a severe political conflict among member states. Such a clash would ultimately threaten to call into question the very design of the economic and monetary union. 5 The ECB Governing Council approved this rationale at early stage of the financial crisis (which is considered as an annex of the TFEU). EMEA M ACRO S NAPSHOT 5 An illusory economy In the very unlikely – because unrealistic – case that one of the above proposals would be agreed by European partners (not our base case), the potential benefits of such operations would be very limited in the absence of market reaction (also unlikely). And in case one of these operations would increase the risk premium on France’s public bonds (very likely), this would lead to additional costs for the French government while being inflationary. A stock story An obvious first question is the volume of debt that would be affected by each of the three proposals. In July 2026, French debt held by the Eurosystem as part of its monetary policy programme stood at €600bn ( Chart 1 ). Of this total, nearly 80% is held by the Banque de France (BdF), amounting to €494bn (or 14% of French Maastricht debt) 6 . This sum is split between €360bn under the PSPP and €239bn under the PEPP by the Eurosystem. Consequently, under Proposals 1 and 3, the debt stock in question is close to €600bn 7 within the Eurosystem. Proposal 2, for its part, target the entire debt held by the private sector. Depending on the scope of the proposal, the figures could vary significantly. For instance, would it only comprise debt securities, or should loans be included as well? Would it focus solely on central government debt, or also encompass local government and social security schemes? For the sake of simplicity, we shall focus exclusively on debt managed by Agence France Trésor (AFT), the debt management office (DMO) of French state debt securities. As of 31 July, the outstanding amount managed by the AFT was €2,882bn, representing around 80% of French Maastricht debt 8 . Of this amount, 47.5% was held by domestic investors, with the remainder held by non- domestic investors. Analysing the ECB’s SHSS database provides a clearer picture of the market participants likely to be affected by this proposal ( Chart 2 ). In total, this proposal would include a volume of debt close to €2,250bn. 6 There is no official figure for the debt held by the Banque de France (BdF) under its monetary policy for July 2026. However, at the end of 2025, the BdF held €545bn of the €663bn total held by the Eurosystem, representing 82.3%. We assumed this share remained unchanged in July 2026. See 2025 Annual Report Banque de France. 7 By the time the election concludes in May 2027, this figure will have reduced; however, for the remainder of this analysis, we shall stick to the July 2026 data. 8 See Agence France Trésor . At the end of March, the total outstanding amount stood at €2,804bn, compared to a Maastricht debt of €3,536bn, or 79.2%. EMEA M ACRO S NAPSHOT 6 Chart 1: Holdings of French bonds under PSPP and PEPP programs(€bn) Chart 2: French securities holdings by type of holders in Q1-26 (€bn) 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 PSPP PEPP Eurosystem Private holdings 0 250 500 750 1000 1250 1500 1750 2000 2250 2500 Eurosystem Foreign investors Domestic Banks Domestic I & PF Other € Banks Other € I & PF Other € investors Source : ECB, Natixis CIB Research Sources: ECB SHSS database, Natixis CIB Research Note: I&PF stands for Insurance companies and Pension Funds A flow story Having addressed the question of the debt stock involved, we now turn to the potential benefits the above proposals would yield for the government. These would primarily manifest as a reduction in its debt-servicing costs, with the amount and dynamic differing across the three proposals compared to a no-ECB intervention scenario — which would require refinancing the debt at a 3.7% yield 9 . For the first and second proposals, we assume that the ECB waits for the securities to mature and then refinances them using zero-coupon bonds 10 . These annual amounts refinanced are equal to €94bn in the first proposal 11 and range between €90bn and €150bn for the second proposal. Under the first proposal, the annual interest savings could reach €3.5bn on the debt held by the Eurosystem, split between €2.2bn for the PSPP portfolio and €1.3bn for the PEPP portfolio. Assuming the intervention begins in 2027, the government would save €21.6bn in interest payments once the portfolio is completely refinanced in 2033 ( Chart 3 ). 9 We replicate here the assumptions of our 'market forward -100bp' scenario, which was developed in our previous note. « France’s Rising Public Debt : The Bill Comes Due » 10 Put differently, the government does not default on its debt, whether through interest payments or the repayment of principal. 11 Since the weighted average maturity of the French debt held by the Eurosystem is 6.4 years, we assume that 1/6.4 of the total debt — approximately 16% — is refinanced annually and with the total portfolio being refinanced in 6.4 years This represents €94bn being refinanced each year. EMEA M ACRO S NAPSHOT 7 Chart 3: Cumulative variation in French general government cost of debt under the different proposals compared to a no ECB intervention scenario (€bn) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 -35 -30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 Proposal 1 Proposal 2 Proposal 3 Sources : Agence France Tresor, ECB, Banque de France, Natixis CIB Research The second proposal is expected to generate cumulative savings of nearly €30bn in 2033 or €4.2bn in annual interest savings. Finally, the amount saved in the third proposal is equal to the first one. However, the dynamics of the annual interest saved would differ slightly. A bail-out on the debt held by the Eurosystem would immediately relieve the government of its interest payment obligations. To be specific, these interest expenses amounted to €5.6bn in 2025 and €5.7bn in 2024 12 at the Banque de France level, representing an annual yield of 0.7%. Extrapolating this yield to the entire Eurosystem portfolio in July 2026 suggests the government would save €4.2bn immediately, whereas under the first proposal, this €4.2bn saving would only be realised progressively. Taken together, Proposals 1 and 2 could allow the government to save up to €30.6bn by 2030, and €51bn by 2033, assuming the intervention starts in 2027. From theory to practice The potential savings we discussed above are just theoretical as they suppose no reaction from the financial markets under proposal 1 and 3. However, the reality could be quite different. as this does not take into account: 1) the French government's loss of revenue related to potential dividend distributions from the BdF, and 2) an increase in the risk premium demanded by investors on the remainder of the debt traded on financial markets. Regarding the latter point, the rise in the risk premium would affect both future deficits and the substantial volume of upcoming debt refinancing 13 . Assuming future deficits remain between €150bn and €160bn, a 100bp increase in the risk premium would add €1.5bn to €1.6bn in interest charges. This additional cost is already well above the savings that would be generated by the PEPP portfolio under the first proposal alone. When factoring in the refinancing of maturing debt, this extra 12 Banque de France Annual Report 2025 . 13 It should be noted that Proposition 2 assumes future deficits would be financed by the ECB/Banque de France, which is not necessarily the case for the other two propositions. To avoid the risk premium demanded by the market, the latter two assume that the French State has a balanced budget. EMEA M ACRO S NAPSHOT 8 cost would range between €2bn and €3bn per year under proposal 1 mentioned above 14 . By netting the cumulative annual extra cost on one hand with the annual savings on the other, a scenario involving a 100bp increase in the risk premium on French debt would result in an overall cost of debt saving of €5.4 in 2033 once the entire portfolio is completely refinanced ( Chart 4 ). Chart 4: Cumulative interest payment difference for different risk premium increases under Proposal 1 compared a no ECB intervention scenario (€bn) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 -16 -14 -12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 50bp 100bp 150bp Source : Agence France Tresor, ECB, Banque de France, Natixis CIB Research This projection is obviously highly sensitive to the risk premium increase priced in by the markets. In a scenario where this increase is limited to 50bp, refinancing both the PSPP and PEPP would yield a net gain for the government of €14.9bn; however, it would result in an additional cost of €4bn, should the premium reach 150bp. As we can see, the actual gains are highly uncertain and would depend almost entirely on how markets would react to the decision and for potential gains that are ultimately quite limited, especially since the risk premium will remain after the ECB portfolio is completely refinanced. We do know the floor but not the ceiling. Is it worth the risk? 14 The same exercise can be applied to Proposal 3, but not to Proposal 2, since the ECB refinances all maturing debt. EMEA M ACRO S NAPSHOT 9 Understanding the dynamics of the ECB’s balance sheet On the basis of the Treaty provisions and the ECB Statutes, financial accounts of central banks need to be audited first before considering the distribution of profits to governments, if any. To strengthen the financial soundness of the Eurosystem, two accounting rules are implemented. First, central banks of the Eurosystem (including ECB 15 ) need to make mandatory provisions in their financial accounts, with the possibility to have additional ones when losses are expected to materialize. 16 Second, in the calculation of the profits and losses accounts, the ECB and NCBs have to enter realized profits and losses but also latent losses (and not latent profits). Once each NCB has finalized and audited its accounts, then the various profits and losses enter in the consolidated balance sheet of the ECB. Two remarks are thus worth noting. First, it is very likely that there will be no majority within the ECB Governing Council to allow a unilateral operation for French assets. The main reason is that allowing such operation for France would trigger similar requests from other highly indebted countries. 17 Second, given the accounting rules applied in the Eurosystem, any of the above proposals (constituting potential losses) would stop the distribution of profits to the French state for a considerable period of time. Given these accounting specificities, the latent losses of the above proposal would enforce the Bank of France to stop the transfer of dividends to the French government (which amounts between EUR1.5 billion and EUR 3 billion a year in normal conditions since 2008). In the worst case, the cumulative losses of these proposals could eventually oblige the French government to recapitalize Bank of France over time. 18 It is not worth the trouble The proposals to restructure France’s public debt that arose from the left-side of the political spectrum will be problematic at various levels. Beyond the legal challenges, the potential strong market reaction would be very costly for the French government. Additionally, this will deprive the State of receiving dividends from the central bank, given the accounting rules currently in place within the Eurosystem. There is also the question of the funding of public deficit. In case the restructuring of French public debt would be a one-shot operation, the French government would be obliged to avoid any further public deficit in the future as it is unlikely that market will have sufficient trust to continue to buy newly issued French public bonds without additional risk premium. In case any new public deficit would be perpetually financed by the ECB/Bank of France, which in turn would trigger inflationary pressures. In sum, it is more trouble than it is worth. And nothing would be possible without amending the European Treaty, which is very unlikely. Any attempt of the French government to convince its European partners along these lines would trigger a useless strong volatility of French public bond prices in financial markets since this would certainly create huge tensions with the fiscally disciplined countries. 15 The profits generated by the ECB alone are generally redistributed to its shareholders, namely the national central banks 16 For example, the Dutch central bank (DNB) decided unliterally to stop the distribution of profits to the Dutch government at the time of the financial crisis arguing expected losses from the then Securities Market Portfolio (SMP). 17 In the past, rich NCB like Banca d’Italia has faced several attempts from various governments to get the money from it, which it pushed back strongly (protected by the Treaty provisions). 18 In the early stage of the 2007-2012 financial crisis, the ECB Governing Council approved the rationale that any negative equity of NCBs/ECB would require recapitalization by Member States on the basis of the central bank independence. Note that all decisions by the Governing Council constitute an annex to the European Treaty. EMEA M ACRO S NAPSHOT 10 Head of CIB Research Head of Macro & Financial Institutions Research Jean-François ROBIN Nathalie DEZEURE +33 1 58 55 13 09 +33 1 58 55 99 93 jean-francois.robin@natixis.com nathalie.dezeure@natixis.com Head of Europe Macro research Financial Institutions Alain DURRE, Ph.D. Bouchra RHAJBAL +33 1 58 55 60 49 +33 1 58 55 79 93 alain.durre@natixis.com bouchra.rhajbal@natixis.com France, Belgium, Euro Area Germany, Euro Area Covered Bonds Hadrien CAMATTE Bastien AILLET Jennifer LEVY +33 1 58 55 39 43 +49 699 715 3358 +33 1 58 55 05 81 hadrien.camatte@natixis.com bastien.aillet@natixis.com jennifer.levy@natixis.com Spain, Italy, Greece, Portugal, Euro Area Inflation, Macro modeling, Euro Area Jesus CASTILLO Patricia FLOREZ CABRA +33 1 58 55 99 90 +33 1 58 55 62 71 jesus.castillo@natixis.com patricia.florezcabra@natixis.com CEMEA UK, Nordics, Real Estate Inna MUFTEEVA, CFA Sylwia HUBAR , Ph.D. +33 1 58 55 52 04 +33 1 58 55 35 59 inna.mufteeva@natixis.com sylwia.hubar@natixis.com Assistant Economists Théa BARTOLETTI Rita BEJJANI Leslie HUYNH thea.bartoletti@natixis.com rita.bejjani@natixis.com leslie.huynh@natixis.com Data base Ludovic DUCROCQ Camille CREUZE Eric RABARISON +33 1 58 55 14 76 +33 1 58 55 99 92 +33 1 58 55 12 65 ludovic.ducrocq@natixis.com camille.creuze@natixis.com eric.rabarison@natixis.com Andriat RAKOTOVAO +33 1 58 55 14 92 andriatsaramiafara.rakotovao @natixis.com

Publisher disclaimer

EMEA M ACRO S NAPSHOT research.natixis.com In compliance with Market Abuse Regulation (MAR) that came into force on 3 July 2016, please find relevant information regarding investment recommendations. As a staff member of Natixis, the producer of the document is considered as the author of an investment recommendation as defined by MAR. Policy for managing conflicts of interest: https://natixis.groupebpce.com/wp- content/uploads/2022/11/summary_policy_management_of_conflicts_of_interest s_eng_220826.pdf Information about potential conflicts of interest within Natixis/Groupe BCPE: https://home.cib.natixis.com/regulation This document is a communication for discussion and information purposes only and is exclusively intended for and may only be transmitted to eligible counterparties, professional clients and qualified investors, as such terms (or their equivalents) are understood and applied under all relevant laws and regulations applicable to you and us, for purposes of this communication. This document is not intended for retail client use. It is not for further distribution or distribution to retail clients. It should not be reproduced (in whole or in part), forwarded, transmitted, or summarized to any person other than the original addressee(s) without the prior written consent of Natixis. This communication is highly confidential and is the property of Natixis. If you are not the intended recipient of this document and/or any related attachments, or if you do not agree to or cannot comply fully with the requirements and terms of the disclaimers which follow, please delete it (and/or them) and immediately notify the sender. This document does not constitute a personalized recommendation. It is intended for general information and the products or services described herein do not take into account any specific investment objective, financial situation or particular need of any recipient. Natixis does not provide any advice herein, including in particular in case of investment services. Under no circumstances should this document be considered as an official confirmation of a transaction to any person or entity. The distribution, possession or delivery of this document in, to or from certain jurisdictions may be restricted or prohibited by law. Recipients of this document are therefore required to ensure that they are aware of, and comply with, such restrictions or prohibitions. Neither Natixis, nor any of its affiliates, directors, employees, agents or advisers nor any other person may be deemed liable to anyone in relation to the distribution, possession or delivery of this document in, to or from any jurisdiction. Further, it is important to note that not all of the products, services and information are available in all jurisdictions. The information does not constitute an offer or solicitation to buy or sell any security, currency, derivative, investment fund or other product, service or information to anyone in any jurisdiction in which an offer or solicitation is not authorized or cannot legally be made or to any person to whom it is unlawful to make an offer or solicitation. For information concerning any specific jurisdiction, please contact your local sales representative. In addition, this material is not intended to provide specific financial, investment, tax, legal or accounting advice for you in any jurisdiction, and should not be relied upon in that regard. You should not act or rely on the information without seeking the advice of a professional in the relevant jurisdiction. Securities or financial instruments mentioned herein may not be suitable or appropriate for all investors or in all geographical areas. Every state in the US, and most countries throughout the world, have their own laws regulating the types of securities and other investment products which may be offered to their residents, as well as the process for doing so. As a result, the products and services discussed in this material may not be eligible for sale or otherwise in some jurisdictions. This material is not, and under no circumstances should be construed as, a solicitation to act as securities broker or dealer or otherwise in any jurisdiction by any person or company that is not legally permitted to carry on the business of a securities broker or dealer or otherwise in that jurisdiction. Any guarantee, funding, interest or currency swap, underwriting or more generally any undertaking (if mentioned in this document) should be treated as preliminary only and is subject to a formal approval and written confirmation in accordance with Natixis’ current internal procedures. Natixis has neither verified nor conducted an independent analysis of the information contained in this document. Therefore, Natixis makes no statement or warranty and makes no commitment to the recipients of this document in any way (express or implied) as to its relevance, the accuracy or completeness of the information contained therein or the appropriateness of the assumptions to which it refers. Indeed, the information contained herein does not take into account the specific accounting or tax rules that would apply to Natixis' counterparties, customers or potential customers. Natixis cannot therefore be held liable for any differences in valuation between its own data and that of third parties, these differences being due in particular to considerations on the application of accounting rules, tax or valuation models. The statements, assumptions and opinions contained in this document may be changed or may be withdrawn by Natixis at any time without notice. Natixis shall not be liable for any financial loss, damages, or any decision taken on the basis of the information contained in this document and Natixis does not hold itself out as providing any advice, particularly in relation to investment services. In any event, you should independently retain any internal and/or external advice that you consider necessary or desirable to obtain, including any financial, legal, tax or accounting advice, or any other specialist advice, in order to verify in particular that the investment(s), transaction(s), structure(s) or arrangement(s) described in this document meets your investment or financial objectives and constraints, and to obtain an independent valuation of such investment(s)/transaction(s), its risks factors and rewards. It should not be assumed that the information contained in this document will have been updated subsequent to the date stated on the front page of this document. In addition, the delivery of this document does not imply in any way an obligation on anyone to update the information contained herein at any time. Prices and margins are deemed to be indicative only and are subject to change at any time depending on, inter alia, market conditions. Past performances and simulations of past performances are not a reliable indicator and therefore do not anticipate future results . The information contained in this document may include results of analyses from a quantitative model, which represent potential future events, that may or may not be realized, and is not a complete analysis of every material fact representing any product. Information may be changed or may be withdrawn by Natixis at any time without notice. Natixis makes no representation or warranty, express or implied, as to the accomplishment of or reasonableness of, nor should any reliance be placed on any projections, targets, estimates or forecasts, or on the statements, assumptions and opinions expressed in this document. Nothing in this document should be relied on as a promise or guarantee as to the future. Natixis may have conflicts of interest: Natixis may from time to time, as principal or agent, be involved in a wide range of activities globally, have positions in, or may buy or sell, or make a market in any securities, currencies, financial instruments or other assets underlying the instruments to which the Information relates, including possibly a position that was accumulated on the basis of this analysis material prior to its dissemination. Trading desks may also have or take positions inconsistent with this material. Natixis activities related to those instruments may have an impact on the price of the relevant underlying asset and may give rise to conflicting interests or duties. Natixis may provide services to any member of the same group as the recipient of the information or any other entity or person (a Third Party), engage in any transaction (on its own account or otherwise) with respect to the recipient of the information or a Third Party, or act in relation to any matter for itself or any Third Party, notwithstanding that such services, transactions or actions may be adverse to the recipient of the information or any member of its group, and Natixis may retain for its own benefit any related remuneration or profit. In addition, Natixis may, whether by virtue of the types of relationships described in this paragraph or otherwise, from time to time be in possession of information in relation to a particular instrument that is or may be material in the context of that instrument and that may or may not be publicly available or known to you. Our providing you with an indicative price quotation or other information with respect to any such instrument does not create any obligation on the part of Natixis to disclose to you any such information (whether or not confidential). Natixis reserves the right to record, exchange, analyse and use relevant information about you and your relationships with any affiliates of Natixis (including the nature of your transactions) for combating money laundering and terrorists financing as well as for credit assessment, market research, insurance and administrative purposes including back-office management. This may include information provided by you, or someone acting on your behalf. Relevant information may also be exchanged with members of the Natixis group and others, for audit or compliance purposes and if required by appropriate governmental and non-governmental regulators as well as in accordance with applicable laws and regulations. No part of author compensation was, is or will be, directly or indirectly related to the specific recommendations or views expressed in this report. The personal views of authors may differ from one another. Natixis, its subsidiaries and affiliates may have issued or may issue reports that are inconsistent with, and/or reach different conclusions from, the information presented herein. The stocks/companies mentioned might be subject to specific disclaimers. Please click on the following link to consult them: https://www.research.natixis.com/Site/en/disclaimers/3 . France: Natixis is supervised by the European Central bank (ECB). Natixis is authorized in France by the Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de Régulation (ACPR) as a Bank-Investment Services Provider and subject to its supervision. Natixis is regulated by the Autorité des Marchés Financiers in respect of its investment services activities. This material is not, and is not intended to be, a “research report”, “investment research” or “independent research” as may be defined in applicable laws and regulations worldwide. However, it may constitute “research” as defined in Recital 28 of the Commission Delegated Directive (EU) 2017/593 and in the Financial Conduct Authority’s Handbook. EU : In compliance with Market Abuse Regulation (MAR), please find relevant information regarding investment recommendations. If this material is an investment recommendation as that term is defined in Article 3(1)(35) of the EU and UK MAR, distribution of this material is subject to the relevant provisions of MAR. Policy for managing conflicts of interest: Summary-Policy-management-of- conflicts-of-interests_ENG_20241212.pdf Information about potential conflicts of interest within Natixis/Groupe BCPE: https://home.cib.natixis.com/regulation. USA : Natixis, a foreign bank and broker-dealer, makes this report available solely for distribution in the United States to major U.S. institutional investors as defined in Rule 15a-6 under the U.S. securities Exchange Act of 1934. This document shall not be distributed to any other persons in the United States. All major U.S. institutional investors receiving this document shall not distribute the original nor a copy thereof to any other person in the United States. Natixis is a National Futures Association (NFA) member in the United States and has filed its Swap Dealer registration per the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) regulations, and is registered as a Security-Based Swap Dealer with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Please refer to the Natixis website and applicable final legal documentation relating to the relevant product for additional risk disclosures. Investors are exposed to the default risk of the issuer and/or the guarantor as applicable. For any swap products, please also refer to Dodd-Frank Act - Compliance – Natixis https://www.natixis.com/natixis/en/dodd-frank-act-rpaz5_115246.html. Structured securities, options, futures and other derivatives are complex instruments and may involve a high degree of risk. Before entering into any such transactions, please ensure that you have read and understood the Options Clearing Corporation’s Characteristics and Risks of Standardized Options, also known as the options disclosure document (ODD) available at: http://www.theocc.com/about/publications/character-risks.jsp . THIS COMMUNICATION IS NOT A “RESEARCH REPORT” AS DEFINED IN CFTC REGULATIONS 1.71 and 23.605 AND IS TO BE DISTRIBUTED ONLY TO INSTITUTIONAL CLIENTS. THIS COMMUNICATION HAS BEEN GENERATED BY ONE OR MORE EMPLOYEES OF NATIXIS AND IS BEING CONVEYED TO YOU EITHER (I) COMMENTARY ON ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, OR MARKET CONDITIONS AND STATISTICAL SUMMARIES OF MULTIPLE COMPANIES’ FINANCIAL DATA, WHICH MAY INCLUDE LISTS OF CURRENT RATINGS, AND ON THE BASIS OF WHICH NO INVESTMENT DECISION SHOULD BE MADE AS THIS MATERIAL IS CONDENSED, NOT COMPREHENSIVE, AND DOES NOT INCLUDE ALL RISK FACTORS OR OTHER MATTERS THAT MAY BE MATERIAL, OR (II) A SOLICITATION FOR ENTERING INTO A DERIVATIVES TRANSACTION, BUT IS NOT A BINDING OFFER TO BUY OR SELL ANY FINANCIAL INSTRUMENT. THE VIEWS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE AUTHOR AS OF THE DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION AND ARE NOT TO BE RELIED ON AS AUTHORITATIVE, AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REFLECT THE VIEWS OF NATIXIS OR ANY OF ITS AFFILIATES OR SUBSIDIARIES, OR THEIR RESPECTIVE OFFICERS, DIRECTORS, EMPLOYEES, CONTRACTORS, AGENTS, REPRESENTATIVES, SUCCESSORS AND ASSIGNS. THIS IS NOT A RECOMMENDATION OR INVESTMENT ADVICE. ANY VIEWS EXPRESSED HEREIN MAY NOT BE OBJECTIVE OR INDEPENDENT OF THE AUTHOR OR OTHER NATIXIS (AND ITS AFFILIATES) SALES AND TRADING DESKS, WHO ARE ACTIVE PARTICIPANTS IN THE MARKETS, INVESTMENTS, OR STRATEGIES REFERRED TO IN THIS COMMUNICATION. THEY ARE SUBJECT TO CHANGE WITHOUT NOTICE. THIS COMMUNICATION IS BASED ON PUBLIC INFORMATION AND SHALL NOT BE USED NOR CONSIDERED AS AN UNDERTAKING FROM NATIXIS. NATIXIS TAKES NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANY ERRORS OR OMISSIONS AND DOES NOT GUARANTEE THE ACCURACY OR COMPLETENESS OF THE CONTENTS OF THE COMMUNICATION. NEITHER THE AUTHORS NOR NATIXIS HAVE ANY OBLIGATION TO UPDATE, MODIFY OR OTHERWISE NOTIFY THE RECIPIENT IN THE EVENT ANY INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN, INCLUDING ANY OPINION OR VIEW, CHANGES OR BECOMES INACCURATE. NATIXIS SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FOR ANY FINANCIAL LOSS, DAMAGES, OR ANY DECISION TAKEN ON THE BASIS OF THE INFORMATION DISCLOSED IN THIS COMMUNICATION AND NATIXIS DOES NOT PROVIDE ANY ADVICE, INCLUDING IN CASE OF INVESTMENT SERVICES. THIS COMMUNICATION IS COMMUNICATED TO EACH RECIPIENT FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY. This document does not constitute a financial analysis or research report and has not been developed in accordance with legal requirements designed to promote the independence of investment research. Accordingly, there are no prohibitions on dealing ahead of its dissemination. Opinions expressed may differ from the opinions expressed by other business units of Natixis. Natixis and each of its respective affiliates accepts no liability whatsoever for any direct, indirect or consequential losses (in contract, tort or otherwise) arising from the use of this material or reliance on the information contained herein. However, this shall not restrict, exclude or limit any duty or liability to any person under any applicable laws or regulations of any jurisdiction which may not lawfully be disclaimed. No representation or assurance is provided by Natixis with respect to whether any product or financial instrument referenced in this document meets requirements or criteria established under any regulatory, industry or other rules and standards related to climate, sustainability or environmental matters. Canada : In Canada, this document may only be transmitted to “permitted clients” as defined in National Instrument 31-103. No further distribution is permitted. Distribution to retail investors is prohibited. In Canada, Natixis operates through Natixis Canada Branch, a Foreign Bank Branch (Schedule 3 – Lending only). Natixis Securities Americas LLC is not a registered broker-dealer in any Canadian province but operates under the International Dealer Exemption in each province. Natixis S.A. is not a registered broker-dealer in any Canadian province and operates under the International Dealer Exemption in Quebec and Ontario. Any securities transaction or other offer, sale, or solicitation will be structured to be in compliance with such exemption. Mexico : As per your request, this information is delivered to you, which strictly pertains to activities performed by Natixis, a Foreign Financial Entity in its country of origin, such institution is herein represented by its Representation Office in Mexico. This information is being delivered to you for information purposes only. Please note that the Representation Office in Mexico is prevented from negotiating, executing, or participating in (i) operations related to listed derivatives; and (ii) securing funds from the general public in Mexico. Brazil: This communication and the matters discussed therein have not been and will not be issued, placed, distributed or offered in the Brazilian market. Documents relating to this communication, as well as information contained therein may not be supplied to the public in Brazil nor be used in connection with any offer for subscription or sale of financial products or services to the public in Brazil. This communication will not be offered in Brazil, except in circumstances which do not constitute any breach or noncompliance with the Brazilian applicable legislation. Persons wishing to acquire or invest in any debt or equity interest in Brazil should consult with their own counsel as to the applicability of registration requirements or any exemption therefrom. This material is only intended for persons who are eligible investors residing in Brazil, which are considered to be Professional Investors (Investidores Profissionais), as designated by the applicable regulation, mainly the CVM Resolution No. 30 from the 11th of May 2021. Argentina : Products/services included in the presentation have not been and will not be publicly issued, placed, distributed, offered, or registered in Argentine Securities Commission (Comisión Nacional de Valores (CNV). Neither this nor any other material may be utilized in connection with any general offering to the public within Argentina. Any Argentine resident who acquires any products or services will do so under his/her own responsibility under the terms of a private offering to him/her, from outside of Argentina. Panama : This document and its content are for information purposes and shall not be interpreted as banking or financial intermediation, business solicitation and/or public offering of any kind. Natixis is duly authorized by the relevant authorities to carry out banking activities in the United States. Any and all services provided by Natixis are provided on a cross border basis outside of Panama. Natixis is not authorized by the Superintendence of Banks nor the Superintendence of the Securities Market to carry out any activities in Panama.The information contained herein is not intended to be a source of advice or credit analysis with respect to the material presented, and the information and/or documents contained in this material do not constitute investment advice or an invitation to offer. EMEA M ACRO S NAPSHOT research.natixis.com Peru : The products or information discussed here have not been registered under the Peruvian Securities Market Law (Supreme Decree N° 093-2002-EF) or before the Superintendencia del Mercado de Valores (SMV). There will be no public offering of the shares in Peru. The SMV has not reviewed the information provided to the investor. This material is only for the exclusive use of institutional investors in Peru and is not for public distribution. Colombia : By receiving this document you confirm that you have requested us to provide you this document and information on the matters described in it. You also confirm that your interest in requesting such documents and information arose out of your own private interest and was not the result of any direct or indirect solicitation, promotion or offering of services or products by Natixis or by any of its representatives. Accordingly, the information contained in this document is not intended and should not be construed as constituting onshore promotion, marketing or solicitation of securities-market services or products. The distribution of the information contained in this document is restricted by law and persons who access it are required to comply with all such restrictions. The information is not intended to be published or made available to any person in any jurisdiction where doing so would contravene any applicable laws or regulations. By receiving this document, you confirm that you are aware of the laws in Colombia relating to the promotion and marketing of financial services products and you warrant and represent that you will not pass on or utilise the information contained in this document in a manner that could constitute a breach of such laws by Natixis, its affiliates or any other person. Any securities mentioned in this document have not been and will not be registered with the National Register of Securities ("Registro Nacional de Valores y Emisores") maintained by the Colombian Financial Superintendency ("Superintendencia Financiera de Colombia") and may not be publicly offered or sold in Colombia. This information does not constitute and should not be construed as an offer to enter into any agreement, or to purchase or subscribe any securities. The information on the following pages is provided for information purposes only and does not constitute investment, legal, tax or other advice or any recommendation to buy, sell or otherwise transact in any of the funds or securities mentioned. Prospective investors should take appropriate professional advice before making any investment decision. Bolivia : Natixis is not authorized to conduct in Bolivia activities reserved by law for financial intermediation entities and/or brokerage firms. The products/services offered will be provided from Natixis's offices outside of Bolivia. Chile : This communication and any accompanying information (the "Materials") are intended solely for informational purposes and do not constitute (and should not be interpreted to constitute) the selling, or conducting of business with respect to such products or services in Chile (this "Jurisdiction"), or the conducting of any brokerage, banking or other similarly regulated activities in this Jurisdiction. Natixis ("Bank") is not registered (or intended to be registered) in this Jurisdiction. The Materials are private, confidential and are sent by the Bank only for the exclusive use of the addressee. The Materials must not be publicly distributed and any use of the Materials by anyone other than the addressee is not authorized. The addressee is required to comply with all applicable laws in this Jurisdiction, including, without limitation, tax laws and exchange control regulations, if any. The services do not include the offer or intermediation of any securities. Additionally, the Bank will not be liable for investment decisions made by the client based on the information derived or obtain from the Bank's materials. UK : In the UK, Natixis SA is authorised by L'Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de resolution (ACPR), supervised by the European Central Bank (ECB) and regulated by the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF), Authorised by the Prudential Regulation Authority. Subject to regulation by the Financial Conduct Authority and limited regulation by the Prudential Regulation Authority. Details about the extent of our regulation by the Prudential Regulation Authority are available from us on request. Germany : Natixis Zweigniederlassung Deutschland is subject to a limited form of regulation by the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) with regards to the conduct of its business in Germany under the right of establishment there. The transfer / distribution of this document in Germany is performed by / under the responsibility of Natixis Zweigniederlassung Deutschland. Spain: Natixis is regulated by Bank of Spain and the CNMV (Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores) for the conduct of its business under the right of establishment in Spain. Italy: Natixis is regulated by Bank of Italy and the CONSOB (Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa) for the conduct of its business under the right of establishment in Italy. Japan: Natixis Tokyo Branch is authorized in Japan by the Financial Service Agency as a Bank. Natixis Japan Securities Co., Ltd. (NJS) is a Financial Instruments Business Operator (Director General of Kanto Local Finance Bureau (Kinsho) No. 2527 and a Money Lender (Tokyo Governor (4) No. 31548), supervised by the Financial Services Agency. NJS is a member of the Japan Securities Dealers Association and Type II Financial Instruments Firms Association. This document is intended solely for distribution to Professional Investors as defined in Article 2.31 of the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act. Hong Kong: In Hong Kong, Natixis is regulated by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and registered with the Securities and Futures Commission (the “SFC”) to carry on Type 1 (dealing in securities), Type 2 (dealing in futures contracts), Type 4 (advising on securities), Type 5 (advising on futures contracts) and Type 6 (advising on Corporate Finance) regulated activities under the Securities and Futures Ordinance (Cap. 571 of the Laws of Hong Kong) (“SFO”). This document has not been approved by the SFC nor has a copy of this document been registered by the Registrar of Companies in Hong Kong, unless specified otherwise. The investments contained herein may or may not be authorised by the SFC. You are advised to exercise caution in relation to the investments contained herein. If you are in any doubt about any of the contents of this document, you should obtain independent professional advice. The investments may not be offered or sold in Hong Kong, by means of any document, other than (i) to “professional investors” as defined in the SFO and any rules made under the SFO, or (ii) in other circumstances which do not result in the document being a “prospectus” as defined in the Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (Cap. 32 of the Laws of Hong Kong)(the “C(WUMP)O”) or which do not constitute an offer to the public within the meaning of the C(WUMP)O. No person shall issue or possess for the purposes of issue, whether in Hong Kong or elsewhere, any advertisement, invitation or document relating to the investments, which to his knowledge is or contains an invitation to the public of Hong Kong (except if permitted to do so under the applicable laws and rules of Hong Kong) other than with respect to investments which are or are intended to be disposed of only to persons outside Hong Kong or only to “professional investors” as defined in the SFO and any rules made under the SFO. This document is not and should not be construed as Natixis (or any affiliate or anyone else) offering or holding itself out as being willing or able to provide any service or to carry on any activity which it is not licensed to provide or carry on in Hong Kong. Natixis Asia Limited is registered with the Securities and Futures Commission to carry on Type 1 (dealing in securities), Type 2 (dealing in futures contracts), Type 4 (advising on securities) and Type 5 (advising on futures contracts) regulated activities under the Securities and Futures Ordinance. Singapore: Natixis Singapore branch is regulated by the Monetary Authority of Singapore. If this document is distributed in Singapore, this document is intended solely for distribution to Institutional Investors, Accredited Investors and Expert Investors as defined in Section 4A of the Securities and Futures Act 2001 of Singapore. People’s Republic of China: In Mainland China, Natixis Shanghai branch and Natixis Beijing branch are regulated in the People’s Republic of China (the “PRC”, which, for such purposes, does not include the Hong Kong or Macau Specifical Administrative Regions or Taiwan) by National Financial Regulatory Administration, the People’s Bank of China, and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange for the engagement of banking business. This document is intended solely for distribution to investors of the PRC who are qualified/authorized under the laws of the People’s Republic of China to engage in the purchase of Product of the type being offered or sold. PRC investors are responsible for verifying their eligibility to purchase the Product, obtaining all relevant approvals/licenses, verification and/or registrations themselves from relevant governmental authorities, and complying with all relevant applicable regulatory requirements under the PRC legal regime, including, but not limited to, all relevant foreign exchange regulations and/or outbound investment regulations. Taiwan: In Taiwan, Natixis Taipei Branch is authorized by the Financial Supervisory Commission as a commercial bank and is subject to its supervision. The Product may not be sold or offered to Taiwan resident investors or in Taiwan unless they are made available, (i) outside Taiwan for purchase by such investors outside Taiwan and/or (ii) investors are authorized to engage in the purchase of product in accordance with applicable laws. South Korea: In Korea, Natixis Asia Limited Seoul Branch is registered as a licensed financial investment business entity under the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act (“FSCMA”) and regulated by the Financial Supervisory Services and Financial Services Commission. This document/communication is distributed by Natixis Asia Limited Seoul Branch in the republic of Korea to Professional Investor only and is not intended for investors in Korea who are not Professional Investor within the meaning of the Article 9(5) of the FSCMA and should not be passed on to any such persons. Some products or transactions described in this document/communication may not be authorized in Korea and may not be available to Korean investors. This document/communication is being provided in accordance with procedures required under applicable laws and regulations as well as internal control standards of Natixis Asia Limited, Seoul Branch. India, Indonesia, and Thailand: Natixis has set-up representative offices in India, Indonesia and Thailand. The activities of the representative offices are supervised by the Reserve Bank of India, the Otoritas Jasa Keuangan (Financial Services Authority) and the Bank of Thailand respectively. Australia: Natixis Asia Limited is registered with the Securities and Futures Commission to carry on Type 1 (dealing in securities), Type 2 (dealing in futures contracts), Type 4 (advising on securities) and Type 5 (advising on futures contracts) regulated activities under the SFO. If this document is distributed in Hong Kong, this document is only to Professional Investors as defined in the SFO of Hong Kong and any rules made under the SFO. In Australia, Natixis has a wholly owned subsidiary, Natixis Australia Pty Limited ("NAPL"). NAPL is registered with the Australian Securities and Investments Commission and holds an Australian Financial Services License (No. 317114) which enables NAPL to conduct its financial services business in Australia with "wholesale" clients. Details of the AFSL are available upon request Natixis S.A. is not an Authorised Deposit-Taking Institution under the Australian Banking Act 1959, nor is it regulated by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority. Any references made to banking in the document refer to Natixis activities outside of Australia. United Arab Emirates: Natixis is authorized by the ACPR and regulated by the Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA) for the conduct of its business in and from the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC). The document is being made available to the recipient with the understanding that it meets the DFSA definition of a Market Counterparty or Professional Client; the recipient is otherwise required to inform Natixis if this is not the case and return the document. In accordance with the Decision No (13/R.M) of 2021 on the Financial Activities Rulebook and Mechanisms of Adjustment of the Securities and Commodities Authority (SCA) (the SCA Rulebook), the products to which this document relates may only be promoted in the UAE (excluding the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) and the Abu Dhabi Global Market (ADGM)) as follows: (i) to a person who meets the definition of a “professional investor” under the SCA Rulebook; or (ii) following a ‘reverse’ (i.e., unsolicited) enquiry by an investor. Further, this document does not constitute a public offer of securities in the United Arab Emirates (including the DIFC and the ADGM) and is not intended to be a public offer. The SCA has not verified this document or other documents in connection with the products. Accordingly, the SCA has not approved this document or any other associated documents nor taken any steps to verify the information set out in this document. The SCA may not be held liable for the accuracy or completeness of the information in this document. The products to which this document relates may be illiquid or subject to restrictions on their resale. Prospective investors should conduct their own due diligence on the products. If you do not understand the contents of this document you should consult an authorised financial advisor. The recipient also acknowledges and understands that neither the document nor its contents have been approved, licensed by or registered with any regulatory body or governmental agency in the GCC or Lebanon. Oman: In Oman, Natixis neither has a registered business presence nor a representative office and does not undertake banking business or provide financial services in Oman. Consequently, Natixis is not regulated by either the Central Bank of Oman or Oman’s Financial Services Authority. This document has been prepared by Natixis. The information contained in this document is for discussion purposes only and neither constitutes an offer of securities in Oman as contemplated by the Commercial Companies Law of Oman (Royal Decree 18/2019) or the Securities Law (Royal Decree 46/2022), nor does it constitute an offer to sell, or the solicitation of any offer to buy non-Omani securities in Oman as contemplated by Article 139 of the Executive Regulations to the Capital Market Law (issued vide CMA Decision 1/2009). Additionally, this document is not intended to lead to the conclusion of a contract for the sale or purchase of securities. Natixis does not solicit business in Oman and the only circumstances in which Natixis sends information or material describing financial products or financial services to recipients in Oman, is where such information or material has been requested from Natixis and by receiving this document, the person or entity to whom it has been dispatched by Natixis understands, acknowledges and agrees that this document has not been approved by the CBO, the FSA or any other regulatory body or authority in Oman. Natixis does not market, offer, sell or distribute any financial or investment products or services in Oman and no subscription to any securities, products or financial services may or will be consummated within Oman. This document has not been approved by the FSA or any other regulatory body or authority in Oman, and no authorization, licence or approval has been received by Natixis from the FSA or any other regulatory authority in Oman, to market, offer, sell, or distribute the securities within Oman. Natixis does not advise persons or entities resident or based in Oman as to the appropriateness of investing in or purchasing or selling securities or other financial products. Nothing contained in this document is intended to constitute Omani investment, legal, tax, accounting or other professional advice. The recipient of this communication represents that it is a financial institution and/or is a sophisticated investor (as described in Article 139 of the Executive Regulations of the Capital Market Law) and that its officers/employees have such experience in business and financial matters that they are capable of evaluating the merits and risks of investments. Qatar: The investments described in this document have not been, and will not be, offered, sold or delivered at any time, directly or indirectly, in the State of Qatar in a manner that would constitute a public offering. This document has not been, and will not be, filed with, reviewed by or approved by the Qatar Central Bank, the Qatar Financial Markets Authority or any other relevant Qatari authority. This document is intended for the original recipient only and should not be provided to any other person. It is not for general circulation in the State of Qatar and should not be reproduced or used for any other purpose. Saudi Arabia: Natixis Saudi Arabia Investment Company, licensed and regulated by the Capital Market Authority (Number: 19205-31), located in Alfaisaliah Tower, 16th Floor, King Fahad Road, Riyadh – KSA. Turkey: Natixis is not licensed in Turkey to perform any banking/capital market activity. No information in this document is provided for the purpose of offering, marketing and sale by any means of any capital market instruments in the Republic of Turkey. Therefore, this document may not be considered as an offer made or to be made to residents of the Republic of Turkey. Accordingly, neither this document nor any other material may be utilized in connection with any offering to the public within the Republic of Turkey without the prior approval of the Turkish Capital Markets Board. However, according to Article 15 (d) (ii) of the Decree No. 32 there is no restriction on the purchase or sale of products in this document by residents of the Republic of Turkey, provided that: they purchase or sell such products in the financial markets outside of the Republic of Turkey; and such sale and purchase is made through banks, and/or licensed brokerage firms in the Republic of Turkey. Links from or to web sites outside Natixis sites are meant for convenience only. Natixis does not review, endorse, approve or control, and is not responsible for any sites linked from or to Natixis sites, the content of those sites, the third parties named therein, or their products and services. Linking to any other site is at your sole risk and Natixis will not be responsible or liable for any damages in connection with linking. No endorsement or approval of any third parties or their advice, opinions, information, products or services is expressed or implied by these materials.

Preview PDF

Download institution PDF Download English PDF

AI analysis

AI-generated from the report above · not a translation and not the institution's wording · verify against the official source

Key arguments

All proposals would breach key TFEU provisions (Articles 123, 124, 127, 130), making them illegal without treaty changes.
Market reaction would likely increase the risk premium on French bonds, outweighing any savings.
The cancellation would force the Bank of France to stop profit redistribution, costing the state €1.5-3bn annually.
The proposals would introduce moral hazard and risk undermining euro area stability.

Risks

Legal challenge from euro area partners without treaty change.
Market reaction: higher risk premium on French bonds, increasing costs.
Loss of Bank of France dividend transfers to the French state.
Moral hazard and threat to euro area stability.